The Phenomenology of Time Constitution

and the

Deconstruction of the Self

A Postmodern Heritage of One Hundred Years

A Reading of Edmund Husserl’s Lectures of 1904-5 and Supplements of 1910: On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time

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Forever Dedicated to Edmund Husserl (1859-1939)

And, forever is a very, VERY long time

And, with eternal love for Virginia (1994-2005),

who lived life too fully to get around to finishing her Ph.D.
CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  viii

INTRODUCTION  ix

PREAMBLE TO THE MAIN TEXT — The Continuity of Experience and the
Marking Out of Temporal Difference  1

CHAPTER ONE — Hume, Husserl and the Question of Continuity

The problem of the Cartesian Cogito and the presupposition of the Ego as the starting-point of
philosophy are reviewed through an examination of David Hume’s analysis of the continuity
of experience. The psychological flux – the unresolved issues. The notion of the mind in flux
requires a shift to a pre-egological orientation on the constitution of the temporal
extendedness of consciousness. Husserl’s inspiration in the work of Hume and his resolution
of the outstanding problems are discussed.

1. Looking for the Self — the Ego that cannot find itself  5
2. The Problematization of the Self / Ego as the Starting Point of Philosophy – The Mind
   as Flux  6
3. Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time  7
4. Primary Impression – Fields of Presence and Vanishing Points  12
5. Intentionality – The Play of Unity in Difference and Difference in Unity  15
6. The Living-Through of the Extending / Extendedness of the Present  22
CHAPTER TWO – The Phenomenological Problem of Time

Introduction to Husserl’s lectures *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* (1904-5). This chapter begins the re-reading of Husserl’s lectures: the primary questions and the delineation of the horizon of phenomenological discourse on temporality – the proto-epoché.

7. The Suspension of Objective Time 30
8. The Origin of Time 43
9. Brentano’s Discourse on Temporality and the Roles of Original Association and Phantasy 45
10. Signs of the Times? 56

CHAPTER THREE – Continuous Alteration

The question of Primary Memory / Retention and its relation to Husserl’s critique of Brentano. The intentional forms of the entanglement of alteration and continuity are examined in relation to the possibility of the distinction between phantasy and actuality. This analysis opens up discourse on the differences between retentional memory and its re-productive modifications.

11. The Problem of the Constitution of Duration 59
12. Husserl’s Diagram of Time – *Perception, Primal Impression, and Retention* 64
13. Retentional Continua and the Differences Between Appearances and Appearing 67
14. The Radicalization of the Meaning of Perception 70

CHAPTER FOUR – The Constitution of the Three Horizons of Temporality

Reproduction, Primal Impression, and Protention. The phenomenon of the Living Present (*lebendige Gegenwart*) expresses a tri-horizontal matrix of temporal indices – primal impression, retention, and protention – at the heart of lived experience. Husserl turns toward the genesis and structuralization of the intentional web of time-consciousness and its various forms of intentional *intra-play*. 
CHAPTER FIVE – The Unity of a Life

The Constitution of the Unity of Experience. What are the conditions of possibility of consciousness as an abiding continuity of different streams of consciousness? How is it that each and every moment of consciousness refers to a single life as-a-whole? The deepening of the theme of intentionality at this point in Husserl’s lectures concerns problems of continuity and connectedness and requires a twofold analysis of the vertical and horizontal dimensions of time-consciousness.

CHAPTER SIX – Primordial Flow / Flux – The Constituted and the Constituting

Husserl’s discourse on time-consciousness arrives at a phenomenological Absolute. He describes it as Primordial Flux; an originary horizon that names a region for which ‘names’ are lacking. The difficulties in disentangling the intertwined pairs: passivity and activity, presentation and re-presentation, genesis and structure (in the description of the constitution of experience) are brought into the foreground. The consciousness of temporalization is the temporalization of consciousness.

End of First Half...
CHAPTER SEVEN – Absolute Time Constituting Consciousness

The final part of the lectures on immanent time consciousness re-examines the phenomenological question of the meaning of immanence and leads to a focused study on the intertwining of continuous-alteration in the constitution of temporal awareness (the second set of time-diagrams). Husserl returns to the issue of the perception of interiority and that of exteriority and analyzes the differences between primal apprehensions and constituted apprehensions. The lectures close with the question of the constitution of non-temporal transcendencies.

1. Immanence and Continuous-Alteration
2. Impression and Reproduction – Primal Apprehensions and Constituted Apprehensions
3. Interiority / Exteriority and the Constitution of Non-Temporal Transcendencies

CHAPTER EIGHT – The Appendices of 1910

The readings conclude with an examination of the appendices to the 1928 publication of the *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* and the ways in which in they deepen or modify the original lecture course of 1904-5.

CHAPTER NINE – The Temporal Horizons of Being

Summary and introduction to later phenomenological and existential thought on temporality. Reading: Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, Sartre’s *Being and Nothingness*, and Merleau-Ponty’s *Phenomenology of Perception*.

CHAPTER TEN – “Is there anybody in there? Is there anyone at home?”

Sartre’s existential discourse on the Self / Ego and its relation to that which is disclosed by Husserl’s phenomenology and the theme of intentionality – the apparent antagonism. The problems of Egology and the issue of the unconscious (as distinguished from Sartre’s interpretation of the meaning of intentionality and the notion of Bad Faith) are discussed in relation to Husserl’s later writings.
CHAPTER ELEVEN – Inter- and Intra-Subectivity

The transcendental-phenomenological analysis of the Self as a unity of a life-history is nothing other than the deconstruction (Abbau) of layers or sediments of retained intentional threads that regulate experience at a passive level (e.g., the ego as substrate of habitualities). Here, we speak of performances that do not have an original performer, but actually constitute the performer as an abiding style / habituation. Husserl’s discourse on the Self discloses that it is somewhat like a community that is stretched out through time. There is no singular or monolithic core. The structure of intra-subjectivity mirrors that of inter-subjectivity.

CHAPTER TWELVE – Writing on Time as Writing

The deconstruction of Western discourse on time and self-presence: non-linear forms of temporality (Derrida). Reading: “Différance,” Derrida’s Introduction to Husserl’s “Origin of Geometry,” and Speech and Phenomena. The Husserlian legacy in relation to contemporary philosophical discourse on time is discussed within a postmodern frame, giving emphasis to the deconstructive strategies that he employed in his writing – where the reader is invited to go with Husserl beyond Husserl…

AFTERWORD AND CODA

BIBLIOGRAPHY
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I would like to express my thanks to the researchers and staff at the Husserl Archives in Louvain, Belgium for extending a warm welcome to me when I made my pilgrimage there in the summer of 2005.

I would like to give special thanks with love to my family, particularly my dear mother Lily and my sister Linda and say “Cheers” to my best friend Virginia – in loving memory of all the adventures (good and bad) that we shared.

I extend my gratitude to the few special people (including my mentors) who have shown me the meaning of true friendship; those who have inspired and those who have been inspired (regardless of whether we have ever met).

And, for a lifetime of friendship, understanding, and encouragement I extend my deepest respect to Dr. Geof. N. Hanks, my greatest friend.
Introduction

The title of this text, *The Phenomenology of Time Constitution and the Deconstruction of the Self – a Postmodern Heritage of One Hundred Years* and the subtitle, “A Reading of Edmund Husserl’s Lectures of 1904-5 and Supplements of 1910: On The Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time” commemorate the centennial of what is the most seminal and, surely, the most significant phase in the work of Edmund Husserl, the father of phenomenology. For one occasion only (as far as it’s known), in the winter semester of 1904-5, Husserl presented a lecture course at Göttingen University on the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal / immanent time.\(^1\) After extensive editing, by Husserl’s colleague, Edith Stein, the lectures were eventually published in 1928 as (*Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*) the *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness.*\(^2\) It included

\(^1\) When Husserl employs the word ‘internal’ (*inneren*), it does not imply an ontological divide between inside and outside, as is the case with the classic Cartesian dyad. It is really a question of *lived-experience*. I shall usually employ the expression immanent (*immanent, Immanenz*) rather than internal when referring to the phenomenology of temporal awareness. It is in *Ideen 1* (1913) that Husserl breaks with the internal / external parallelism, preferring the contrast between immanence and transcendence – see *Ideen / Ideas 1*. Sec.38. But, despite the title of *The Phenomenology of ‘Internal’ Time Consciousness*, this text can be seen as the first to suggest the categorial alteration. Although the latest of the material of the lectures on time-consciousness pre-dates *Ideas 1* by at least three years, the book was not actually published until 1928 after extensive revision. The extremity of this contrast between the time of conception and that of the publication of Husserl’s writing is even more marked in the case of his lecture course of 1907, which was not actually published until 1950. The text, entitled *The Idea of Phenomenology* (given just after the period in which he produced the lectures on time consciousness), is the transcript of a course that was designed to thematize the new orientation by introducing the concept of the phenomenological reduction in an analysis of the meaning of transcendence as it makes itself felt immanently. This extremely fertile phase in Husserl’s thought provided the seminal basis for the radical direction of research that is peculiar to his three-volume work, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy.*”

appendices from 1910 and a foreword by Heidegger, whose attitude to the text Husserl always felt to be unsatisfactory (the reasons were personal as well as academic).³

My text is primarily meant as a guide to reading Edmund Husserl’s lectures on immanent time consciousness. It is a kind of primer for what is otherwise an almost impenetrable phase in Husserlian phenomenology. For the English reader, the abstractness, super-complexity, and sophistication of its language and orientation, have less to do with the continental tradition in which Husserl (a German speaker) was writing, since he was also particularly influenced by the British empiricist movement, e.g., Locke, Berkeley and Hume and the work of the American pragmatist William James but, rather, that he developed a unique language and multi-perspectival philosophical orientation of his own according to the rigorous demands of the subject matters themselves. Husserl is what one might call a philosopher’s philosopher. The lexical bible for reading his work in German is Dorion Cairns’ *Guide to Translating Husserl.*⁴ Without Cairns’s invaluable contribution to our understanding of Husserl’s vocabulary of phenomenology, his writing would be just as impenetrable to a natural reader and speaker of German.⁵ Husserl was an extraordinarily prolific writer, utilizing an extremely condensed form of shorthand (an additional problem in translation), and up until quite recently, only a fraction of his life’s work was available in published form (even in German).⁶

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³ Heidegger’s own temporal investigations are clearly inspired by Husserl’s early lecture course on temporality. See Heidegger’s endnotes in *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit*, 1927), where he acknowledges his indebtedness to Husserl for allowing him access to unpublished manuscripts. There is something almost perfunctory about his conspicuously short foreword to the ‘belated’ publication of Husserl’s text in 1928 (one year after *Being and Time*, but based on material that Husserl first presented twenty two years prior to Heidegger). It should be noted in particular that Husserl was dissatisfied with Heidegger’s suggestion that the title should read simply as “The Phenomenology of Time Consciousness.” He felt that it was important to include ‘internal’ or ‘immanent’ as a way of distinguishing his sphere of orientation from that of the ‘objective’ time of the natural sciences. I shall occasionally use the hyphenated expression ‘time-consciousness’ when the brevity does not interfere with the meaning.


⁵ Dorion Cairns also translated Husserl’s *Cartesian Meditations* and *Formal and Transcendental Logic.*

⁶ See bibliography for details regarding the *Husserliana* series.
Rudolph Boehm compiled a new edition of Husserl’s lectures on the consciousness of temporality, including material from 1893 to 1917, which was published as part of the *Husserliana* (Hua) series in 1966: *Hua X: Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeittbewusstseins.* This extended collection was later translated into English by John Barnett Brough and published in 1991 under the title, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time.* Alongside the extra papers that had been collected by Boehm, Brough made the wise decision to present the 1928 published version of the lectures of 1904-5 and the appendices of 1910 in their original order. His translation of Husserl’s discourse on temporality demonstrates the same degree of excellence and devotion to detail as the earlier (and shorter) version translated by J. S. Churchill. In particular, Brough’s Translator’s Introduction is scholarly and philosophically informative and it inspires further research in the field of the phenomenology of temporality, not only with respect to the continuing examination of Husserl’s own aims (which he returned to question repeatedly) but also in terms of the ways in which developments in his temporal analyses have insinuated themselves in postmodern thought.

Despite the importance of the lecture course of 1904-5 – which radicalized Western philosophical discourse on time as much as Einstein’s theory of relativity (spacetime) revolutionized the way in which objective time came to be thematized in the physical sciences – the text is not well known, especially in the English-speaking world. During the period of my postgraduate study at Warwick University (U.K.) under the supervision of Professor

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9 Though Brough makes some extremely illuminating remarks regarding the questionable chronological order of the lecture notes as published in 1928 in his Translator’s Introduction to *PCIT*, I have chosen to go with the order as edited by Edith Stein since Husserl himself endorsed its publication in that form. However, I have added some marginal comments on this matter at certain points in my reading. It is most likely that Edith Stein’s order was determined in part by the later development of the *epoché* so as to bring the early temporal lectures (1904-5) into line with the more mature Husserlian methodology of *Ideen* – 1913 and after.
David Wood\textsuperscript{10} (beginning in 1988), I was amazed to find that the Churchill translation of the *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* was actually out of print – a scandal as far as contemporary scholarship on all things related to time was concerned (so I had to commission a printer in the U.S.A. to make one for me). Husserl’s phenomenological meditations on temporality are elegantly complementary to those of Einstein and certainly just as significant philosophically, scientifically, and above all historically. Einstein’s papers of 1905 that introduced the Principle of Relativity (or Special [Specific] Theory of Relativity), which first thematized the exotic forms of temporal warpage that occur at velocities close to that of light – thus refuting the classical concept of Absolute time – were published in the same year that Husserl presented his lecture course on the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time. When taken together, their different orientations – Husserl’s ‘subjective’ discourse and Einstein’s ‘objective’ account – fulfil one another in exquisite harmony.\textsuperscript{11}

The text that is presented here is derived from a twelve-week lecture course, entitled: “Time and the Constitution of the Self,” which was designed primarily for postgraduates in philosophy whose research tended toward postmodern discourse on time, subjectivity, intersubjectivity and politics (the Other). I use the expression ‘designed’ loosely since the lectures and seminars evolved over time. The project was initially inspired by a question that weaves its way through three seminal research papers that I wrote, respectively, in 1989, “Recuperation in Transgression”; 1992, “Heidegger and the Concept of Time – the Turn[s] of a radical Epoché”\textsuperscript{12}; and 1995, “The End of Time and the beginning of Writing (including Ph.D. research that evolved into essays, entitled: “Hume and Husserl – the Problem of the

\textsuperscript{10} See Wood’s excellent examination of the relations between phenomenology and deconstruction regarding the theme of time in his monograph, *The Deconstruction of Time*. Humanities Press. 1989.

\textsuperscript{11} Einstein’s papers on the Special theory of relativity (1905) demonstrate that it is no longer possible to speak of an Absolute time irrespective of an observer while Husserl’s phenomenological investigations of temporal awareness demonstrate the Absolute intentional / temporal conditions of possibility by which there can be such a thing as an observer.

Continuity or Temporalization of Consciousness,

The question dominating my thought was: How to uncover a common frame of reference that makes it possible to establish a balanced dialogue between radically different proponents of phenomenology, existentialism, and deconstruction?

These papers – and others – retroactively determined how their different contexts should be allowed to unfold through their common ties in phenomenological discourse on temporality according to the language of intentionality. Pedagogically, this meant returning to Husserl’s lectures on immanent / internal time consciousness. However, the question of the appropriate narrative form of my lectures, which were actually written week-by-week as the needs of the students became clearer during the progression of the course, remained a mystery to me. Never really quite knowing where I was going, such ‘foundering,’ in my adherence to both chance and necessity, allowed an opening for a collective meditation to occur regarding – and according to – the Spirit of phenomenological praxis itself.

Despite the twists and turns of the lectures and seminars, the aim was to provide a thorough introduction to the central phenomenological issues regarding the problem of the analysis of the meaning of the Self by working through the more fundamental issue of its temporal constitution. The working-through of the method of this transcendental-genetic approach to the temporalization of consciousness concerned Husserl throughout his career.

13 The essay “Hume and Husserl – The Problem of the Continuity or Temporalization of Consciousness” evolved into chapter one of the present book and is also due to be published as an independent article in the International Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 46, No. 1, Issue 181 (March Edition).

14 Me-ontic foundering – as employed by Eugen Fink (one of Husserl’s most significant colleagues in later life) in his description of what are ostensibly the deconstructive elements (sous rature / writing under erasure) in phenomenological methodological comportment concerning questions of constitution. In this regard, see Ronald Bruzina’s illuminating essay “The Transcendental Theory of Method in Phenomenology; the Meontic and Deconstruction.” Published in Husserl Studies 14: 75–94, 1997. © 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

15 This method of genetic phenomenology has the remarkable power to adumbrate the principal conditions of the possibility of the constitution of Selfhood through the manifold forms of ego-functioning that develop over time. Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations is arguably the best text on this sphere of phenomenological interrogation.
right up to the end of his life. What began as a kind of descriptive psychology of temporal awareness in 1904-5 deepened into a constitutional phenomenology of temporality through the various developments of the phenomenological reduction (epoché) – which are only hinted at in the early lectures. The rigour and sophistication of phenomenological methodology with respect to the treatment of temporal awareness has had important consequences on the development of discourse on time and the relation of philosophy to itself as a historical praxis. These issues were brought into the foreground of my own lectures on Husserl’s lectures in order to prepare the way for a further course discussing the legacy that remains today, at the beginning of the 21st Century. The second course – part of which is presented in the second half of this book – went on to examine some of the exciting insights on time that have emerged in the wake of writers such as Heidegger, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, Freud, Sartre, Ricoeur, Deleuze, Lyotard, and Derrida – who were deeply inspired by the phenomenological theme of intentionality, as re-introduced by Franz Brentano and further developed in Husserl’s phenomenology, and yet were so distinctively different in their respective manners of appropriation.

Ultimately, the overall form of the course[s] – and the book – that emerged was the result of an ongoing dialogue with my group of students, without which this particular book would not have been written (it probably would have been an entirely different text). The lively interactive chemistry of the meetings is inscribed within the structure of the form and content of the writing. Pedagogically and stylistically, it became increasingly apparent to me

16 For detailed inside information about Husserl’s mature views, see Dorion Cairns’ Conversations with Husserl and Fink (1931-32). Edited by the Husserl Archives in Louvain, with a Foreword by Richard M. Zaner. Martinus Nijhoff / The Hague / 1976.
17 Epoché = to cut, break or suspend. In the early days of the development of the methodological epoché, Husserl also employed the expression ‘bracketing.’ The motivation and implementation of the epoché are distinguished from that of Cartesian methodological doubt in that it articulates a moment of suspense [Aufhebung] that is irreducible to the bi-logic of contradiction. The Cartesian adopts a diametrical opposition, whereas the phenomenologist aims toward the suspense of any position-taking whatsoever. However, it must also be understood that this is the ‘ideal’ goal or regulative principle of methodological comportment, no matter how asymptotic it may be with respect to its realization in actuality.
as the classes unfolded that this ‘live’ format was an extremely effective way of re-introducing the transcripts of Husserl’s live lectures on immanent time consciousness to a contemporary readership. Originally, the idea of presenting it on the internet as an interactive (non-linear) e-text with hyperlinks to and from Husserl’s original text and my own fired my imagination, but copyright issues and a host of other considerations that were pointed out to me by colleagues with more familiarity with the field of academic publishing changed my mind. However, given the lightning speed with which the world-wide-web is infiltrating all aspects of the cyber-spatial media of knowledge dissemination, I hope to reconsider this possibility in addition to the printed text with my publisher in the not-too-distant future.

The years between the publication of the Logical Investigations (1901) and the first volume of Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and a Phenomenological Philosophy (1913) were incredibly fertile for Husserl. They represent one of the most radical periods in his thought regarding the problems of constitution and the method of phenomenology: the epoché. The extraordinary impact that this phase had on 20th Century philosophical discourse on temporality produced reverberations that are being felt even more strongly at the beginning of the 21st. It was during this period of radicalization in Husserl’s research that his phenomenology began to extend beyond a purely descriptive psychology by developing a transcendental-genetic orientation – the working-through of the idea of the phenomenological reduction / epoché, which included the practice of eidetic reduction. As already indicated, the issues that emerged during this period continued to concern Husserl for the rest of his life and, in this regard, the lectures of 1904-5 represent the very pivot of his life’s work.

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18 It was also a period of change that eventually divided many phenomenologists into different camps.
19 Eidos = essence, shape, form. The eidetic reduction involves a shift in orientation from facts to essences (note, not to be confused with Platonism). The method is inaugurated by varying an object in imagination to the point at which it would otherwise lose its integrity, thereby disclosing that which is essential to it. Interestingly, Husserl also referred to this process of imaginary variation as ‘fictionalizing.’
Despite the importance of these lectures, there is not, in the strictest sense, an adequate introduction available for anyone unfamiliar with Husserl’s discourse on immanent time consciousness and its tremendous influence on the development of phenomenology as a transcendental method of interrogation by way of the epoché. The present book aims to contribute to the task of fleshing out this history and to provide a contemporary re-valuation of the significance of Husserl’s lifelong project of phenomenology as a multi-directional and pluri-dimensional movement that exemplifies how a truly rigorous philosophy must constitute itself – its Self. The phenomenological investigations of logic (both formal and transcendental), the egological route of inquiry, and the analyses of the Lifeworld (Lebenswelt) – which are genetic in orientation – are forms of interrogation whose seeds germinated in the interplay of the themes of time-consciousness and the multiple forms of epoché that ultimately define the scope of phenomenological practice – as pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy.

Other than a few published texts by such specialists as John Brough, Rudolph Bernet, Claude Evans, David Wood, Leonard Lawlor, and (somewhat notoriously) Jacques Derrida [see bibliography] there are not any reasonably accessible contemporary texts that work through this pivotal phase in Husserlian thought.20 However, there are a great many classic texts that misrepresent it, including, most significantly, works by Heidegger, Sartre, and Derrida. To my knowledge, this is the only specialized introductory course on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time that has been prepared for 21st century English-speaking academia, despite the fact that Husserl’s temporal investigations have significant implications in the new millennium for a number of different fields, e.g., philosophy (Occidental and oriental), research on space and time (scientific as well as

20 Though the interested reader should take a step back in time and look at the invaluable contributions of such scholars as Dorion Cairns, Eugen Fink, Aaron Gurwitsch, Joseph Kockelmans, Ludwig Landgrebe, Paul Ricoeur, Alfred Schutz, Robert Sokolowski, Herbert Spiegelberg, and Donn Welton.
philosophical), consciousness studies, literature, musicology, psychology and, perhaps most significantly (given the startling evolutionary speed of computer technology) artificial intelligence [A.I.].

Unfortunately, though understandably, there is a certain German-speaking philological clubbishness about the contemporary dissemination of Husserl’s phenomenology, which makes it difficult for the uninitiated English-speaker to gain an adequate introduction to the field let alone touch upon the more profound elements in his thought and method. An introductory text to Husserl’s lectures on time-consciousness, which situates them within the proper context of his life’s work, particularly taking into account his inspiration in the work of David Hume, should certainly be made available to an English-speaking readership which, inevitably, has its own potential contribution to make to the further development of phenomenology – as a radical philosophical methodology involving a perpetual return to beginnings that points or extends beyond the limits of its regional linguistic origins.21

My approach to presenting Husserl’s lectures on immanent time consciousness has a two-fold aim: Firstly, to awaken in the reader the sense of urgency concerning the central place of philosophical discourse on time for any account of experience and what is classically referred to as the Self. Husserl’s temporal analyses are re-evaluated in the light of contemporary insights on Being, consciousness, narrative structure, deconstructive re-reading, spatiality, and linear and non-linear temporalities by demonstrating their relevance for our cyber-spatial, postmodern age. Secondly, to explicate the specific issues in phenomenology that consumed Husserl throughout his career (e.g., phenomenological methodology,

21 The possible scope of phenomenology is irreducible to the study of the phenomenon of regional languages or regional ontologies. Phenomenology, as the science of letting that which shows itself from itself precisely as it articulates itself – i.e., phenomenon + logos, has a much broader horizon since it is concerned rather with the structurality of showing that first permits any particular language to function at all. It is really a question of the phenomenality of language – i.e., its temporalization, repeatability, iterability. A philology does not make a phenomenology. Husserl would be first to argue that the latter is irreducible to the former (which particularly distinguishes his philosophy of language from that of the later Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations – post Tractatus).
temporality and intentionality) by situating them in the proper context [self-understanding] of his life’s work. This is achieved by examining their many different threads as they weave their way through his later writings, e.g., *Ideas, Experience and Judgement, Cartesian Meditations, Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, etc., by demonstrating how they already resonate in the early lectures on immanent time consciousness. These lectures are notoriously difficult to grasp, therefore such contextualization is necessary for the uninitiated (and some of the initiated, not mentioning any names).

My text reproduces a large portion of the original lectures of 1904-5 (as edited by Edith Stein [the publication of 1928 with the foreword by Martin Heidegger]) along with some of the appendices of 1910. The format is something like a “Husserl Reader / Primer” except that my own text is integrated into the main body of the work rather than serving in a marginal capacity. Husserl’s style of presenting his observations in relatively short sections lends itself most readily to this form of approach. As I have indicated, my classes were quite lively in spirit and the manner in which the course developed had much to do with weekly feedback from students. I have attempted to craft the text as a whole in such a way as to retain the character and spirit of the live sessions of my course with respect to the lively feel that resonates throughout Husserl’s own lecture course of 1904-5. It is my hope that this textual celebration of the centennial (1905-2005) of Husserl’s lectures on the temporality of consciousness will serve to convey something of the freshness of the spirit of his phenomenology, which, in many respects, is still ahead of its time.

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Preamble to the main text – The Continuity of Experience and the Marking Out of Temporal Difference

To paraphrase St. Augustine, we all know what time is until we begin to talk about it.\textsuperscript{22} The most significant Thinkers of the Occident have flexed their philosophical muscles over the problem of time and its articulation.

Similarly, we all know what we mean when we make reference to the Self – or do we? The traditional (Cartesian) conception of the ‘essential’ existence of a monolithic “I” that is presupposed by any act of consciousness fails to take into account the temporality of its constitution. The contemporary shift from the essential viewpoint to that of a genetic account of the structuration of the Self through time focuses on the pre-conditions of its possibility. This presents us with the thought of the Self as a function of a unity of a life history / memory – a style of Being-in-the-world – where the temporalization of consciousness at a pre-egological level is that which always already precedes the Self as the primordial condition of its possibility.

The notion of the Self as a selfsame, monolithic entity, being presupposed by any act of consciousness (according to the logic of attributes), has found itself to be shaken to the very core. The tradition that put the Self or Ego at the center of all discourse on consciousness actually put the cart before the horse. In the wake of phenomenology, existentialism, and deconstruction rather than presupposing the pre-existence of the Self as an

essential substrate of consciousness, the question has become: how is the Self constituted through the temporalization of consciousness?

The two themes of time-constitution and the deconstruction of the Self are really two facets of the same issue. It is through peeling away (deconstructing) the layers of the Ego that one lays open the question of the constitution of continuity on which it depends. It leads to a dimension where the consciousness of temporality is its own temporalization.

We take the continuity of experience and the arrow of time for granted. That which is now, slips into the past, while the future becomes actualized in the present vacuum that is left behind. Time flows. The linearity of temporality, its uni-directional order of successivity, is the condition of the possibility of any intelligible form of experience. But, how is the linearity of time itself constituted?

The phenomenological interrogation of temporality does not concern itself with the objective time of the sciences as such (e.g., according to the second law of thermodynamics – though this is far from implying that phenomenology is at odds with it since the uni-directionality of temporal experience is a rich field of phenomenological study in its own right), it rather seeks to describe the temporalizing structures of consciousness and the ways in which Objectivity is constituted in and by experience. However, this requires a turn toward subjectivity that cannot reduce it to an object, an objective state of affairs, or an empirical process of successive facts / objectivities. Despite the constitutional interpenetration of subjectivity and objectivity, the field of inquiry concerns the articulation of time – not as an entity in an objective sense, but as the timeliness of Objectivity as it unfolds subjectively. The principal question becomes: How is it that consciousness is a continuum?23

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23 Edmund Husserl’s investigations on the awareness of duration (time-consciousness) are turned toward the heart of phenomenology as the adumbration of the manifold intentionalities (not ‘intentions’) that are essentially in play in the constitution of the ‘continuum’ through which consciousness is retentionally and protentionally stretching out in time. Despite the back and forth play in this continuum there is a procedural tendency toward an overall uni-linear structure that fixes the relative moments of the flow according to an irreversible sequence of successions in the life-flux as a whole. Every moment has a before and after because consciousness is
As well as discussing the necessary conditions of the possibility of the constitution of linear time – which must always be presupposed by any discourse on the Self ‘as that which abides through time’ – the aim of the following study is to facilitate awareness of the pluri-dimensional and non-linear temporalities that are also in operation. The unity of the Self is constituted by vertical and horizontal relations (which participate in linearity and non-linearity) by which the “I” relates to itself through time as the same but non-identical – since the continuity of the Self is also structured through the tracing out of radical discontinuities. Such a form of unity actually bears more resemblance to a community rather than to the trace of a monolithic entity.\textsuperscript{24} It is along these lines that existentialism and deconstruction have made significant contributions to contemporary philosophical discourse on Time and the Self in terms of the alterity that always already inhabits oneself. In this regard, the work of Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jacques Derrida stand out in particular.

With such an immense history lying before us, we shall begin with an arbitrary point of insertion into the field by examining David Hume’s challenge to the Cartesian postulation of the self-certainty of the Ego as the first real starting point of modern philosophical – proto-phenomenological – interrogation. Hume’s introspective meditations, which turn this classical assumption inside out, were factored into Edmund Husserl’s groundbreaking writing on fundamentally transitive and futural; only ever catching itself in its effect; from anticipation to fulfilment from desire to gratification and from living towards death. The philosophical (and not just scientific) importance of the uni-directional element of temporal duration is brought out with particular force by John Ellis McTaggart’s discourse on the A, B and C series of time constitution in his 1908 essay, provocatively titled, “The Unreality of Time.” This short and brilliantly argued article makes an enormous contribution to the study of the uni-directional temporal flow of time as announced in the B-series of ‘before and after.’ His approach to the issue is elegant and most complementary to the goals of the physical sciences with respect to entropy and the arrow of time, despite his idealist intentions. It is interesting to note that one of McTaggart’s principal sources of inspiration is in the work of Hegel when he introduces the C-series of ordered fixity as a dialectical third after showing that the A-series of past, present and future and the B-series of before and after as a uni-linear direction of change cannot be sufficiently explained in themselves or out of each other. I like to see McTaggart’s essay as a challenge to early 20\textsuperscript{th} Century philosophical discourse on time to catch up, at the very least, to the level of 19\textsuperscript{th} Century classical science and the discovery of the second law of thermodynamics. Arguably, it is in the variegated folds of the phenomenology of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century that this challenge was most seriously taken to heart. \textsuperscript{24} This theme is brought out with wonderful clarity in Husserl’s final, unfinished manuscript, \textit{Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology} (\textit{Crisis}).
temporal consciousness. His meticulous series of investigations (1904-5) demonstrates the
pre-egological structural dynamics that are necessarily in play in the constitution of the
linearity and continuity of experience. Although Husserl begins by examining the issue of
how linear temporality is constituted – as the principle condition of the possibility of a
continuous identity / Self – his analyses ultimately raise awareness of the non-linear temporal
forms that are also in play throughout this constitution. Such discourse on pluri-dimensional
temporalities has now become an almost commonplace theme along with the evolution of
computer information dissemination technology (cyberspace). And so, with respect to the
philosophical issue of time’s articulation and in keeping with the primary movement of
phenomenology – as a perpetual return to beginnings, in which the return is deconstructive
and transvaluative – it is time, once again, to return to a beginning…
Chapter One – Hume, Husserl and the Question of Continuity

1. Looking for the Self – the Ego that cannot find itself

Whenever I return to David Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* (a child stillborn from the Press)\(^25\) my admiration for the conscientiousness, rigor, courage, and radicality of his investigations increases exponentially. The essay "Of Personal Identity" shakes the whole foundation of everything that precedes and works up to it (particularly his own discourse on association). Hume’s Appendix to the *Treatise* gives us an honest declaration concerning the limits of his investigations. His problem was twofold in that he considered...

...that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou’d be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a skeptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflection, may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile those contradictions.\(^26\)

Thus, Hume claims the 'privilege' of a sceptic" without committing himself to full-blown scepticism. His philosophical writing embodies an extremely rare combination of startling intellectual brilliance, methodological rigor (without doing away with risk), and genuine humility. He skilfully employs the full armoury of the techniques of empiricism and makes it dance at the very limits of exhaustion. Although Hume is an empiricist from a methodological point of view, his investigations are not in the service of an empiricism.


Thus, he is able to show that empiricism itself always rests on certain metaphysical presuppositions.

But, what legacy remains regarding the issue of the Self? Hume’s introspective analyses, which upset the basis of Cartesian certainty and the primacy of the Ego, have not done away with the Self. Rather, his rigorous investigations have re-situated it within a horizon in which it is no longer the master.

2. The Problematization of the Self / Ego as the Starting Point of Philosophy: The Mind as Flux

What ‘constitutes’ the Self, if it is no longer to be considered as that which always already lies behind each act of consciousness as its primordial and monolithic core (the res of the cogitans)? Does this suggest a dimension of inquiry that is actually inaccessible to thought? How can we speak of continuity, motivation, memory, association, judgment, etc., without having recourse to a continuous and monolithic ‘I’ – the ‘I’ that motivates, the ‘I’ that remembers, the ‘I’ that associates, or the ‘I’ that judges?

Of course, the anxiety stems from the concern to grasp one’s own ‘I,’ ‘Self,’ or ‘Ego’ – the particularity of that which is one’s own in each instance. This is a legitimate concern, but it does not begin with the beginning. To turn to the issue of the constitution of the Self, which is at once both transcendental and genetic, is not to plunge into the issue of the constitution of what is peculiarly my own – my personality. It is to gesture toward the

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conditions of possibility of any Ego per se: the structuralization that is universal to any possible Ego.

This is one of the primary methodological motifs in play in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology in its ‘eidetic’ mode. The constellation of issues raised by his lectures on internal time-consciousness is borne out of an effective response to the set of problems handed down from Hume.

3. Edmund Husserl’s *Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*

Hume’s 'introspective' inquiry into that which we call the Self (in the study, "Of Personal Identity" – *A Treatise of Human Nature [Treatise]*) leads to the claim that there is no impression of the Self that is "constant and invariable."\(^{27}\) He maintains that the mind is "...nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement."\(^{28}\) At no time, however, does he ask about how there is *consciousness of* such movement, change, succession, etc. In other words, he does not inquire into the possibility of 'introspection' itself as an 'extended' consciousness or project that is somehow coextensive with itself. Hume’s investigations start out as a quest for the legendary Self and it is a limitation that blinds him to a deeper dimension. He does have the key, but the original question obscures the door that is to be unlocked.

\(^{27}\) Hume, *Treatise*, p.251.
\(^{28}\) Ibid, p.252.
Husserl, in his preface to Boyce-Gibson’s English translation of *Ideen 1*, suggests that Hume’s *Treatise of Human Nature* "...gives the first systematic sketch of a pure phenomenology." 29 This is clearly true, but when Hume maintains that "...all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences," 30 it can also be argued that his analyses get stuck in the sphere of empirical phenomenalism. The principally psychologistic orientation of his studies only gestures toward a more profound phenomenological field, which his language and orientation cannot actually penetrate. Hume is unable to explain continuity or consciousness of change within what is fundamentally a 'diachronic' flux of discrete existences. It is significant that this viewpoint, which is caught up in the thought of time as mere linear successivity, cannot actually account for Hume’s determination of mind as a ‘bundle ’ of impressions. It disregards the question of the meaning and possibility of the kind of co-existence or simultaneity that must always already be implicated in the capacity to juxtapose and concatenate various different sequential / successive moments within a single grasp. Despite the fact that it can be said that these past 'impressions' no longer exist as such, they are, in an extremely important sense, still retained. This must be so as a matter of principle if there is to be the consciousness of a flux of differences in the first place. It is in response to this issue that Husserl’s discourse on retention in the lectures on time-consciousness [PCIT] addresses the question of the possibility of the unfolding of continuity that produces the registration of difference.


All references to *Ideas 1 / Ideen 1* are to the classic translation by Boyce Gibson. I developed a particular fondness for this translation (published in 1931) after reading extracts from Boyce-Gibson’s journal where he re-counted his close association with Husserl during his visit to discuss the issue of translation. Husserl’s introduction is clearly influenced by their meetings. For further details on this text in German and the more contemporary translation by Fred Kersten, see the bibliography.

Husserl writes...

...every act of apprehension is itself a constituted unity of duration. During the time that it is built up, that which it is to make into an Object is long since gone by and would be – if we did not already presuppose the entire play of primal consciousness and retentions – no longer accessible to the act at all. However, because primal consciousness and retentions are on hand, the possibility exists in reflection of looking to the constituted lived experience and the constituting phases, and even becoming aware of the differences which exist, for example, between the primordial flux as we are conscious of it in primal consciousness and its retentional modifications.31

Husserl's discourse on the temporalization of consciousness, which is nothing other than its 'intentionality,' also leads to the thought of ‘flux.’ However, this is not an empirical flux of a Humean order. It is more primordial in that it addresses the structurality of the Living Present (what Husserl later calls: lebendige Gegenwart) of presencing – the structurality of the flux (or flow) itself rather than its contents. It is earlier than, but constitutive of the presence of an Ego. Husserl’s discourse shows how the ‘now’ is intrinsically spanned within itself as the locus of an inter- / intra-play of retentions, primal impressions, and protentions. This flux or play of interpenetration is not originally that of a successive order, but rather it names a certain kind of simultaneity at the heart of the present and presence.

Hume cannot explain simultaneity on the basis of succession, for he surely relegates simultaneity to a secondary position in relation to his flux of psychological succession, since he seems to have lost sight of their interdependency. For Husserl, simultaneity and succession are inseparably constituted together. Although Hume is concerned to find that which abides – that which is simultaneous with itself – throughout an order of succession (objective, real time

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flux), he is blinded by that which is fleeting, that which runs off without being able to see that such a movement of surpassing has to be registered. He does not inquire about that which actually ‘gives’ surpassing or that which travels with or through these running-off impressions, not monolithically, to be sure, but that which also undergoes change – an interdependent structure of surpassing and reappropriation (where the ‘re’ should not be assumed to designate a mere recuperation that follows ‘after’ a more originary dispersive flow) which gives continuous alteration / successivity.

Hume supposes originary discreteness and that discrete impressions are only brought into continuous relation through laws of association in empirical time. However, association is irreducible to that which comes ‘after’ the fact. Association is not simply about bringing disparate moments together. It is also that which holds such moments apart – the condition of possibility of the differentiation that we call succession.

It is the condition of the possibility of Hume being able to observe a flux in the first place.

The Husserlian flux is irreducible to an objective flow of successions. It refers to a structurality that is always already implied by the consciousness of successivity. This temporalizing interplay of intentionalities originally permits consciousness of unity and difference as the condition of any possible impression – whose ‘lived’ content is already the product of sedimented contents that have been retained and which are motivated by a consciousness that is always already surpassing itself in the bodying forth of that which is anticipated by means of such retention. Retention gives the passing over of the present into that which is no longer (pastness), while protention fills the present with the anticipation of that which is not yet (the pre-expectational horizon of open futurity). There is also a second
intentionality (Längsintentionalität – longitudinal intentionality\textsuperscript{32}) of retention, which gives the flow itself (where pastness is always already a constant background to the flux). Therefore, what is given is a continuum.

Husserl's lecture course on the phenomenology of time-consciousness is, in large part, an extremely effective response to Hume's problem regarding the issue of continuity. It opens a deeper dimension to the study of time, which is no longer restricted to the aporetic limits of Hume's investigations. However, this presents a whole new set of puzzles, since the absolute or Primordial Flux / horizon (or Ur-region) of the lectures on immanent time consciousness is a field of investigation for which, as Husserl says “...we lack names.”\textsuperscript{33} This horizon of “Absolute Subjectivity” is irreducible to the logic / language / names of the Self or Ego

\textsuperscript{32} I prefer J. S. Churchill’s translation of this term: “Längsintentionalität = longitudinal intentionality” rather than J. B. Brough’s “horizontal intentionality” because it does not restrict itself to the two-dimensional limits of Husserl’s ‘diagram’ of time-constituting consciousness – where the flow of consciousness in its givenness to itself is represented as a horizontal line and the “Querintentionalität = transverse intentionality,” is that which cuts through this line. With respect to the phenomena themselves, given the context of Husserl’s discourse on “The Double Intentionality of Retention and the Constitution of the Flow of Consciousness” (sec. 39, p.84), this particular assignment of horizontal and vertical axes to the two intentionalities of retention are arbitrary in their designation. One must not confuse the map with the phenomena. There are independent reasons for demonstrating that Längsintentionalität expresses more of the vertical than Querintentionalität; e.g., since the latter is directed towards the immanent temporal object, while the former actually gives its extendedness within the flow – retentionally sedimented chains of continuity – its duration as depth. It should be noted that Husserl is explicit about the “metaphorical” aspects of his use of the expression “flow” earlier in section 36 (see the quotation in endnote 33, below). It is a mere habit of thought to restrict the sense of “flow” to a horizontal plane. This problem is exacerbated in German because the word for horizon – a field whose extendedness combines both distance and depth / the horizontal and the vertical – is “Horizont.”

\textsuperscript{33} Husserl. PCIT, sec.36, “The Time-Constituting Flow as Absolute Subjectivity.” Husserl writes, “Time-constituting phenomena, therefore, are evidently different from those constituted in time. They are neither individual objects nor individual processes, and the predicates of such objects or processes cannot be meaningfully ascribed to them. Hence it also can make no sense to say of them (And to say with the same significance) that they exist in the now and did exist previously, that they succeed one another in time or are simultaneous with one another and so on. But no doubt we can and must say: A certain continuity of appearance – that is, a continuity that is a phase of the time-constituting flow – belongs to a now, namely, to the now that it constitutes; and to a before, namely, as that which is constitutive (we cannot say “was”) of the before. But is not the flow a succession, does it not have a now, an actually present phase, and a continuity of pasts of which I am now conscious in retentions? We can say nothing other than the following: This flow is something we speak of in conformity with what is constituted, but it is not “something in objective time.” It is absolute subjectivity and has the absolute properties of something to be designated metaphorically as “flow...” (p. 79).
precisely because it actually refers to something earlier / pre-egological: the “Time-
Constituting Flow” that makes such an entity – both ideally and factically – possible.34

4. Primary Impression – Fields of Presence and Vanishing Points

Hume’s discourse on impressions does not take into account the question of how they
can be stretched-out in their running-off. His emphasis on their discreteness has the
unfortunate effect of presenting the image of a corpuscular or atomic consciousness – discrete
moments inexplicably held together in the flux. If every consciousness was actually like this,
where would we find the ‘unity of the life’ of consciousness, which Hume must already
presuppose, although without apparent foundation, when he speaks of the mind as a ‘bundle
of impressions’? Rather than speaking of the continuity of a life-process, we would have to
speak of such a life in terms of a synthetic connecting together of discrete existences.

34 It may be suggested that Aaron Gurwitsch’s appropriation of phenomenological methodology finds its
beginning point here. He adopts the pre-egological orientation on intentionality that can be found in
Husserl’s later discourse (Ideen and after) on the intentional parallelism of noesis and noema – an ideal
methodological orientation that makes the sensationalist thesis of hyletic data (literally: stuff of sensation)
in his lectures on time-consciousness redundant. Hyle are considered to be just parts of the noetic
dimension of intentionality that fulfils itself in the noematic configurations of meaning with which it is
intrinsically intertwined (e.g., the desired of the desiring). The lectures on time-consciousness are seminal
exercises in the eidetic reduction of consciousness to its essential structures of continuous-alteration and so
they precede the issue of egology, while unearthing the conditions of its possibility. In this regard,
Gurwitsch was also inspired by Jean-Paul Sartre’s pre-egological perspective on intentionality, which
maintains that the ego is always already a de facto (transcendent) ego-out-in-the-world and that it does not
depend on a transcendental original lying at the heart of consciousness. The ekstatic structurality of
consciousness; its intentionality – the play of immanence and transcendence that already operates at the
core of the noetic-noematic parallelism – is the pre-egological condition of the possibility of Selfhood. In
existentialist writing, we are all in hot pursuit of our unrealized selves, which always remain in the realm of
possibility since they cannot be actualized in life. Natural consciousness – what Sartre calls Être pour soi
(Being-for-itself) – seeks to become in-itself-for-itself, but the desire can never be fulfilled. The closest that
any individual can get to this totalized state of being is ‘death’ – where the for-itself does indeed become an
in-itself, but only for-Others.
It is vital to understand that Husserl’s concept of primary impression, as adumbrated in his lectures on time consciousness, departs from the Humean idea of impressions. For Husserl, Hume's discrete impressions can be nothing more than abstractions / idealizing fictions, which are constituted through a form of narrative return that forgets its own conditions of possibility. There must be extendedness.

In section 41 of *PCIT*: “Evidence Pertaining to immanent Contents. Change and Constancy,” Husserl writes,

> If one speaks of the evident givenness of an immanent content, then of course the evidence cannot signify indubitable certainty respecting the being of the tone at a single point in time; I would consider such an evidence so conceived…to be a fiction.\(^{35}\)

In order for perception to occur – here, we speak of the appearing of sense – that which is given up through primary impression must first ‘be able to return upon itself’ (Husserl was not by any means the first to recognize that cognition was primarily a matter of re-cognition). The structural possibility of return – which permits the 'I can do so again' – precedes the issue of personal identity as the condition of its possibility. Husserl describes this recursive structuration in terms of a Primordial Flux: an inter-play or intra-play of intentionalities (which must necessarily precede and condition a flux of a Humean order). According to his phenomenological viewpoint, the meaning of Primordial Flux is not to be understood on the basis of primary impression as its actual starting-point. The discourse on flux is that which originally explains the opening-up of the Living Present in which primary impression serves in the form of a specific intentional index in a tri-horizonal interplay. It is this folding-unfolding of the ‘horizon’ of the present that produces unity and distanciation / continuity and surpassing.

\(^{35}\) Husserl. *PCIT*, sec 41, p. 89.
The Living Present (lebendige Gegenwart), as a longitudinal and transversal play of intentional relations, is an open / extended / extending matrix 'constituted' through a retentional and protentional flux in which primal impression is the spacing of their negotiation. From the standpoint of the Living-Present, this inter-play is actually an intra-play. It is not a question of external relations between individual nows strung out side by side, but of an intra-relational matrix at work within the present. For Husserl, the 'now' is grasped on the basis of the original possibility of such an inter- / intra-play within the heart of itself. This means that the very possibility of the present and the continuity of presence rests on the possibility of return / repetition. It is the structuralizing possibility of return – returnability – that produces a continuum.

As David Wood writes in The Deconstruction of Time, “Husserl's real achievement is to have supplied an answer to the problem of continuity through time.”\textsuperscript{36} The main reason for this is that Husserl’s writing on temporality and presence demonstrates that the present is principally a horizontal form and not an object or some kind of content. Far from participating in the history of the thought of the now as being point-like, Husserl shows how the present is “…a form that persists through continuous change of content.”\textsuperscript{37}

In sum, Husserl's lecture course on the phenomenology of internal (or immanent) time-consciousness is a rigorous response to (and an effective resolution of) the problem of 'association' that plays such a crucial role in Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. Hume was the first to acknowledge that the problem of association could not be addressed with any sort of adequacy (let alone explained) on the basis of his description of the mind as a stream of discrete impressions. This latter view makes it impossible to take into account the structuralization of the unfolding of a continuum – for what is lacking is the pre-impressional matrix of intentional threads through which all impressions are always already interconnected.

\textsuperscript{36} David Wood. The Deconstruction of Time, p.72.
Consciousness, or 'mind', when thought in terms of a 'bundle of impressions' – a succession of fleeting and distinct present perceptions – does not give us continuity. The life of consciousness cannot be made up of discrete packets of perception or time as if they popped in and out of existence from moment to moment. The consciousness of sameness and difference must, in some sense, extend itself beyond the limits of such an atomic model of the mind (as a running-off of discrete impressions and point-like 'nows') if there is to be the possibility of 'association.' Here, we speak of a bringing-together whose meaning cannot be reduced to a movement of homogenization, since it also includes, in an original manner, the bringing-together-of-differences as differences – a weaving of temporally disparate moments within a quasi-simultaneous web of juxtaposition. This cannot be taken into account within the logical bounds of a mere 'order of corpuscular successions.'

5. **Intentionality – The Play of Unity in Difference and Difference in Unity**

Hume's empirical-psychologistic standpoint barred him from access to a transcendental plane of orientation on the question of 'unity,' and thus the possibility of 'association.' This is ironic, in view of the weight of significance that the concept of association has for the theoretical structure and methodology of his *Treatise of Human Nature* – which is actually one of the reasons why Hume’s writing is so admirable. He develops the theory of association only to see the grounding ripped out from beneath it when he reviews the issue of continuity upon which it depends. Hume not only climbs a ladder and kicks it

away; he is also prepared to fall back down and to begin anew. Perhaps it is this conscientious rigor of Hume’s analyses of experience that Husserl admires most of all – given that his own phenomenological enterprise is continually defined as ‘a perpetual return to beginnings.’

It was the development of the theory of intentionality by Brentano and Husserl that allowed a new orientation on the problem of continuity. In phenomenology, consciousness is defined in terms of a transitive movement. It is literally nothing without such transitivity: its directedness-towards something. The concept of the ‘outside-itself’ movement of consciousness is the principal theoretical foundation upon which existentialism depends. This is the basis of Heidegger’s meaning in the expression Dasein (Being-there) and Sartre’s ‘for’ in Être pour soi (Being for itself). The ‘towards,’ indicated by the preposition ‘of,’ is the essential determination of the meaning of consciousness.

In these terms, the consciousness of similarity and difference necessarily implies a stretched-out consciousness that is irreducible to a flux of 'atomic' impressions. Impressions cannot be discrete consciousnesses or point-like presents, since this would imply something like percepts without perceiving, meaning without reference, foreground without background, presence without horizon, situation without relation, position without movement, etc. The life of consciousness cannot be a mere aggregate either – the sum of a collection of impressions, which are said to pass-away with 'inconceivable rapidity.' Without continuity – a continuum that has past and futural horizons – how could we speak of the mind as a 'collection' or a 'bundle'? In the case of the mind as a whole, these expressions have to be applied to a form of non-linear / hologrammatic co-extension or quasi-simultaneous structurality (note: the latter can be thought in a 'virtual' sense without necessarily invoking the language of presence in Derridian terms), which not only retains the impressions that pass-

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38 It should be noted that the existentialists refer to this dynamic outside-itself thrust of consciousness as its ekstatic structurality.

39 One is reminded here of the wave / particle complementarity thesis and Heisenberg’s principle of uncertainty.
away, but is also already at work anticipating their arrival. Both of these performances constitute the consciousness of transition itself. Without the structurality that is constituted by such performances, it is not even enough to say that we would be unable to grasp the same impression twice. We would not be able to grasp it even once.

Hume's introspective narrative gives us a purely linear order of successions that cannot actually account for the consciousness of 'duration' – a consciousness which must, in some way, be coextensive with itself through change as consciousness-of-change. Consciousness has to exceed its various moments if there is to be the registration of difference. Running-off impressions must somehow be able to 'express' the duration of their running-off.

Therefore, to speak in terms of a flux of impressions that successively flash in and out of existence (remember that for Hume, perceptions are 'distinct existences') already presupposes a 'stretched' consciousness, which, in some sense, precedes and outlives the impressions that pass-away. What has to be taken into account is the ‘continuing-through’ or ‘living-through’ of temporal movement. Discrete consciousnesses could never register 'transition.' Therein lies the paradox, such a form of successivity as that expressed by Hume would literally never give succession.

The thematization of motion / change in terms of 'phases,' 'passing-over,' 'passing-away,' 'running-off,' etc., speaks of the consciousness of duration, change, modal variations, etc. These transitions cannot be given in a point-like impression or a mere collection (in the case of the latter we would still need to inquire into that which permits such a synthesis). Therefore, we find that the collecting together of a series of different temporal points would not give time in much the same sense that a collection of spatial points would not give motion.

This is where Husserl’s expression running-off-phenomena (Ablaufsphänomene) comes into play since it does not so much name impressions that are shading off as the
consciousness of the shading off itself. This is why he is also very careful when he speaks of ‘appearance’ (a term which seems to act as a generic leveller in Hume’s ‘impression’ centred analyses).

We would prefer to avoid, then, the use of the word “appearances” for the phenomena that constitute immanent temporal objects; for these phenomena are themselves immanent objects and are “appearances” in an entirely different sense. We speak here of the “running-off phenomena,” or better still, of the “modes of temporal orientation”; and with respect to the immanent objects themselves, we speak of their “running-off characters” (e.g., now, past). We know that the running-off phenomenon is a continuity of constant changes. This continuity forms an inseparable unity, inseparable into extended sections that could exist by themselves, into points of the continuity. The parts that we single out by abstraction can exist only in the whole running-off; and this is equally true of the phases, the points that belong to the running-off continuity. We can also say of this continuity, with evidence, that in a certain sense it is immutable; that is, with regard to its form.  

The lectures on time-consciousness explore the question of the primordial possibility of an extending consciousness which, when understood in intentional terms as a transitive consciousness of something, gives duration. Without duration there cannot be change, without an enduring (temporalized / temporalizing) consciousness there cannot be consciousness of change. Hume's narrative forgets its own condition of possibility, beyond the 'corpuscular' schema that it thematizes. Narratives report duration precisely because they have duration, or, rather, they are forms of duration. Association, is a kind of narrative return – an unfolding of structure, the writing of con-texture, which, in a peculiar sense, combines instantaneity and duration, differentiation and concatenation.

In Section 38: “The Unity of the Flow of Consciousness and the Constitution of Simultaneity and Succession,” Husserl writes...

…simultaneity is nothing without temporal succession and temporal succession is nothing without simultaneity, and consequently simultaneity and temporal succession must become constituted correlatively and inseparably.

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41 Husserl. *Ibid*, Sec 38. p. 82. Husserl continues, “We can differentiate terminologically between the retentional being-all-at-once of fluxions [fluxionalem Vor-Zugleich] and the impressional being-all-at-once of fluxions [impressionalem Zugleich von Fluxionen]. We cannot call the one or the
Such structuration emerges out of the possibility of comparison as a kind of compression of 'lived-time.' This compression is structurally identical to the process of idealization – which rests on returnability. The opening-up of structure, then, points to a general structurality that first permits such an opening. It prescribes the possibility of association. One can still respect Hume's observation that we do not perceive any 'real connexion among distinct existences,' when it comes to questions of causality, but the issue of 'relation' is irreducible to these terms.

Husserl's theory of intentionality emerged out of a manoeuvre of suspension that bracketed questions of causation – whose source of inspiration, as his introduction to Boyce-Gibson's English translation of Ideen 1 (1931) appears to show, can be found in the encounter with Hume as a rigorous response to the aporetic moments that announce themselves at the limits of his investigations. For Hume, our notion of causality is not derived from the perception of real connections among distinct existences, but from 'habitual association' – which, as we have already seen, cannot actually be explained by his schema concerning the corpuscular temporalization of experience[s]. His dissatisfaction with this state of affairs is well known. It is in the Appendix to the Treatise that Hume confesses...

...all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head.42

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42 Hume. Treatise, Appendix, p.635.
The theory of intentionality, when considered from the point of view of the temporalization of consciousness, explains continuity in terms of returnability. It is the retentional and protentional extending of return that gives the 'possibility' of habituation and association – which, in turn, permits the idea of causality.

This brings us back to a fundamental question that Hume has overlooked. Why does he assume / presuppose that perceptions are actually 'distinct' existences? Is there not a certain degree of uncritical hypostatization going on here? For Husserl, "...no concrete experience can pass as independent in the full sense of the term"43 Consciousness, or experience (in the most general sense), when understood according to the logic of intentionality, is a transitive upsurge, a unity of a projection, a comportment-towards – which is precisely a 'stretched' consciousness: the extended / extending of a history. Hume’s overturning of the primacy of the Self as the starting-point of philosophy is a radical departure from the tradition, but there is still a residual and problematic trace of corpuscular thinking in his definition of existence.

Existence, when thought in terms of its phenomenological relation to that which is expressed by the Greek word ekstaticon: to-stand-outside-itself – expresses emergence, self-differentiation, spatialization (kinesthesis), temporalization (history). These are essential dynamical structures that are always already implied by the ‘phenomenon’ as that which shows itself from itself. In these terms, that which stands-outside-itself implies a whole matrix of referential differences (that must in some sense register themselves as such) from which no ekstatic node can be absolutely distinct. Distinctness arises out of the possibility of the consciousness of difference. Therefore, consciousness, in its time, is essentially spaced-out. We should say, in consonance with Husserl, that these moments are not 'distinct existences,' but rather phases, modes, threads, or streams of one 'unity of lived-experience.'

43 Husserl. Ideen 1, sec.83, p.221.
In the section entitled, "Intentionality as the Main Phenomenological Theme" of *Ideen* I, Husserl writes.

It is intentionality which characterizes *consciousness* in the pregnant sense of the term, and justifies us in describing the whole stream of experience as at once a stream of consciousness and unity of *one* consciousness.44

It is important to remember that in Husserl's phenomenology the question concerning the unity of the consciousness of time – as consciousness through time – is not restricted to (understood on the basis of) a mere expression of Self or personal identity, which Hume targeted for critique. The unity about which Husserl speaks indicates something earlier and pre-egological: temporalized / temporalizing consciousness (the a priori condition of possibility of what we would normally name as the Self or the Ego); a retentional and protentional tracing of a projection – a reflexive unity of a history.

The *life* of consciousness (as a whole) is another name for the *intentionality* of consciousness. It is by means of the thesis of intentionality that Husserl effectively tackles the paradoxes that arise through Hume’s ‘discretist' perspective, in which the primary components of perception are presented as corpuscular impressions. Husserl’s theory of intentionality provides a careful response and overturning of this thesis precisely because it permits the description of the interweaving of the threads of experience according to laws of association that are already presupposed by the very possibility of Hume’s analyses, although the latter is unable to take them into account.

6. The Living-Through of the Extending / Extendedness of the Present

Unlike Hume, Husserl does not give privilege to discrete or point-like impressions in his discourse on perception / experience – since this would be like treating the present of presence and the presence of the present as an instant / point. As we have seen, for Husserl, such a present / now / instant could never be more than an abstraction from a flux (a Primordial flux, Absolute Flow, Ur-region that precedes and constitutes the purely successive flux in Hume's account).

There is an important difference that must be taken into account: any consideration of the meaning of living presence must attend to the question of its unfolding or constitution as a unity of duration. The internal dynamics – which trace out both dispersion and recuperation in flux – are those which also open up the 'Living Present.' In its very principle, the now cannot be a point-like moment or presence. As we have seen, an atomic or corpuscular now, within the context of Husserl's phenomenological orientation, could never be anything more than an idealization, a fiction. A now-point can be nothing for itself. It is a fundamental law of experience that the now is intrinsically transitive. Every time has a before and an after. As the lectures on time-consciousness unfold, it becomes clear that this is not a simple external relation, but that the past and the future are necessarily embodied 'within' the present.

There is a certain 'virtuality' expressed by the Living Present in that it is not a presence in the sense of an objective appearance, but is the opening and the depth of any possible mode of 'appearing.' As a horizon, it recedes before that which stands out or comes to presence. In this sense, it is pure transcendence. Deferring and surpassing trace out the structure of its performance as opening.

There is also another sense in which it expresses a fundamental form of immanence. For Husserl, the structurality of the opening-up of the Living Present is precisely flux –
through which the giving of temporal objects is lived. The thought of the Living Present is irreducible to the boundaries of any meta-general form of discourse on presence, since it is the opening of presencing itself.

For Hume, immanence is tied to appearance and thus the more sophisticated phenomenological orientation on immanence could only seem paradoxical. For although the Living Present does not actually appear it is not a pure absence. It is, in a vital phenomenological sense, immanent in its transcendence. Like the Earth as ground-horizon (the from-which), which is immanent and yet unseen, in that it is not principally an object, that which is closest to us recedes from our noticing grasp. In other words, the lebendige Gegenwart is not present to consciousness in any 'objective' sense as an appearance, but is the present form of consciousness in its directedness toward something.

It must be noted that we are indifferent as to whether such 'directedness' is an orientation toward the now, the past, or the future. Both the horizons of pastness and that of futurity already inhabit the Living Present (as interplaying fringes of the now) in that retention and protention are present modes of consciousness, e.g., retention is not a past moment as such, but a present consciousness (a retaining) of the past – giving pastness within the present. Note: retentions embody retentions within themselves – they are continua of continua.

To reiterate a most essential point, retentions are not simply retentions in an 'objective' sense i.e., specific contents of apprehensions that have been retained. Retentions retain other temporal orientations – 'of' or 'toward' objects. These temporal orientations are not objects 'for' temporalizing consciousness (although they can be made to appear as such at a higher level of reflection), but are orientations of consciousness in its changing 'modes' of directedness-toward temporal objects. Retended orientations retain previously retended orientations within themselves. Each retention bears within itself a history of continuous modification of orientation – where the continuous modification means a certain holding-back / delay, which
produces a sinking-down of experience into the past. In other words, retention is the extension of a continuum that is embodied within itself.

Such a retentional tracing of modification or 'continuous alteration' always already precedes the apprehension of any temporal object – for this shifting of orientation is the originary illumination of any content. In a sense, the content is the same, but delayed in its givenness with reference to the present. It is given in different lights (the same, but non-identical) – beacons, signs of the unfolding of its duration.

Husserl writes,

As a matter of principle, any phase of a change can be expanded into a rest, and any phase of a rest can be carried over into a change.

Now, if we consider the constituting phenomena in comparison with the phenomena just discussed, we find a flow, and each phase of this flow is a continuity of adumbrations. But as a matter of principle, no phase of this flow can be expanded into a continuous succession; and therefore the flow cannot be conceived as so transformed that this phase would be extended in identity with itself. Quite to the contrary, we necessarily find a flow of continuous “change”; and this change has the absurd character that it flows precisely as it flows and can flow neither “faster” nor “slower.” If that is the case, then any object that changes is missing here; and since “something” runs its course in every process, no process is in question. There is nothing here that changes, and for that reason it also makes no sense to speak of something that endures. It is therefore nonsensical to want to find something here that remains unchanged for even an instant during the course of its duration.\footnote{Husserl. \textit{PCIT}, sec 35. p. 78.}

Of course with this orientation, the usual dyadic categories that delimit discourse on the static and evolutionary, space and time, continuity and alteration, genesis and structure, etc., are quite insufficient. They are inadequate to the task of grasping the structurality of such dimensions. Whereas Hume’s flux is in process, the Primordial Flux about which Husserl speaks falls outside such a determination and bears little in resemblance to that which can be adumbrated by any traditional discourse on time. It also upsets the specific form of the primordial / constituted disjunction that is generally in operation in classical modern thought, i.e., with respect to the way in which the static is set up in opposition to the genetic – a form
of bi-polar thinking that also carves up the world into such apparently distinct opposites as structure contra alteration, rest contra movement, passivity contra activity, etc.

At the level of Husserl’s temporal analyses, where it is disclosed how time constituting consciousness is none other than its own temporalization, we become aware of the intertwining of passivity and activity in the interaction between different levels or modes of intentional consciousness: activity, in its directedness towards the future, establishes its focus by simultaneously being informed [passivity] by the past – while at the same time reorganizing (in other words, acting / working upon) the significance, structural presentation, and thus the meaning of the past. In Husserl’s phenomenology, the reproductive (presentificational rather than presentational) correlates to retention and protention are known as secondary remembrance and expectation. These are generally active, whereas the former intentionalities are, to a certain extent, passive. It is the difference between an 'act of evocation' and the tracing of a past horizon that extends itself to such an act – a horizon that always already precedes a reflective performance as a remembering. Primordial flux is the name of that which constitutes this horizon. At this primal depth though, we have to accept that we cannot rigidly separate passivity from activity (although there is no actor as such). Here, we find that there is always activity in passivity and passivity in activity.

In sum, the Living Present is a tri-horizonal nexus of interplaying orientations: retention, primary impression, and protention. Each orientation is a 'present' form of consciousness with a unique ‘intentional’ index. These related issues are partly inspired by Augustine's problem in section 20 of Book XI of the Confessions where he ponders over the question of whether we can speak of the future or the past as actually existing. Augustine decides that we can only do so if we speak of the future as a presently occurring anticipation and the past as a presently occurring act of remembering.
The now is the fulcrum of 'existence' or being for Augustine. However, it is the basis of a 'cosmology,' not a phenomenology. He oscillates between the two orientations (a symptom of Aristotelianism) without realizing that he is doing so – beginning in a cosmology and ending with a singularly phenomenological orientation. "It seems to me," Augustine writes, "that time is merely an extension, though of what it is an extension I do not know. I begin to wonder whether it is an extension of the mind itself."\textsuperscript{46}

The operative schema that determines Augustine's thought on time is one in which the now or present is not extended – even though his speculation about the possibility of time being an extension of the mind problematizes such a viewpoint. He never actually raised this as a problem and did not really explore the question of the structure of the now itself.

Husserl’s discourse on the now does not determine its being in terms of such an extensionless point, but as a stretched horizon that is protentionally stretching ahead of itself—likewise, with respect to the constitutive role of retention. He demonstrates that when we speak of retention it is not as a ‘past’-consciousness, but as a ‘present’ consciousness of the past: it is the giving of having-beenness. The retained is that which is given up by the present retention as that which is no-longer.\textsuperscript{47}

The lectures on time-consciousness can be seen to provide an extraordinarily sophisticated and yet radically clear elaboration of Augustine’s meditations; the phenomenological description of what must necessarily be entailed in the constitution of the past as present-recollection and the future as present-expectation. However, unlike Augustine's discourse on the non-extension of the now, Husserl shows how it necessarily


\textsuperscript{47} Husserl is also careful to distinguish between retention as primary memory and its representational modification. The former gives the just-past, whereas the latter merely re-presents it. “Retention constitutes the living horizon of the now; in it I have a consciousness of the “just past”” (\textit{PCIT}, sec. 18, p.45). Here, we find different modalities of ‘present’ experience in the ‘ways in which pastness is given.'
must be a field. Augustine makes the mistake of hypostatizing the mathematical point-system by which duration is measured and confusing it with the structure of the now itself.

Primary impression is the boundary to retention and protention. It marks the point at which they pass over into one another. Such a point is ideal of course. Another way of looking at primary impression is in terms of a boundary that has no thickness in itself / on its own. The sense of this is to be found in Husserl's agreement with the radicalization of the concept of the 'boundary' (Grenze) in Brentano’s philosophy – which specifically rejects the notion that it is composed of two adjacent points. In the same terms, retention and protention are not adjacent to one another in the sense in which they could be said to either lie alongside one another (touching without blending) or that they are separated by primal impression as a substantive divide or gap. Boundary is pure transition. There is not a strict divide between retention and protention, for that division to which the concept of primal or primary impression refers is more a kind of zone of transitional smudging – a blending and a bleeding of one into the other. Boundary, here, signifies a nexus of 'play' where the Living Present is precisely a spacing of negotiation between the three intentional dimensions of temporalization / ekstases. What is given through this movement is the unfolding of a horizon, not discrete things. The thought of the boundary as a dividing line without thickness or as a point is, once again, merely an ideal limit – an idealizing fiction.

There are multiple ways in which we might understand this play or interplay. Firstly, in the sense in which there is an absence of rigidity – unfixedness. This kind of play occurs through erosion; a loosening that comes with the passage of time. The now is always protentionally ahead of itself while being the cutting edge of a train of retentions. This brings us to the following sense: it is a perfect metaphor for the open-endedness of the present – the retentional and protentional interplay that gives the play of the now – its unfolding. It is a kind of blurring of edges. The Living Present is a horizon with fringes (as opposed to the common
notion of boundaries), which extend on both sides of itself. These fringes (or overlapping zones) are not merely external supports to the present, but constitute its extendedness from within itself. Therefore, the intentional interplay, once again, is in a very fundamental sense also an intra-play (Primordial Flux / Flow).

The idea of primary impression brings with it the all-important phenomenological concepts concerning apodicticity and adequacy and the play between fulfilment, non-fulfilment, and degrees of fulfilment. Primary impression is the fulfilment of what was a protention. The movement gives, to paraphrase Merleau-Ponty, the germination of what will have already been given. Primary impression is the present actualization of what was futural. This is the fold of a structure of negotiation that originarily permits us to distinguish between phantasy and the real. At a 'higher' level, an example of this would be when a figure, perhaps shrouded in darkness, may seem familiar, but when it is approached (on the basis of the apprehension of familiarity), it turns out to be someone (or even something) quite different in actuality. What signs itself here is the moment at which a determinate expectation, whose material is delivered up from the past (through memory), is forced to undergo adjustment on the basis of a present consciousness (primary impression) of something with which the expectation does not correspond. As the protention passes over into retention the content of expectation is annulled and retained only as unfulfilled and mistaken. Primary impression marks (to speak metaphorically) the 'point' at which expectations are fulfilled or otherwise. It is the spacing through which existence pours in, disrupting imagination (phantasy) and ideality.

Therefore, it is important to understand that the term primary impression (or now-consciousness) is not synonymous with the meaning of the expression Living Present. It refers to only one present form of 'orientation' that articulates the way in which retention and protention (as present modes of orientation of that which is no-longer and that which is not-
yet) pass over into one another in the constitution of the ever-flowing present. The Living Present itself, far from being point-like, is a tri-horizontal 'field.' Along with Merleau-Ponty, we may describe it as a 'bulb' made up of indeterminately extended fringes stretching into the past and the future.\(^\text{48}\)

The Living Present (\textit{lebendige Gegenwart}) is a waiting-towards presence. It is not so much the present (in an objective sense) as the \textit{living through of presencing}, since the consciousness of continuous alteration / temporalization is none other than its own temporalization.

7. **The Suspension of Objective Time**

Thus far, we have explored the outstanding problems that arise in Hume’s analyses *Of Personal Identity*, which not only problematize the issue of the Self as the hub of experience, but also deepen the mystery concerning how the continuity of experience itself is constituted through time. The primarily psychologistic orientation that guides his analyses – in which mental events are described purely as atomic facts moving in rapid succession – cannot take into account a fundamental structurality that must always already precede and condition the possibility of the concatenation of apparently discrete entities running off in time. What is lacking is an adequate description of the structurality of the continuum that makes such a flux possible in the first place.

As we have seen, Husserl was inspired by Hume to a high degree. And, it was Hume’s methodological scepticism in particular that established one of the most contemporary levels of analysis from which to approach the problem of time and continuity by means of a phenomenological mode of interrogation. Kant’s influence is also in play in Husserl’s form of approach – particularly in terms of the Kantian themes of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Deduction – but it remains, largely, in the background. In many ways, Husserl’s analyses on time deepen the field of the Transcendental Aesthetic (in which space and time are not out in the world, but are rather ‘forms’ of experience). However, Kant accepts these intertwined dimensions on the basis of a certain kind of grace – as structural
‘forms’ of interiority and exteriority that constitute an intelligible spatio-temporal world of experience – while Husserl is driven by the quest to unearth the constitution of these forms themselves.

We shall examine how Husserl establishes the starting point to his lectures on the *Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*. That is, we shall look at the manner in which he establishes the context of this discourse, historically, and methodologically.

Husserl’s intellectual pin-up, Augustine is the most admired of the long history of thinkers who have applied their efforts to the problem of articulating time. And, the teachings of Husserl’s mentor, Brentano play the role of applying a more contemporary ‘intentional’ orientation on the problems that are raised by the 11th book of Augustine’s *Confessions*, which is, perhaps one of the most rigorous and, yet, adventurous attempts to explicate the thematic of temporality.

I shall begin by quoting Husserl in this regard. And, what could be a more appropriate beginning than the opening passages of his *Introduction*?

5 The analysis of time-consciousness is an ancient burden for descriptive psychology and epistemology. The first person who sensed profoundly the enormous difficulties inherent in this analysis, and who struggled with them almost to despair, was Augustine. Even today, anyone occupied with the problem of time must still study Chapters 14-28 of Book XI of the *Confessiones* thoroughly. For in these matters our modern age, so proud of its knowledge, has failed to surpass or even to match the splendid achievement of this great thinker who grappled so earnestly with the problem of time. We may still say today with Augustine: *si nemo a me quaeat, scio, si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio.*

Naturally, we all know what time is; it is the most familiar thing of all. But as soon as we attempt to give an account of time-consciousness, to put objective time and subjective time-consciousness into the proper relationship and to reach an understanding of how temporal objectivity – and therefore any individual objectivity whatever — can become constituted in the subjective consciousness of time, we get entangled in the most peculiar difficulties, contradictions, and confusions. Indeed, this

The lectures on time-consciousness are studies on intentionality and the eidetic elements that make up the multiple intentional forms through which the *consciousness of* temporal objects is possible (a prepositional transitivity that is temporal in its very essence as *durational-consciousness-of-duration*). The exercise does not confine itself to the study of temporal ‘objects,’ but is concerned to focus on the *temporality* of the objects. The objective flux of an empirical psychological succession is generally taken for granted in the natural attitude – the habituated and non-reflexive orientation in which things just give themselves (as Husserl puts it). However, the ‘natural attitude’ is a problem in itself. A radical change in orientation is required in order to unearth that which actually makes the natural attitude possible in the first place and to do this by means of a form of reduction that does not so much reduce its field of interrogation as open it up to an eidetic deconstruction of the manifold elements of its constitution (ironically, it is the so-called ‘natural attitude’ that reduces – diminishes, decreases – the world horizon whereas phenomenology is concerned to restore its profundity, complexity and excess). Similarly, the attitude toward the objective time of the sciences, in a cosmological sense, is deeply problematic.

In Section One, Husserl begins by expressing the urgency of the requirement to ‘suspend’ objective time. He then begins to adumbrate precisely what remains after such a suspension.

This suspension is characteristic of phenomenological methodology. In Husserl’s later work, it is developed under the heading of the *epoché* (to suspend / to cut) – or the
phenomenological, eidetic, and transcendental-phenomenological reductions. Although the various forms of reduction, *epoché* – or the methods of bracketing – are not thematized in Husserl’s lectures on time, they are implicit. Husserl’s preliminary suspension of objective time involves both a phenomenological reduction of objective (cosmological) experience to its intentional modes of givenness and an eidetic reduction of such experience to the essential structures which already underlie their possibility.

At no point must we confuse this manoeuvre with a withdrawal from the objective world to a realm of idealism. It is, indeed, a shift to transcendental subjectivity, but it is not taken on the basis of a vulgar cosmological or ontological decision. We do not constitute the existence of the objective world, but we are required to uncover the *validity of its sense* as an ‘existing objective world’ within our own subjectivity. It is a transcendental epistemological enterprise, but of a form that is irreducible to the classic tradition that is still infected with Cartesianism.

We are introduced, therefore, to what can only be described as a kind of ‘methodological idealism’ which, to reiterate, must not be confused with a ‘doctrinal’ form of idealism.

It is crucial to understand that it is not so much the world that is suspended, as the ‘attitude’ that usually defines it. The adoption of the phenomenological attitude does not eradicate the world, but displaces the ‘natural attitude’ by which it is generally articulated along with all its prejudices and presuppositions. Note: ‘natural’ here should not be confused with any kind of primary or originary state according to a philosophical naturalism, since it actually designates a synthetic and habituated construction that is more often than not rooted in prejudice.

Thus, Husserl writes,
We are intent on a phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness. Inherent in this, as in any phenomenological analysis, is the complete exclusion of every assumption, stipulation, and conviction with respect to objective time (the complete exclusion of all transcending presuppositions concerning what exists).

Husserl, p. 4. *PCIT*.

Of course, the idea of achieving a “...complete exclusion” is highly problematic (an issue that we shall explore later on in this course), but nevertheless it remains as a regulative principle of phenomenological interrogation by which it strives to be rigorous throughout its movement.

Thus, phenomenology cannot relax into metaphysical speculation. The practicing phenomenologist must maintain vigilance with respect to their adherence to the limits of the task at hand.

Which is why Husserl writes that it might be...

It may be of interest to determine the objective time of an experience, including that of a time-constituting experience. It might also make an interesting investigation to ascertain how the time that is posited as objective in an episode of time-consciousness is related to actual objective time, whether the estimations of temporal intervals correspond to the objectively real temporal intervals or how they deviate from them. But these are not tasks for phenomenology.


So, what is the task of the *Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*? Phenomenology is concerned with that which shows itself from itself as it gives itself. The phenomenon is irreducible to an existent thing, whether it happens to be of an internal order or that of an external kind. Phenomenality is exhibition, givenness, appearing – therefore the phenomenon of existence is only one possible type among many. What is meant here is that the phenomenon of existence is an announcement or exhibition of existence: it is the
appearing of actuality in the announcement of the existent. Thus, it is with respect to the phenomenal givenness of things, regardless of whether that which is given actually exists, or whether it is just imagined, hoped for, or remembered, etc., that phenomenology must find its point of focus. Even existence must be ‘announced!’

Husserl writes,

Now when we speak of the analysis of time-consciousness, of the temporal character of the objects of perception, memory, and expectation, it may indeed seem as if we were already assuming the flow of objective time and then at bottom studying only the subjective conditions of the possibility of an intuition of time and of a proper cognition of time. What we accept, however, is not the existence of a world time, the existence of a physical duration, and the like, but appearing time, appearing duration, as appearing. These are absolute data that it would be meaningless to doubt. To be sure, we do assume an existing time in this case, but the time we assume is the immanent time of the flow of consciousness, not the time of the experienced world. That the consciousness of a tonal process, of a melody I am now hearing, exhibits a succession is something for which I have an evidence that renders meaningless every doubt and denial.

Husserl. *PCIT*, p. 5.

The absolute evidence of the field that phenomenology takes upon itself to explore is not that of the Cartesian cogito. Neither does Husserl fall into the Humean trap. The phenomena are not ‘in’ consciousness. They are transcendent to consciousness while simultaneously transcending the world. Although Husserl speaks of the absolute data that are given to consciousness as being ‘immanent’ to experience, this is not a re-iteration of a Cartesian dyad – between inside (sphere of consciousness – res cogitans) and outside (sphere of external things – res extensa). Immanence does not equal that which is mental and transcendence does not equal that which is external (extra-mental) reality.

The lectures on time are an exercise in the adumbration of the important differences that are at work in the parallelism of immanence and transcendence, which do not participate
in the traditional inside / outside dyad and which pre-phenomenological discourse cannot penetrate.

The phenomenon does not stand-in for the world like some kind of representational proxy. It is the *standing-out* of the world. It does not subsist in consciousness, neither does it occupy a Platonic dimension that is in addition to the world and consciousness. When something is given, the appearance is not a substitute for that which is given as though it stood next to the original thing.

For instance, when Husserl sets up a phenomenological analogue between time and space, he shows that it does not make any...

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\text{sense at all to say, for example, that a point of the visual field is one meter distant from the corner of this table here, or is next to it, above it, and so on. Just as little does the appearance of the physical thing have a position in space or spatial relationships of any kind: the house-appearance is not next to the house, above it, one meter away from it, etc.}
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\text{Now something similar is also true of time. Temporal apprehensions, the experiences in which the temporal in the objective sense appears, are phenomenological data. Again, the moments of experience that specifically found temporal apprehension as the apprehension of time – thus the (perhaps) specifically temporal apprehension-contents (what moderate nativism calls the originally temporal) – are phenomenologically given. But none of that has to do with objective time. One cannot discover the least thing about objective time through phenomenological analysis. The “original temporal field” is obviously not a bit of objective time; the experienced “now,” taken in itself, is not a point of objective time, and so on. Objective space, objective time, and with them the objective world of actual things and events – these are all transcendencies. But note well that space and actuality are not transcendent in some mystical sense, as things in themselves, but are just phenomenal space, phenomenal spatio-temporal reality, appearing spatial form, appearing temporal form. None of these are experiences. And the ordered connections that are to be found in experiences as genuine immanencies cannot be met with in the empirical, objective order, and do not fit into it.}
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What is truly fascinating about this shift from the inside / outside dyad – by focusing on qualities of immanence and transcendence purely in terms of their phenomenality – is that it permits the possibility of demonstrating the degrees of overlap that are always already implied in the traditional dyad: interiority and exteriority. For example, intentionality, which is the defining characteristic of consciousness – as its directedness toward something – is a self-transcending movement that is actually constitutive of immanence. The immanence of that which presents itself is constituted by manifold transcendencies that actually signify its meaning, e.g., a spatio-temporal object whose givenness as an ‘actual’ spatio-temporal object also depends upon the manifold evidences concerning the manner in which it does not give itself to a momentary regard. Certain aspects recede from the point of view, thus giving its three-dimensional spatial extendedness – whereby its totality signifies that it transcends any particular perspective through which it announces itself. Such transcendence is a truly immanent component of the evidence of its actuality. Of course, this is equally true of its temporal extension, since the unfolding of its other aspects (e.g., rotating the object before one’s eyes – where kinesthesis / movement already announces the consciousness of time) is a process that is stretched out over a duration of ‘different’ phases of exhibition and yet, the object is given as a harmonious multiplicity precisely as the same. Although it is the same, and the assurance of this is an immanental evidence, it is not identical. Its temporal extendedness lies in the many differences in the modes of its exhibition by which it is given as that which is stretched out through time: as a real temporal object. This manifold running-off of overlapping evidences is immanent, while the actual articulation of the changing orientations actually demonstrates its transcendence or ‘excess.’

There is a vast spectrum of different forms of overlap between immanence and transcendence that begins to reveal itself to descriptive phenomenology when freed from the constraints of the metaphysical dyad of the inside and outside. I would like to mention one
particular form that will continue to grow in significance – with respect to the issue of the presence of a continuous Self, which does not equal the continuous presence of a Self – as these lectures unfold. According to Husserl, every consciousness is positionally directed toward something while being non-positionally related to itself. His thesis of intentionality demonstrates that the twofold dimension of the flow of consciousness – in its encounter with that toward which it is directed – expresses a primordial inter-/intra-play of immanence and transcendence at the heart of itself. We shall examine the implications of this structurality in greater detail at a later stage of this lecture course.

But, we are running too far ahead. At this point in Husserl’s text, the agenda involves the adumbration of the outstanding philosophical problems that need to be addressed in order to establish the relevance/significance of a phenomenological approach to the experience of time. Here, it is a question of determining the precise meaning and limits of such a phenomenology.

An investigation of the data of place (taken up by nativism in the psychological attitude), which make up the immanent order of the “field of visual sensation,” as well as an investigation of this field itself, would also belong in a fully developed phenomenology of the spatial. The data of place are related to appearing objective places just as the data of quality are related to appearing objective qualities. If we speak of place-signs in the first case, then we would have to speak of quality-signs in the second. The sensed red is a phenomenological datum that, animated by a certain apprehension-function, presents an objective quality; it is not itself a quality. The perceived red, not the sensed red, is a quality in the proper sense, that is, a determination of the appearing thing. The sensed red is called red only equivocally, for red is the name of a real quality. If, with reference to certain occurrences in phenomenology, we speak of a “coinciding” of the one with the other, we must nevertheless
Methodologically, at this point, Husserl finds it necessary to distinguish sensing and the sensed from the idea of the perception of something in the classic terminology as *perception of an objective kind*. The constitution of objectivity is a multi-dimensional fold. For instance, it is clear that what we normally take as distinct differences between the experiencing and the experienced and what is truly immanent or transcendent to them are involved in referential relations that first constitute them. Also, the distinctions between what is generally perceiving and sensing require a thoroughgoing analysis of what we mean by perception, since both forms are still ‘types’ of experience that announce themselves
according to their own unique intentional indices. Together, they constitute the one ‘shared’ objective landscape that we take as the background to our lives.

What stands out here is the requirement to raise the distinction between contents and objects. This is fundamental if there is to be a way of understanding the continuity of an object through its temporal duration as a flux of changing contents. The contents of apprehensions may change even though the object is said to be one and the same.

What is true of the many different spatial orientations of a single object, which can be given from one side or the other, is true of any object that is stretched out in time. The changing contents refer to the same object as a whole, although it is never actually given totally in any particular perception. The object is adumbrated by these contents as a unity of the same as given according to different profiles. The object is nothing without this flowing unity of changing contents, but it is also other to them. However, there is no implicit substitution of things by signs or images as in the traditional dyadic thinking of the classic image theory. We do not find that things are substituted by mere images.

One of the most striking aspects of Husserl’s descriptive repertoire is how he employs spatial analogies to time and vice versa. This is not in any way a reduction or subsumption of one to the other as some kind of attempt to minimize their differences, but to emphasize the manners in which they are fundamentally intertwined / mutually implicated. Before Husserl, most treatments of time tended to merely spatialize it. His phenomenological approach has the great merit of demonstrating the temporalization of spatiality, which restores a certain balance.

Husserl is concerned to explicate another kind of evidence that is irreducible to that of an empirical order.
To grasp a content – specifically, to grasp it with evidence, just as it is experienced – does not yet mean that one has grasped an objectivity in the empirical sense, an objective reality in the sense in which one speaks of objective physical things, events, relationships, of location in objective space and time, of objectively real spatial form and temporal form, and so on.

Let us look at a piece of chalk. We close and open our eyes. We then have two perceptions. We nonetheless say that we see the same chalk twice. Here we have contents separated in time; we even see, phenomenologically, a separation or division in time. But there is no division as far as the object is concerned: it is the same. In the object there is duration; in the phenomenon, alteration. Thus we can also sense, subjectively, a temporal succession where, objectively, we must confirm a coexistence. The experienced content is “objectivated,” and at that point the object is constituted in the mode of apprehension from the material of the experienced contents. But the object is not merely the sum or combination of these “contents,” which do not enter into it at all. The object is more than content and in a certain sense other than it. The objectivity belongs to “empirical experience,” specifically, to the unity of empirical experience, to the nexus of nature governed by empirical laws. Expressed phenomenologically: the objectivity is precisely not constituted in the “primary” contents but in the apprehension-characters and in the laws belonging to the essence of these characters. To grasp this fully and to render it clearly intelligible is precisely the task of the phenomenology of knowledge.

Husserl. PCIT, p. 8.

These considerations ultimately draw us to the subject of the origin of time. But, not the origin of time in any cosmological sense, or the origin of time according to a psychological origin. Husserl focuses on the truly primitive act characters of experience that operate according to the laws that are the source of the validity of objective experience. The inquiry is epistemological rather than ontological, but with a slight twist, because it is not merely a question of knowing, but of meaning or sense.
8. The Origin of Time

The question of the origin of time is a classic conundrum that is usually resolved by invoking God or some other cosmological surrogate. However, in the context of a phenomenological investigation of temporality, the question of the origin of time actually refers to the primordial constitutional conditions of experience. It is the “epistemological question about the possibility of experience” (Husserl. PCIT, p. 9). As such, it asks “the question about the essence of experience” (Ibid).

The question of the origin of time is directed towards the primitive formations of time-consciousness, in which the primitive differences of the temporal become constituted intuitively and properly as the sources of all the evidences relating to time. Husserl. Ibid.

In sum, the phenomenological analysis of the origin of time is directed toward the primordial structuralizing performances of temporalizing consciousness. The question of worldly objective / real time and its metaphysical origin is not the issue. The phenomenology of time concerns the manners of its articulation within experience as experienced.

The epoché is clearly in evidence, despite the fact that it is unnamed, when Husserl writes,

We are concerned with reality only insofar as it is reality meant, objectivated, intuited, or conceptually…
thought. With respect to the problem of time, this means that we are interested in experiences of time. That these experiences are themselves fixed in objective time, that they belong in the world of physical things and psychic subjects, and that they have their place, their efficacy, their empirical being, and their origin in this world does not concern us and we know nothing about it. On the other hand, it does interest us that data “in objective time” are meant in these experiences. Precisely this description that the acts in question mean this or that “objectivity” – or more exactly, the exhibition of the a priori truths that pertain to the different constitutive moments of the objectivity – belongs to the domain of phenomenology. We seek to bring the a priori of time to clarity by exploring the consciousness of time, by bringing its essential constitution to light, and by exhibiting the apprehen-

sion-contents and act-characters that pertain – perhaps specifically – to time and to which the a priori temporal laws essentially belong. Naturally, I mean by this laws of the following obvious sort: that the fixed temporal order is a two-dimensional infinite series, that two different times can never be simultaneous, that their relation is a nonreciproc al one, that transitivity obtains, that to every time an earlier and a later time belong, and so on. – So much by way of general introduction.

Husserl. PCIT, p. 9-10.

Thus, Husserl turns to the essential transitivity of time that conditions the consciousness of time, but without reducing such a law to a psychological origin (i.e., psychologism). As we shall see, the theme of intentionality, as it develops in Husserl’s thought, means much more than a mere character of consciousness. It is the primordial structurality of transitivity – with its apriori laws concerning simultaneity and succession – by which consciousness is structured in its various forms of comportment. However, this does not represent a mere shift to the formal / idealistic opposition to psychologism. Husserl’s phenomenological approach is rather a suspension of these classical Absolutes in order to explore the middle-ground of what is none other than an essential oscillation between them. The project is to clarify this horizon precisely as it gives itself.
9. Brentano’s Discourse on Temporality and the Roles of Original Association and Phantasy

With the suspension of Objective Time, Husserl attends to the issue of the origin of temporality. Inevitably, he is drawn to the teachings of his mentor, Franz Brentano – who was chiefly responsible for re-introducing a radicalized theory of intentionality into middle to late nineteenth century occidental philosophical / psychological thought. As with all beginnings, Husserl’s initial focus on Brentano’s work is actually none other than a point of departure. We shall focus on what Husserl retains (and modifies) in Brentano’s discourse on time and that which he specifically rejects.
FIRST SECTION

BRENTANO'S THEORY OF THE ORIGIN OF TIME

§ 3. The Original Associations

We now want to attempt to gain access to the problems we have raised, doing so in connection with Brentano's theory of the origin of time. Brentano believes that he has found the solution in the original associations, in the "coming into being of the immediate representations of memory, that is, of those representations which, according to an invariable law, attach themselves without any mediation to the actual perceptual representations."1 When we see, hear, or in any way perceive something, it always happens that what we perceive remains present to us for a time, but not without undergoing modification. Apart from other changes, such as those in intensity and fullness, which occur in more or less noticeable degrees, we must always confirm yet another and distinctly original change: namely, that something remaining in consciousness in this way appears to us as more or less past, as pushed back in time, as it were. When a melody [11] sounds, for example, the individual tone does not utterly disappear with the cessation of the stimulus or of the neural movement it excites. When the new tone is sounding, the preceding tone has not disappeared without leaving a trace. If it had, we would be quite incapable of noticing the relations among the successive tones; in each moment we would have a tone, or perhaps an empty pause in the interval between the sounding of two tones, but never the representation of a melody. On the other hand, the abiding of the tone-representations in consciousness does not settle the matter. If they were to remain unmodified, then instead of a melody we would have a chord of simultaneous tones, or rather a disharmonious tangle of sound, as if we had struck simultaneously all the notes that had previously sounded. Only because that peculiar modification occurs, only because every tone-sensation, after the stimulus that produced it has disappeared, awakens from out of itself a representation that is similar and furnished with a temporal determination, and only because this temporal determination continuously changes, can a melody come to be represented in which the individual tones have their definite places and their definite tempos.

It is therefore a universal law that a continuous series of representations is fastened by nature to every given representa-
tion. Each representation belonging to this series reproduces the content of the one preceding, but in such a way that it always affixes the moment of the past to the new representation.

Husserl. PCIT, pp.11-12.
Brentano’s theory demonstrates how phantasy plays an essential role in constituting the temporality of experience and the temporality of the objects of experience. However, he also postulates that we do not actually see duration, succession, and change. His analyses of time get caught up in a kind of Parmenidean present where phantasy plays the role of originally producing the echoes of past impressions which continually attach themselves to that which is actually present, thus giving them as enduring temporal objects. Change occurs to that which presently endures, but it is not actually perceived as such. In a sense, alteration takes a backseat to continuity or sameness.

However the pivotal role that Brentano assigns to phantasy in the constitution of, what he calls, Original Association – the production of reproductive annexations to the present – actually bears the seeds of a radically different orientation. This will become apparent shortly.

Let us see what Husserl has to say about Brentano’s discourse on phantasy.
This is actually where Hume erred – although we must be careful not to confuse sensations with what he calls impressions – let us stay, for the moment, with ‘experiences.’ He was blinded by the succession of experiences without taking due account of the *experience of succession*. This is particularly apparent when he speaks of the mind as a ‘bundle of impressions.’ As it was pointed out earlier, a collection of different experiences in succession would not *give* time – without the *experience of succession* – in much the same way that a collection of different positions of an object in space would not *give* movement.

The notion of the mind as a bundle of impressions would not actually give discreteness since temporal differences would not be announced and perceived as such. Therefore, at one end of this spectrum, a collection of notes in these terms would only sound as a simultaneous cacophony. We would not find any hint of a melody – only a clash of noise. And, at the other end of the spectrum singular tones that popped in and out of existence would not give a melody either. Their rapid succession as discrete existences would not be sufficient to produce a melodic continuum since, as Husserl reminds us, the duration of sensation is not to be confused with the sensation of duration.

Brentano presents a theory that does, but only to a certain extent, account for the possibility of hearing a melody. He goes further than Hume in reference to the originally productive function of phantasy in the constitution of the temporal object, but he does not really escape the latter’s purely psychologically objective bias. Brentano expresses what is implicit in Hume’s analyses (but which Hume was unable to explain with the degree of precision and clarity that he desired) when he makes reference to the obvious point that the discreteness of a temporal object actually requires certain laws of association to be at work if that object is to stand out as a temporally extended object – in its discreteness and self-
sameness – at all. Its discreteness actually depends on an originary form of association. Brentano’s idea of association through the reproductive annexation of echoes to the present engages with the issue of how objects can be extended rather than merely momentary. However, although his theory of continuous annexation – whereby past sensations are reproduced in phantasy and continuously added as external supports to that which is given in the present – addresses how a temporal object is stretched / extended, it is insufficient with respect to how we may address differences between the enduring or passing-away as distinct from the object that endures or passes-away. In this sense, he does not really get much further than Hume’s object-oriented analyses, which are limited to the objective description of successive mental states.

Husserl gives a careful analysis of the merits of Brentano’s theory by adumbrating its achievements and the major breakthroughs, which serves as the principle starting point of what is actually nothing other than a critique of its limitations. He establishes the direction of his own phenomenological investigations by discussing the context of Brentano’s discourse in the following terms:

It is conceivable that our sensations might endure or succeed one another without our knowing anything about it at all, since our representations would carry in themselves no temporal determinateness whatsoever. If we consider the case of a succession, for example, and assume that the sensations disappear along with the stimuli causing them, we would have a succession of sensations without a suspicion of a temporal flow. With the emergence of the new sensation, we would no longer have any memory that the earlier sensations had existed; in each moment we would be conscious only of the sensation just produced and of nothing further. But even the persistence of the sensations already produced would still not furnish us with the representation of succession. If, in the case of a succession of tones, the earlier tones were to be preserved just as they had been while at the same time new tones were to sound again and again, we would have a simultaneous sum of tones in our representation but not a succession of tones. There would be no difference between this case and the case in which all of these tones sounded at once. Or consider another example: If, in the case of a motion,
the moving body were held unchanged in consciousness in each of its successive positions, the space traversed by the body would appear to us as continuously filled, but we would not have the representation of a movement. The representation of succession comes about only if the earlier sensation does not persist unchanged in consciousness but is modified in an original manner; that is, only if it is continuously modified from moment to moment. With the shift into phantasy, the sensation receives the continuously changing temporal character; thus from moment to moment the content appears as pushed further and further back. But this modification is no longer a matter of sensation; it is not produced by the stimulus. The stimulus generates the present sensation-content. If the stimulus disappears, the sensation also disappears. But then the sensation itself becomes productive: it produces for itself a phantasy-representation the same or almost the same in content and enriched by the temporal character. This representation in turn awakens a new one, which is joined to it in continuous fashion, and so on. Brentano calls this continuous annexation of a temporally modified representation to the given representation “original association.” As a consequence of his theory, Brentano comes to deny the perception of succession and change. We believe that we hear a melody and therefore that we still hear what is just past, but this is only an illusion proceeding from the vivacity of the original association.


Brentano’s discourse on Original Association is based on a theory of phantasy that extends and deepens the Kantian view that it plays a constitutional role in experience. In these terms, the imagination no longer represents a merely secondary feature of experience that only repeats, abstracts, and concatenates that which has already been given. It plays a principle role in the originary givenness of the given. We not only speak here of a reproductive modification of that which is given, thereby endowing it with a retained horizon of persistence, but of the foundation of its givenness as an extended object in both dimensions of the past and the future – i.e., retaining and expecting.

This is the subject of section 4 of Husserl’s *Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*: “The Acquiring of the Future and Infinite Time”
In section 5: “The Modification of Representations through Temporal Characters,” Husserl examines another important claim by Brentano.

According to Brentano, we must take note of yet another particularly important characteristic of the representations of time. The temporal species of past and future have the peculiarity that they do not determine the elements of the sensuous representations with which they combine, as other supervening modes do, but alter them instead. A louder tone \( c \) is nevertheless a tone \( c \), and so too is a weaker tone \( c \). On the other hand, a tone \( c \) that was is not a tone \( c \), a red that was is not a red. Temporal determinations do not determine: they alter essentially, exactly as the determinations “represented,” “wished,” and the like, do. A thaler represented, a possible thaler, is no thaler. Only the determination “now” constitutes an exception. The \( A \) that now exists is certainly an actual \( A \). The present does not alter, but on the other hand it does not determine either. If I append the now to the representation of a man, the man acquires no new characteristic thereby, nor is any characteristic designated in him.


Whereas the determination ‘now’ adds nothing to that which presently gives itself, the temporal indices of past and future are fundamentally transformative. It is in the next passage that Husserl presents what is, perhaps, the most fundamental insight that establishes the whole direction and orientation of his temporal analyses.

The fact that perception represents something as now adds nothing to the quality, intensity, and spatial determination of what is represented. According to Brentano, the modifying temporal predicates are irreal; only the determination of the now is real. What is remarkable here is that the irreal temporal determinations can belong in a continuous series along with the only actually real determination, to which the irreal determinations attach themselves in infinitesimal differences. The real now then becomes irreal again and again. If one asks how the real is able to turn into the irreal through the supervision of modifying [15] temporal determinations, no answer other than the following can be given: temporal determinations of every sort are attached in a certain way and as a necessary consequence to every coming into being and passing away that occurs in the present. For it is altogether evident and obvious that everything that is, in consequence of the fact that it is, *will have been*; and that, from the perspective of the future, everything that is, in consequence of the fact that it is, is something that has been.
That which is now is, itself, constituted by the interplay of past and future. That which is given precisely as now presences by the grace of this interplay. In other words, the now / present is non-self-sufficient. Neither is it discrete. It is rather the field of a negotiation – the site of the fulfillment, degree of fulfillment, or non-fulfillment of a play of remembrance and expectation. It is by virtue of this play that the present is the constant horizon in which change is announced – while it does not change. This is its constancy. It is the stage on which the history and, thus, objectivity of things play themselves out.

In section 6, Husserl continues his critique of Brentano’s discourse on temporal experience. But, before looking at the next passage, I would like to suggest, as we work through Husserl’s text as a whole, that we might try to bear in mind the degree to which he actually departs from the thought of his teacher, by re-introducing the theme of how we do actually perceive succession and change – which according to Husserl, “Brentano comes to deny” (Husserl. PCIT, p. 14).

Husserl writes

If we turn now to the criticism of the theory we have presented, we must first ask: What does it do, and what does it intend to do? Obviously it does not move within the realm that we recognized as necessary for a phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness: it works with transcendent presuppositions, with existing temporal objects that bring “stimuli” to bear on us and “cause” sensations in us, and the like. It therefore presents itself as a theory of the psychological origin of the representation of time. But it also contains fragments of an epistemological consideration of the conditions of the possibility of a consciousness of objective temporality – a consciousness that itself appears and must be able to appear as temporal. We may add to this the discussions about the peculiarities of temporal predicates, which must stand in relation to psychological and phenomenological predicates – relations which, however, are not pursued further.

Husserl. PCIT, p.16.
Now, this passage demonstrates that Husserl’s phenomenological discourse on hyletic data is not in service to any form of sensationalism in the strict sense of the term. This represents a considerable departure from Brentano (and perhaps, from Freud, who also studied Brentano’s work). This type of language of causation is suspended along with Objective time.

To reiterate, Husserl is only interested in the “...fragments of an epistemological consideration of the conditions of the possibility of a consciousness of objective temporality – a consciousness that itself appears and must be able to appear as temporal.”

As for Brentano’s theory concerning laws of original association, which shares certain similarities with that of Hume, Husserl is not concerned with such an objective psychological level of concatenation, but only by what is always already presupposed by its possibility. There are fundamental differences in the givenness of a temporal object that need to be taken into account by turning toward the question of the appearing of duration, succession, and change.

Brentano speaks of a law of original association according to which representations of a momentary memory attach themselves to the perceptions of the moment. Brentano obviously means this to be a psychological law governing the new formation of psychic experiences on the basis of given psychic experiences. These experiences are psychic, they are objectivated, they themselves have their time, and what is at issue for Brentano is their genesis and development. All of this belongs in the region of psychology and does not interest us here. However, a phenomenological core does lie hidden in these considerations, and the statements that follow are intended to be restricted to this core alone. Duration, succession, changes appear. What is implied in this appearing? In a succession, for example, a “now” appears and, in union with it, a “past.” The unity of the consciousness that encompasses intentionally what is present and what is past is a phenomenological datum. Now the question is whether, as Brentano asserts, what is past actually appears in this consciousness in the mode of phantasy.

Husserl. *PCIT*, p.16.
It is precisely at this point that Husserl’s developing thesis begins to inscribe the theoretical traces of the phenomenological orientation of which he is said to be the father. It is here that he begins to draw our attention to nothing other than a transcendental aesthetic – to the horizon of the *possibility* of judgement. How is it possible to distinguish between that which is now, no-longer, or not-yet?

*When Brentano speaks of the acquisition of the future, he distinguishes between the original intuition of time, which according to him is the creation of original association and the extended intuition of time, which also derives from phantasy*\(^2\) *but not from original association. We can also say that the intuition of time stands over against the nonpresentive representation of time, the representation of infinite time, of times and temporal relations that are not realized intuitively. Now it is most extraordinary that in his theory of the intuition of time Brentano does not take into consideration at all the difference between the perception of time and the phantasy of time, a difference that forces itself upon us here and that he cannot possibly have overlooked. Even if he may refuse to speak of the perception of something temporal (with the exception of the now-point as the limit between past and future), the difference that underlies our talk about the perceiving of a succession and the remembering of a succession perceived in the past (or even the mere phantasy of a perception) surely cannot be denied and must somehow be clarified. If the original intuition of time is already a creation of phantasy, then what distinguishes this phantasy of the temporal from the one in which we are conscious of something temporal that belongs to the more remote past – of something, therefore, that does not belong in the sphere of original association and is not combined in one consciousness with the current perception, but that at one time was combined with a perception that is now past? If the re-presentation of a succession experienced yesterday involves the re-presentation of the temporal field originally experienced yesterday, and if the latter already presents itself as a continuum of originally associated phantasies, then we would be dealing with phantasies of phantasies. Here we encounter unresolved difficulties in Brentano’s theory, which call into question [17] the accuracy of his analysis of the original consciousness of time,\(^3\) *That he could not master these difficulties depends on still other shortcomings beyond those we have indicated.*

Husserl. *PCIT*, pp.16-17.

The associative movement that Brentano describes – as produced by phantasy – does not carry sufficient distinctions within itself to provide the criteria by which consciousness
would be able to distinguish between different moments of the past. One may go further and suggest that it would not really have a way of determining the present as distinct from the past either – given that the original association by which a present object is experienced is already the product of phantasy.

Furthermore, Brentano’s discourse on association, as based on a theory of constitutive and originary phantasy, inevitably leads to an infinite regress. Although there is a metaphysical adherence to actual objects of sensation affecting us, it is only through the reproductive association of phantasy that their persistence is given. Since only the now-point is actual in this schema and the presentation of that which is now depends upon a reproductive / representative movement of adding, re-productively, past presents to it, how could we distinguish between the now and the not-now? Is it a case of taking different ‘types’ of phantasy into account? After all, if the possibility of temporal awareness ultimately rests on phantasy, where would we find the distinction between that which is actual (now) and that which is phantasy (not-now)? As present moments are increasingly shunted further into the past as reproductive annexations to the new now, then according to such a schema, we find nothing more than a mimetic matrix of representations of representations whose starting point was already that of phantasy.

According to Husserl,

Brentano does not distinguish between act and content, or, respectively, between act, content of apprehension, and apprehended object. Yet we must make up our minds about which of these accounts it is to which the temporal moment should be charged. If original association fastens a continuous sequence of
Brentano’s analyses express a bias toward the present. According to his viewpoint, only the now is real, whereas the past and future are irreal. This is a classic re-formulation of a most ancient prejudice. However, his theory of original association already problematizes this metaphysics of the primacy of the present, and yet its originarity remains unquestioned.
10. Signs of the Times?

Husserl turns to a question that cannot be answered with any efficacy within the limits of such an account of time. He asks...

Where do we get the idea of the past? The being-present of an A in consciousness through the annexation of a new moment, even if we call that new moment the moment of the past, is incapable of explaining the transcending consciousness: A is past. It is not able to furnish the slightest representation of the fact that what I now have in consciousness as A with its new character is identical with something that is not in consciousness now but that did exist. – What, then, are the moments of original association that are now being experienced? Are they perhaps times themselves? In that case, we confront the contradiction: all of these moments are there now, enclosed within the same consciousness of an object; they are therefore simultaneous. And yet the succession of time excludes simultaneity. Are these moments perhaps not the temporal moments themselves but temporal signs instead? But this only provides us with a new word. The consciousness of time is still not analyzed: it remains unexplained how the consciousness of a past becomes constituted on the basis of such signs, or in what sense, in what way, and through which apprehensions these experienced moments function differently from the moments of quality, and function in such a way that the consciousness that is supposed to be now comes to be related to a not-now.


This passage presents a fascinating vantage point from which to re-examine the role of the sign in the functioning of time-consciousness. The early work of Jacques Derrida (see *Speech and Phenomena* [1967]) takes up this theme as a means of undermining the traditional hierarchy of Western philosophy, which has always tended to reduce the sign – re-presentation – to a secondary position in relation to the ideal of the primacy and immediacy of presentation. Derrida goes as far as saying that the ‘re’ of re-presentation always already precedes presentation, thus reversing the old hierarchy. We can find the seeds of this thought in Brentano, which is more fully developed in Husserl, but the former still holds onto a primal now as the original source of sensation that begins the whole process. Classically, the thought

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56
of presentation and re-presentation has always functioned as a dyad that indicates the difference between the real (presentation) and the irreal (re-presentation). However, any epistemological approach to the real / irreal dyad must attend to the conditions of the possibility of such a distinction – thus, the ‘re’ must always already be implied. However, this does not mean that we are left with a matrix of representations of representations acting like a veil that restricts the possibility of attending to the real. It just means that the real still has to be announced as such and that its ‘validity’ – not its existence – first requires the ‘re’ of re-presentation.

But, I am leaping too far ahead again. How does Husserl treat this issue?

The attempt to treat what is past as something nonreal and nonexistent is also highly questionable. A supervening psychic moment cannot create unreality nor can it dismiss present existence. In fact, the whole domain of original association is a present and real experience. To this domain belongs the entire series of original temporal moments produced by original association, together with the rest of the moments belonging to the temporal object.

We therefore see that an analysis of time-consciousness is useless that seeks to make the intuitive extent of time intelligible merely by means of new moments shaded off continuously, which are somehow patched or fused onto the moments of content that constitute the object localized in time. Briefly stated: The temporal form is neither a temporal content itself nor a complex of new contents that somehow attach themselves to the temporal content. Now even if Brentano did not fall into the error of reducing, after the fashion of sensualism, all experiences to mere primary contents, and even if he was the first to recognize the radical separation between primary contents and act-characters, his theory of time nonetheless shows that he has just not taken into consideration the theoretically decisive act-characters. The question of how time-consciousness is possible and how it is to be understood remains unanswered.


According to Husserl, temporal form is not a content or a complex of new contents. He is concerned to deepen the analysis of the difference between primary contents and act-characters, which Brentano was, arguably, the first to make thematic, but which he treated
asymmetrically. Husserl’s phenomenological approach is concerned with that which remains understated in Brentano’s discourse on the origin of time.
11. The Problem of the Constitution of Duration

In the Second Section of the lectures – “Analysis of the Consciousness of Time” – Husserl takes a brief look at the sources of Brentano’s conception of time. He remarks on the theories of Herbart and Lotze, who are said to have worked with a conception of the now that was a ‘driving motive’ in Brentano’s thought:

[N]amely, the idea that in order to grasp a succession of representations (a and b, for example), it is necessary that the representations be the absolutely simultaneous objects of a knowing that puts them quite indivisibly in a single and indivisible act. Husserl. *PCIT*, p.21.

Although this argument expresses the important fact that these associative representations would be impossible “...if the act of representing were itself entirely dissolved in temporal succession” (which remains a problem for Hume) there is a stubborn adherence to the concept of the now in which it is reduced to a point.

Husserl then makes reference to W. Stern’s objection to this “dogma of the momentariness of a whole of consciousness.”
There are cases in which apprehension takes place only on the basis of a temporally extended content of consciousness, that is to say, cases in which the apprehension is extended over a stretch of time (the so-called “presence-time”). Thus, for example, a discrete succession can be held together without prejudice to the nonsimultaneity of its members by a bond of consciousness, by a

unitary act of apprehension. That several successive tones yield a melody is possible only because the succession of psychic events is united “at once” into a total formation. They are in consciousness successively, but they fall within one and the same total act. We obviously do not have the tones all at once, and we do not hear the melody by virtue of the circumstance that the earlier tones continue to endure while the last tone is heard. The tones rather form a successive unity with a common effect, the apprehension-form. Naturally, the latter is consummated only with the last tone. There is, accordingly, a perception of unities that succeed one another in time, just as there is a perception of coexisting unities; and since that is the case, there is also a direct apprehension of identity, equality, similarity, and difference.

“There is no need for the artificial assumption that the comparison always occurs because the memory image of the first tone exists side by side with the second tone; rather the whole content of consciousness unrolling in the presence-time becomes the foundation equally for the resulting apprehensions of equality and difference.”


Stern’s approach to the issue of how extendedness is given within a ‘presence time’ – which is fundamentally extended in itself – is a definite improvement upon the idea of an extendedness that is given in a now-point. But, there are unresolved difficulties.

Husserl returns to the notion of the now-point in such a way as to articulate its inherent weaknesses.

What stands in the way of a clarification of the problems being debated in these statements and in the whole discussion related to them is the absence of the absolutely necessary distinctions that we have already established in connection with Brentano. It now remains to be asked: How are we to understand the apprehension of transcendent temporal objects that are extended over a duration, continuously filling it in the same way

Husserl maintains that this gives rise to an entirely new question: “How, in addition to ‘temporal objects,’ immanent and transcendent, does time itself – the duration and succession of objects – become constituted?” (Husserl. *PCIT*, p. 24).

It is certainly evident that the perception of a temporal object itself has temporality, that the perception of duration itself presupposes the duration of perception, that the perception of any temporal form itself has its temporal form. If we disregard all transcендencies, there remains to perception in all of its phenomenological constituents the phenomenological temporality that belongs to its irreducible essence. Since objective temporality always becomes constituted phenomenologically and stands before us in appearance as an objectivity or as a moment of an objectivity only through this constitution, a phenomenological analysis of time cannot clarify the constitution of time without considering the constitution of temporal objects. By temporal objects in the specific sense we understand objects that are not only unities in time but that also contain temporal extension in themselves. When a tone sounds, my objectivating apprehension can make the tone itself, which endures and fades away, into an object and yet not make the duration of the tone or the tone in its duration into an object. The latter – the tone in its duration – is a temporal object.


Here, we find a level of abstraction or a dimensional shift that is analogous to saying that we must turn from ‘moving objects’ in such a way as to focus purely on the ‘movement’ of the objects instead. Duration, succession, and change ‘announce’ themselves here. Note, it is important to remember that even a state of rest / immobility is still a modality of movement.

Husserl asks us to take...
Husserl explains the problem with the classic assumption that what one really hears when listening to a tone is that which is ‘actually now.’ This would mean that one does not ‘...hear’ the melody, but only the single present tone’ (Husserl. *PCIT*, p. 25).

In order to account for how a melody is heard, rather than just a succession of individual tones, Husserl turns to the running-off phenomena that structure such a possibility. These performances disclose how an enduring object – at rest or in motion – registers as the same object rather than as a succession of fleeting objects that are taken as being independent in themselves. Indeed, the continuum of the object as the same always already presupposes internal differentiation, if it is truly stretched out in time, but only according to a fundamental order of interdependency. The moments of the entity are not discrete, but are flowing temporal indices of the object as a whole in its spatio-temporality. A distinctive difference announces itself here between the object as it appears and its manifold forms of appearing.
Husserl. *PCIT*, p. 28.

Husserl’s analyses require a re-situation of the meaning of appearance in order to achieve the precision that is necessary to carefully describe the phenomena that play themselves out in the differences between that which appears and the manners of appearing of that which appears in the field of experience. This is the point at which he actually launches into his own thesis, by providing a diagram of time, which demonstrates the structure of continuous alteration that is constituted within the flow of the running-off phenomena of time constituting consciousness.

The Diagram of Time

We would prefer to avoid, then, the use of the word “appear-
ances” for the phenomena that constitute immanent temporal
objects; for these phenomena are themselves immanent objects
and are “appearances” in an entirely different sense. We speak
here of the “running-off phenomena,” or better still, of the
“modes of temporal orientation”; and with respect to the
immanent objects themselves, we speak of their “running-off
characters” (e.g., now, past). We know that the running-off
phenomenon is a continuity of constant changes. This continuity
forms an inseparable unity, inseparable into extended sections
that could exist by themselves and inseparable into phases that
could exist by themselves, into points of the continuity. The parts
that we single out by abstraction can exist only in the whole
running-off; and this is equally true of the phases, the points that
belong to the running-off continuity. We can also say of this
continuity, with evidence, that in a certain sense it is immutable;
that is, with regard to its form. It is inconceivable that the
continuity of phases would contain the same phase-mode twice or
even contain it as stretched over an entire component section.
Just as each point of time (and each extent of time) differs
“individually,” so to speak, from every other one and just as no
one of them can occur twice, so no running-off mode can occur [28]
twice. We will still have to make further distinctions and provide
clearer descriptions here, however. First of all, we emphasize that
the running-off modes of an immanent temporal object have a
beginning, a source-point, so to speak. This is the running-off

\[ \text{AE} - \text{The series of now points.} \]
\[ \text{AA'} - \text{Sinking into the past.} \]
\[ \text{EA'} - \text{Continuum of phases (Now-point} \]
\[ \text{with horizon of the past).} \]
\[ \text{E} \rightarrow \text{The series of nows perhaps} \]
\[ \text{filled with other objects.} \]
mode with which the immanent object begins to exist. It is characterized as now. In the steady progression of the running-off modes we then find the remarkable circumstance that each later running-off phase is itself a continuity, a continuity that constantly expands, a continuity of pasts. To the continuity of running-off modes of the object's duration, we contrast the continuity of running-off modes belonging to each point of the duration. This second continuity is obviously included in the first, the continuity of running-off modes of the object's duration. The running-off continuity of an enduring object is therefore a continuum whose phases are the continua of the running-off modes belonging to the different time-points of the duration of the object. If we proceed along the concrete continuity, we move forward in a process of constant modifications; and in this process, the running-off-mode – that is, the running-off continuity of the time-points in question – changes continuously. Since a new now is always entering on the scene, the now changes into a past; and as it does so, the whole running-off continuity of pasts belonging to the preceding point moves "downwards" uniformly into the depths of the past. In our diagram, the continuous series of ordinates illustrates the running-off modes of the enduring object. They grow from A (one point) into a determinate extent, which has the last now as its final point. Then the series of running-off modes that no longer include a now (that is, a now belonging to this duration) begins; the duration is no longer actually present but past, and continuously sinking deeper into the past. The diagram therefore gives a complete picture of the double continuity of running-off modes.


This diagram of time is the hinge of all the intentional analyses of Husserl’s lectures on time-consciousness. When he speaks of the double continuity of running off modes – ‘modes of temporal orientation’ and ‘running off characters’ – he is clear to say that they are part of an inseparable unity of ‘running off phenomena’ [*Ablaufsphänomene*]. It is a double continuity through which the running off moments of experience always already embody, and are embodied by, a continuum. When Husserl speaks of the now-point as the source point of the immanent object’s existence, we must be careful to understand its meaning within the context of the running off modes of the object’s duration. The object does not pop in and out of existence from now-point to now-point. Each now-point is the cutting edge of what is
already a continuum. The now embodies this continuum within itself through the grace of the double continuity of the running off phenomena, which includes the continuity of the running off modes of the object’s duration and the continuity of running off modes that belong to each point of the duration. Such discourse on the now-point is, of course, purely in terms of an abstraction of the original continuity by which it can be brought into relief. Existence is stretched out and the now-point of the continuum of the object in its duration can only stand out because that which preceded it announces a certain kind of difference in temporal orientation through which the now is able to announce itself as such.

The diagram shows how the duration of the temporal object involves a kind of sinking-down \(A \rightarrow A'\) – a movement of sedimentation – which is always co-extensive with the now \(E <\rightarrow A'\) while ‘announcing’ itself as not-now against the past from which it stands out. But, this movement of sinking-down also does much more than establish a simple bifurcation between the now and not-now. The not-now is not a generic leveller, a simple contrast to the now. It is rather a horizon, receding into a past that is stretched, where all that has been retains its own temporal index in relation to that which preceded it and that which followed despite the fact that all of these moments are now past. Pastness is a community of different not-nows. Recall how Husserl likens such a temporal perspective to that of a spatial kind, where one is moving away from a particular spatial point, whose relations with its surrounding objects remain the same as they recede uniformly from one’s moving point of vision. There is a uniform sinking down of past moments that gives a horizon of temporal extendedness from which the now stands out in relief – where the announcement of the now is always simultaneously announcing its transition into not-now – as it passes over into the past.

What is actually retained is the object in its duration – its continuous alteration – where the duration of the immanent object is announced through the enduring running off modes of its changing temporal indices. One cannot speak of an enduring object without its
changing modes of temporal forms of announcement (e.g., now, past, recently past, distantly past, etc). It is not the case that different temporal indices (signs) are simply attached to an object; they are inextricably bound up together as a double continuity.

13. **Retentional Continua and the Differences BetweenAppearances and Appearing**

It is hardly surprising that Husserl feels that it is necessary to abstain from using the word ‘appearances’ for phenomena that constitute temporal objects. These types of phenomena are indeed immanent, but they are irreducible to ‘appearances’ in the usual sense (which are generally associated with ‘enduring objects’ alone, without reference to the announcement of the ‘duration’ of the objects). Therefore, one could say that the word ‘appearing’ is actually better suited to Husserl’s discourse, since it also refers to the announcing through which an object is able to announce itself (appear).

Husserl’s claim regarding the now as some kind of source point within the continuum leads to its classification as primal impression. In reference to the issue of continuity itself, primal impression is of course dependant upon a structurality that always precedes it. This is not a question of an empirical precedence, but one of essential form that is always already implied in its own structure – that is, its constant shift into not-now, which, in Husserl’s discourse, is no longer equivalent to non-being.

After the Diagram of Time, Husserl begins to adumbrate different moments of this structurality by engaging with the question of primal impression and its retentional modification.
The “source-point” with which the “production” of the enduring object begins is a primal impression. This consciousness is in a state of constant change: the tone-now present “in person” continuously changes (scil. consciously, “in” consciousness) into something that has been; an always new tone-now continuously relieves the one that has passed over into modification. But when the consciousness of the tone-now, the primal impression, passes over into retention, this retention itself is a now in turn, something actually existing. While it is actually present itself (but not an actually present tone), it is retention of the tone that has been. A ray of meaning can be directed towards the now: towards the retention; but it can also be directed towards what is retentionally intended: towards the past tone. Every actually present now of consciousness, however, is subject to the law of modification. It changes into retention of retention and does so continuously. Accordingly, a fixed continuum of retention arises in such a way that each later point is retention for every earlier point. And each retention is already a continuum.

Husserl. PCIT, pp. 30-31.

Retentions embody retentions within themselves. This means that retentions are not to be taken as discrete reproductive entities that are strung out side by side along a continuum, or simply tacked on to one another. Every retention is the embodiment of a continuum. It is of the essence of every actual present now of consciousness that it is always already undergoing continuous modification. Retention is a necessary part of its structure. Therefore, to reiterate, the present now of consciousness is a source point only in the sense that it is the site of the giving of nowness and of its passing over into the has-been – where pastness is already part of its horizon. The present of consciousness is the cutting edge of what is always already an expanding retentional continuum. The now cannot be taken for itself – except as an abstraction of what is originally a continuum.

Therefore, that which is given, as Husserl says, “in person” is constantly being relieved by something new. But, this is something new in two dimensions and not only in the dimension of a new now that has replaced the preceding now. The now-past of that which was present as now is equally new in that it coincides with that which is present as part of its
extension. This modification of an enduring object – which gives it as the same, but past rather than now – is not a past consciousness. It is a present consciousness of that which is past and, most significantly, it is coextensive with primary impression. Primary impression and retention name two different temporal orientations that actually occur simultaneously. Primary impression is a present orientation that is turned toward the extended object as it presences now, while retention is also a present orientation that gives the extendedness of the enduring object as it was, which is precisely the present consciousness of its pastness. Together, they produce the possibility of the enduring consciousness of the duration of an object, whose pastness is always already part of its present structure – that is, if it is to be said that it endures.

In these terms, consider what Husserl says about the perception of motion.

DURING THE TIME...

15 that a motion is being perceived, a grasping-as-now takes place moment by moment; and in this grasping, the actually present phase of the motion itself becomes constituted. But this now-apprehension is, as it were, the head attached to the comet’s tail of retentions relating to the earlier now-points of the motion.

Husserl. PCIT, p. 32.

Present perception is more than primary impression alone, since it always already has a history on hand (as the condition of the possibility of determining movement in the first place). Therefore, the meaning of present perception remains ambiguous at this point, since primary impression is not self-sufficient with respect to the consciousness of duration.

Therefore, in this regard, it is necessary to return to the structural interdependency of retention and primary impression. Not only are retentions not simply tacked onto one another, this is also not the case with respect to the relation between retention and primary impression. They are intrinsically ‘intertwined.’ Primary impression gives the now of a temporal object while retention gives the passing-over of that which was now into that which is past as the
unfolding of the horizon of the present itself, always carrying the heritage of the continuous modification of the now into past nows.

14. The Radicalization of the Meaning of Perception

Present perception actually comprises both primary impression and retention. The attentive reader should have noticed that this only takes into account the pushing back of the now into a horizon of former nows, where primary impression is the ever-repeated beginning point (and if the idea of a beginning point that is always already a repetition sounds confusing, then it is necessary that one remind oneself that this is not an empirical-psychological succession of an objective temporal order), and that it does not take into account the role of the extension of the not-yet, i.e., expectation. We must allow Husserl to take his own time in reaching this point in his analysis.

For now, Husserl is concerned to further flesh out the meaning of retention as a unique kind of intentionality.
§ 12. Retention as a Unique Kind of Intentionality\textsuperscript{16}

It still remains for us to discuss in a more precise way what sort of modification it is that we have designated as retentional.

One speaks of the dying-away, the fading, and so on, of the contents of sensation when perception proper passes over into retention. Now it is already clear, following our explanations up to this point, that the retentional "contents" are not at all contents in the original sense. When a tone dies away, it itself is sensed at first with particular fullness (intensity); and then there follows a rapid weakening in intensity. The tone is still there, still sensed, but in mere reverberation. This genuine tone-sensation must be distinguished from the tonal moment in retention. The retentional tone is not a present tone but precisely a tone "primarily remembered" in the now: it is not really on hand in the retentional consciousness. But neither can the tonal moment that belongs to this consciousness be a different tone that is really on hand; it cannot even be a very weak tone equivalent in quality (such as an echo). A present tone can indeed "remind" one of a past tone, exemplify it, pictorialize it; but that already presupposes another representation of the past. The intuition of the past cannot itself be a pictorialization. It is an original consciousness. We cannot deny, of course, that there are echoes. But when we recognize and distinguish them, we can easily confirm that they obviously do not belong to retention but to perception. The reverberation of a violin tone is precisely a feeble present violin tone and is absolutely different from the retention of the loud tone that has just passed. The echoing itself and after-images of any sort left behind by the stronger data of sensation, far from having to be ascribed necessarily to the essence of retention, have nothing at all to do with it.

But it surely does belong to the essence of the intuition of time that in each point of its duration (which we can make into an object reflectively) it is consciousness of what has just been and not merely consciousness of the now-point of the object that appears as enduring.

Husserl. \textit{PCIT}, pp. 33-34.

It is becoming clearer how the true meaning of perception inevitably becomes more ambiguous the further that we delve into the consciousness of time. The past does not appear as a mere reverberation / an echo of what was and it does not appear as a kind of pictorial representation. Pastness does not merely consist in the retention of past nows as correlated
with the present now, but involves an originary intuition of the ‘passing-over’ of presentness into pastness. In spatial terms, the consciousness of an object moving in space is more than the perception of the same object occupying different locations at different times. It is not just a question of the consciousness of the object that is moving, but of the consciousness of the ‘movement’ of the object.

Thus, it is to be understood that retention is an originary givenness of pastness. This insight later forces Husserl to radically re-determine the meaning of perception – not in terms of the consciousness of that which is now as distinct from that which is not-yet or that which is past, temporal determinations that are traditionally explained in terms of phantasy (e.g., Brentano’s discourse, which makes the present consciousness of an extended object consequent upon original association and thus phantasy, which problematizes the possibility of distinguishing between a “phantasy-tone,” which “is not a tone but the phantasy of a tone” and the perception of a tone) – but as originary givenness, which includes both retention and protention.

But, this is to anticipate an overturning of the traditional idea of perception – whose logic is still unclear. In the following passage, Husserl actually appears to set up a radical contrast between remembrance and perception.

Retentional consciousness really contains consciousness of the past of the tone, primary memory of the tone, and must not be divided into sensed tone and apprehension as memory. Just as a phantasy-tone is not a tone but the phantasy of the tone, or just as tone-phantasy and tone-sensation are essentially different things and not by any chance the same thing only differently interpreted or apprehended, so too the tone primarily remembered in intuition is something fundamentally and essentially different from the perceived tone; and correlatively, primary memory (retention) of the tone is something different from sensation of the tone.

Husserl. *PCIT*, p. 34.
Actually, Husserl is not so much setting up a radical distinction between perception and memory as carefully working through different modalities of perception itself. He goes on to discuss different modes of givenness or appearing by attending to different orientations on the meaning of perception and the manner in which it is usually contrasted with memory. He surpasses Brentano’s orientation that gives primacy to the now – as that which is ‘real’ (perception) as contrasted with the irreality (phantasy) of the past and future, though simultaneously problematizing such a distinction in the concept of original association which makes even the now as actual perception consequent upon the functioning of phantasy – by demonstrating that retention / primary memory is also perception. He does this by working through the structure of retention in which the intuition of the now as now-presentation is always already a reference point to each retention, while now-presentation always bears reference to the retentional tail to which it is a mobile limit. Husserl finally demonstrates that the key problem lies with the implicit distinction that traditionally separates the idea of perception from that of remembrance, phantasy, representation, etc. It lies in the distinction between presentation and re-presentation.

Each now-perception constitutes part of a phase that has its retentional horizon. It is part of a continuum. But, this continuum is not made up of representations of representations that would only make the now moment a pure presentation. Such a now could still be broken down into smaller moments and this continuum would still always be an essential part of it. The essential continuous modification of the now precludes the possibility of assigning to it the status of pure presentation (perception) over and above the representational modifications that constitute it internally as its retentional train, which gives duration rather than discrete timeless instances. The difference between retention and primary impression is not a difference between presentation and re-presentation.

In the section entitled: “Perception as Presentation in Distinction from Retention and
Recollection” (p.41) Husserl characterizes “...the past itself as perceived.” We perceive the passing of time. He asks the question: “...are we not directly conscious...of the just-having-been, of the ‘just past’ in its self-givenness, in the mode of being given itself?”

Obviously the sense of “perception” obtaining here does not coincide with the earlier one. Further distinctions are needed. If, in the grasping of a temporal object, we distinguish between perceptual and memorial (retentional) consciousness, then to the opposition between perception and primary memory there corresponds on the side of the object the opposition between “now present” and “past.” Temporal objects—and this pertains to their essence—spread their matter over an extent of time, and such objects can become constituted only in acts that constitute the very differences belonging to time. But time-constituting acts are—essentially—acts that constitute the present and the past; they have the character of those “perceptions of temporal objects” that we have fully described with respect to their remarkable apprehensional constitution. Temporal objects must become constituted in this way. That implies: an act claiming to give a temporal object itself must contain in itself “apprehensions of the now,” “apprehensions of the past,” and so on; specifically, as originally constituting apprehensions.


Perception is not simple or one-dimensional. It is tri-horizontal. What stands out here with respect to the issue of presentation contra re-presentation is not a distinction between perception and retention, but rather a contrast between retention and recollection—a difference between primary memory, which is the originary givenness of pastness, and secondary remembrance, which Husserl later goes on to describe as a representative consciousness that is built upon the structure of the former.
Now if we relate the use of the word “perception” to the differences in givenness with which temporal objects present themselves, the antithesis of perception is the primary memory and the primary expectation (retention and protention) that occur here; in which case, perception and nonperception continuously blend into one another. In the consciousness that belongs to the directly intuitive grasp of a temporal object—of a melody, for example—the measure or tone or part of a tone now being heard is perceived, and what is momentarily intuited as past is not perceived. The apprehensions continuously blend into one another here; they terminate in an apprehension that constitutes the now, but which is only an ideal limit. There is a continuum that ascends towards an ideal limit, just as the continuum of the species red converges towards an ideal pure red. But in our case we do not have individual apprehensions corresponding to individual nuances of red that could be given by themselves; instead we always have—and, according to the essence of the matter, can only have—continuities of apprehensions, or rather a single continuum that is continuously modified. If in some way we divide this continuum into two adjoining parts, then the part that includes the now or is capable of constituting it is distinguished from the other part and constitutes the “rough” now; as soon as we divide this rough now further, it in turn immediately breaks down into a finer now and a past, and so on.

Perception here is therefore an act-characteristic that joins together a continuity of act-characteristics and is distinguished by the possession of that ideal limit. A similar continuity without this ideal limit is bare memory. In the ideal sense, then, perception (impression) would be the phase of consciousness that constitutes the pure now, and memory would be every other phase of the continuity. But the now is precisely only an ideal limit, something abstract, which can be nothing by itself. Moreover, it remains to be said that even this ideal now is not something _toto coelo_ different from the not-now but is continuously mediated with it. And to this corresponds the continuous transition of perception into primary memory.

Husserl. _PCIT_, pp. 41-42.

Since the now is “...only an ideal limit, something abstract, which can be nothing by itself” and since there is a “...continuous transition of perception into primary memory,” we can see that the use of the word perception definitely requires a certain kind of modification. Husserl gives us a transvaluation of the meaning of perception that withdraws from the classical conception in which it is identified purely with a now-consciousness as
consciousness of the now. With this, the rigid disjunction between the real and the irreal, which tended to reduce reality and the now to a point, falls before the idea of perception that actually takes into account the extending of consciousness as the consciousness of extension – its temporalization.

Ultimately, it is all a question of different types or modalities of appearing.

Perception is an act of original giving/presentation, which also covers retention in its original presentation of pastness, but distinguishes the latter from the re-presentative forms of memory that only represent things that are not actually given. At first, this sounds rather odd to the ears, but it accounts for how it is possible to perceive the differences between that which actually lies before us as something that is truly extended with a past horizon and that which is mere phantasy or recollection.

I shall conclude this lecture by quoting Husserl’s own remarks concerning the meaning of perception as originary giving, which characterizes the phenomenological project itself as an enterprise that gives primacy to a sense of perception that turns to the things themselves (not to be confused with the Kantian idea of things-in-themselves) as opposed to remaining imprisoned in a box under the weight of a phenomenalism that cannot account for its own conditions of possibility.
§ 17. Perception as the Act That Gives Something Itself in Opposition to Reproduction

In addition to the contrast between perception, or the giving of the present itself, [and primary memory], which has its correlate in the given past, there is another opposition: between perception and recollection or secondary memory. In recollection a now "appears" to us, but it "appears" in an entirely different sense than the sense in which the now appears in perception. [41]

This now is not "perceived" — that is, given itself — but represented. It represents a now that is not given. And so too the running-off of a melody in recollection represents a "just past" but does not give it. Even in mere phantasy every individual is extended in time in some way, having its now, its before, and its after; but the now, before, and after are merely imagined, as is the whole object. Here, therefore, an entirely different concept of perception is in question. Perception in this case is the act that places something before our eyes as the thing itself, the act that originally constitutes the object. Its opposite is re-presentation [Vergegenwärtigung, Re-Präsentation], understood as the act that does not place an object itself before our eyes but just re-presents it; that places it before our eyes in image, as it were, although not exactly in the manner of a genuine image-consciousness. Here we do not say anything at all about a continuous mediation of perception with its opposite. Up to this point, the consciousness of the past — the primary consciousness of the past, that is — was not "called" perception because perception was taken as the act that originally constitutes the now. But the consciousness of the past does not constitute a now; it rather constitutes a "just past," something that has preceded the now intuitively. But if we call perception the act in which all "origin" lies, the act that constitutes originally, then primary memory is perception. For only in primary memory do we see what is past, only in it does the past become constituted — and constituted presentatively, not re-presentatively. The just past, the before in opposition to the now, can be directly seen only in primary memory; it is its essence to bring this new and original past to primary, direct intuition, just as it is the essence of the perception of the now to bring the now directly to intuition. On the other hand, recollection, like phantasy, merely offers us re-presentation; recollection is as it were the same consciousness as the act aimed at the now and the act aimed at the past, the acts that create time — as it were the same, but nonetheless modified. The phantasied now represents a now but does not give a now itself; the phantasied before and after only represent a before and after, and so on.

Husserl. PCIT, pp. 42-43.
In sum, the radicalization of the meaning of perception beyond its common sense as that which is determined by the present of presence – a now-consciousness – permits the extended-extending of consciousness to stand out in the constitution of the phenomenon of a now-perception as distinct from a perception of the just-past or the not-yet. It is by the grace of an originary giving, which is none other than an intentional intra-play of the registration of now, just-past, and not-yet that conditions the possibility of the sense of perception that is defined in terms of a now-consciousness. Primary impression, retention, and protention occur equiprimordially / simultaneously, but that does not mean that they share the same content. Although each one is a present perception, e.g., pastness is not given by a past-consciousness, it is given by a present remembering (where remembering is irreducible to mere representation, in the mundane sense of substitution). They are intentional forms that coincide in the production of perception in the traditional sense, while their horizons are different. To presently perceive is an entanglement of different perceptions at a more primordial level: an intertwining of nowness, pastness, and not-yet. The originary giving of these different temporal indices is presupposed by the horizontal structure of the Living Present as it is given in experience. A single-pointed directedness toward the now could never give the peripheral horizons of the past and future from which it must necessarily stand out as a present-perception. Perception, in the classic sense, gives objects, while perception in the Husserlian sense is the giving of their horizons of origination. Thus, there is the possibility of distinguishing between objects that are actually given ‘in-person’ as opposed to being merely re-presented.
15. Perception contra Re-presentation?

We have seen how Husserl works through the meaning of perception in relation to time-consciousness and effectively subjects it to a significant transvaluation. Moving through the concept of perception as the consciousness of that which is now (where a now-consciousness is far from being identical to a consciousness of the now), he arrives at the definition of perception as originary giving – a determination that makes retention (perception of the no-longer now) as original as primary impression (perception of that which is now). Retention is the originary giving of the passing over of the now into the not now. Such a determination releases the meaning of perception from point-like immediacy and shows how the now, far from being corpuscular, always has a fringe of relativity built into its structure – that it is already stretched. Therefore, perception (the classical view) is no longer considered as the only authentic expression of that which is, whereby all that is no longer is considered in terms of non-perception / re-presentation / phantasy. The ‘is’ of perception in the classical sense must always already presuppose horizontal relations by which perception in the proper sense is actually an extended field. Perception is horizontal and not point-like. And, so it is with isness – it is fundamentally extendedness.

Perception, when it is considered in terms of pure immediacy / original presentation, in Husserl’s terms, suggests a crucial kind of ambivalence with respect to its relation to representation. The originarity of perception / presentation over and above re-presentation
means that the consciousness of the duration of something (phases of the endurance of a selfsame temporal object) does not suggest an infinite regress, which would ordinarily be implied by the idea that the presence of an object already presupposes an associative matrix of representations through which its actuality as now can be registered – re-presentatively. A flux of representations of representations would never give the actual, and while it would operate purely as phantasy, it would not be able to determine itself as such. Such a phenomenal theory does away with the criteria by which consciousness can determine the difference between actual duration and phantasied duration and, in more general terms, it denies that which would enable it to assess the validity of any given evidence. Phenomenologically, a different approach to the re of re-presentation is required, which does not objectify it by turning it into an opaque image, a substitute, or a symbol.

Primary (or primal) impression is the regulative source of the givenness of that which is now as now, insofar as it is the extending edge of what is already a continuum of retained-primary impressions. But, as we have seen, retention or primal memory is the originary givenness of the passing-over of primary impression into retention, whereby past nows are retained while simultaneously modified in the manner of their announcement, i.e., a now that was, but is no-longer. The previous now has not been annihilated by a new now, since it is still present, but precisely as no-longer now – as a receding extent to that which is ‘actually’ now. Although repetition is an essential part of the givenness of that which gives itself to perception, it is important to understand that the continuum of consciousness is irreducible to a chain of representations that have no actual starting point – echoes that do not bear reference to anything more than what was already an echo.

However, the determination of perception as original presentation also extends to that which is no-longer (and that which is not-yet) – echoes of Augustine – thereby showing that the ‘re’ of re-presentation is an essential part of its structure. But, to reiterate, this is not the
‘re’ of a representation that stands in as a substitute (a mere copy) for something more original. Husserl is concerned to demonstrate that such a sign-theory or image-theory of consciousness does not account for what is ‘essential’ to consciousness as the very condition of the possibility of a higher level ‘pictorializing’ mode of experience. The sense of representation by which it is understood as a copy / simulacrum is not the primal form of the structurality of representation. The consciousness of duration is not a symbolic representation of duration; it is simply the immanent and immediate perception of duration.

Now, this appears to set up an irreducible difference between primary memory (retention) as original presentation and secondary memory (re-collection) as re-presentation. Clearly, repetition is implied in both cases. But, repetition here does not imply some generic leveller that reduces retention to recollection. We speak rather of two different modes of repetition; retention is that which permits pastness to return to the recollection that reproduces it. It is only by virtue of the fact that the past is on hand that it can be reproduced pictorially, symbolically, representationally, etc. However, on the path to the objectivation and historicization of a temporal object, and most significantly the continuum of one lived-stream of consciousness, secondary memory also has an originary and constitutive role to play.

This lecture will focus on the different levels of constitution that are in play in the temporalization of consciousness and its objects. By now, it should be apparent that all further discourse on representation, when understood in terms of repetition without necessarily implying substitution, does not reduce it to a level of secondary importance. It has a fundamentally constitutive role to play in the filling out of a life-history as a whole, but without doing away with the essential function of immanent presentation by substituting it with mediate representation, which would make it impossible to extend beyond phantasy. It is important to note that classical discourse on representation usually admits of an outside objectivity which is never actually given, but only represented internally, which ineradicably
problematizes the validity of what we may designate as evidence of actuality. However, we are obliged to go along with Husserl, for whom such a prejudicial presupposition is to be put out of play. The phenomenalist perspective disregards that it actually throws the baby out with the bathwater. According to a rigorous phenomenological orientation, phenomenalism also denies the possibility of the validity of its own – *imaginal* – assumptions.

Husserl is concerned to take into account precisely how we do make distinctions between actuality and phantasy. It is of interest to note that Husserl’s lectures on time-consciousness were motivated by the need to uncover a Transcendental Aesthetic, which addresses how judgement is possible. The intertwined questions of temporal judgement and the temporality of judgement suggest the earliest possible starting point for such an enterprise.

In section 18 (p.44) “The Significance of Recollection for the Constitution of the Consciousness of Duration and Succession,” Husserl turns to the productive aspects of the interplay between retention and secondary modification in the constitution of time-consciousness.

The constitutive significance of primary and secondary memory presents itself somewhat differently, if, instead of the givenness of *enduring objectivities*, we consider the givenness of *duration and succession* themselves.

Husserl. *PCIT*, p. 44.

In conformity with his determination of perception as originary givenness, Husserl shows that

The consciousness...
of succession is consciousness that gives its object originally: it is “perception” of this succession. We now consider the reproductive modification of this perception—specifically, the recollection. I “repeat” the consciousness of this succession; I re-present it to myself memorially. I “can” do this and do it “as often as I choose.” A priori the re-presentation of an experience lies within the domain of my “freedom.” (The “I can” is a practical “I can” and not a “mere idea.”)

Husserl. *PCIT*, p. 44.

The practical “I can” of the repetition of that which is no-longer now rests on a freedom, a capacity, a re-iterability in which a collected succession, so to speak, can be re-collected. In anticipation of some of the questions that will be raised later on in this course in regard to that which is constitutive of what we call Self, consider how Husserl’s analyses effectively present the theme of re-collection in terms of the differing forms of narrative return by which a life fleshes itself out as a history of overlapping stories/narratives.

More immediately, take note of what Husserl says regarding the re-givenness of a past succession:

Now if we ask about the consciousness that originally gives a succession of enduring objectivities—and, indeed, the succession of the durations themselves—we find that it necessarily requires retention and recollection. Retention constitutes the living horizon of the now; in it I have a consciousness of the “just past.” But what becomes originally constituted here—say, in holding on to the just heard tone—is only the being-pushed-back of the now-phase or, as the case may be, of the completely constituted duration, which in this completeness no longer becomes constituted and is no longer perceived. I can, however, undertake a reproduction in “coincidence” with this “result” that is being pushed back. Then the past of the duration is given to me, given precisely as the “re-givenness” of the duration simpliciter. And we must note: It is only past durations that I can originally intuit in acts that repeat their objects—only past durations that I can actually intuit, identify, and have objectively as the identical object of many acts. I can relive the present, but it cannot be given again. If I return to one and the same succession, as I can at any time, and identify it as the same temporal object, I produce a succession of recollecting experiences in the unity of an overlapping consciousness of succession;

Husserl begins by classifying the difference between retention and recollection in the constitution of the possibility of holding onto a just-heard tone. Retention originally gives the pushing back of the past duration, whose completeness is no longer perceived, while recollection ‘gives’ it once again. What is significant and fascinating here is that the ‘re’ of the re-given is announced in coincidence with that which is re-given. In other words, the announcement of a representation as a representation – as distinct from a presentation – involves a form of giving that is actually presentative / immanent. Such an announcement of representation is not given re-presentatively. That which is represented as being transcendent to the actual moment may be echoed by its representation, but the announcement of such transcendence is not itself an echo; it is immanent. The actual meaning of perception falls upon the temporal extent to which consciousness is directed and the manners of announcement by which the experienced exhibits itself. This is open. In other words, it is only with the addition of secondary remembrance (recollection) that a life-continuity can present itself as a perception. At any level, primary memory (retention) is necessary, but it is not sufficient. To ‘perceive’ oneself as a singular and abiding unity through time is to rely on recollection as well. At this level of constitution, perception is inextricably linked with the ‘re’ of re-presentation – and yet the distinction between originarity and secondary representation is still announced presentatively and not re-presentatively. One is not the representation of oneself in such a gestalt perception, where the recollected stands in as a substitute for the recollected, but one is precisely that which is presented by the modal form of announcement / narrative type. One is one’s story (the meaning of story being equivalent to a content that is reproduced according to a certain narrative style of delivery), but the story is never complete. This is a fundamental theme in existential analysis.
But, once again, I am running too far ahead. It is important to consolidate what we have already seen in Husserl’s analyses regarding different types of perceptual judgements regarding what is actual and what is phantasy. Let us return to Husserl’s text itself.

§19. The Difference between Retention and Reproduction (Primary and Secondary Memory or Phantasy)²⁸

At this point our position with respect to Brentano’s theory that the origin of the apprehension of time lies in the domain of phantasy is definitely decided. Phantasy is consciousness characterized as re-presentation (reproduction). Now there certainly is re-presented time; but it necessarily points back to a time that is given originally, a time not phantasied but presented. Re-presentation is the opposite of the act that gives something originally; no presentation [Vorstellung] can “spring” from it. That is, phantasy is not a consciousness that can set forth, as given itself, some objectivity or other, or an essential and possible trait of an objectivity. Not to give the object itself is the very essence of phantasy. Even the concept of phantasy does not arise from phantasy. For if we want to have given to us originally what phantasy is, we certainly must form fantasies; but this of itself does not yet mean that what phantasy is, is given. We must, of course, contemplate the fantasizing, perceive it: perception of phantasy is the consciousness that originally gives the object for the formation of the concept of phantasy. In this perception we see what phantasy is; we grasp it in the consciousness of the givenness of the thing itself.

Husserl. PCIT, p. 47.

As we can see, Husserl succeeds in resolving a fundamental problem that Brentano could not effectively take into account within the limits of his discourse on time – the issue of how we can distinguish between actuality and phantasy. Husserl’s radicalization of the meaning of perception as originary presentation – which does not reduce actuality to an extensionless point, but includes the retaining of that which is no longer by ‘presenting’ (as opposed to re-presenting) it precisely as that which is no longer – shows how perception is the source in which such distinctions lie. Perception, in this sense, precedes phantasy, but only
to the extent that it is a form of grasping in which phantasy may originally present itself precisely as such. To repeat Husserl’s own words,

...perception of phantasy is the consciousness that originally gives the object for the formation of the concept of phantasy. In this perception we see what phantasy is; we grasp it in the consciousness of the givenness of the thing itself. Husserl. *Ibid*.

Thus, phantasy does indeed play a fundamental and constitutive role in the temporalization of consciousness (as a whole) and that toward which it is directed, but it does not furnish the material by which it originally determines itself as phantasy in contrast to actuality. In other words, Husserl does not oppose his analyses to those of Brentano regarding the constitutive function of phantasy in the apprehension of time, but he does radically oppose the real / non-real distinction that carves up reality into a non-extended division between two irrealities: past and future, which are not given, but only represented / phantasied. As Husserl shows, Brentano’s conception of phantasy and its constitutive role in the apprehension of time could never actually give the distinction between that which is given and that which is not given but only represented / substituted; there would be nothing more than phantasies of phantasies.
The modification of consciousness that converts an original now into a reproduced now is something entirely different from the modification that converts the now, whether original or [47] reproduced, into the past. The latter modification has the character of a continuous adumbration; just as the now is continuously shaded off into the past and the further past, so too the intuitive time-consciousness is continuously shaded off. On the other hand, we never refer to a continuous transition of perception into phantasy, of impression into reproduction. The latter is a difference between discrete things. Hence we must say: What we call original consciousness, impression, or even perception, is an act that is shaded off continuously. Every concrete perception implies a whole continuum of such shadings. But reproduction, phantasy-consciousness, also requires precisely the same shadings, only reproductively modified. It belongs to the essence of both of these experiences that they must be extended in such a way that a punctual phase can never exist by itself.


The shading-off the now into the not-now – its continuous adumbration – is not a matter of re-presentative repetition, but the latter requires such a shading-off. Classical discourse on representation tends to encourage the thought of discrete signs, images, entities, etc., that are tacked onto one another reproductively – whereby the thought of extendedness is that of a mere aggregate, a collection of originally discrete things. Husserl is concerned with extension / extending as an original unfolding of temporality that first constitutes the time-space / the horizon in which discrete things, representations, echoes, can stand out at all. To reiterate, perception is not simple or discrete, since it involves a continuum of shadings – of acts and objects – which is precisely why it is stretched, but it is not to be reduced to a representation in itself or as an aggregate of objective representations.

In other words, when we refer to the associative matrix that must be at work in the perception of an enduring object, we do not focus on a pseudo-empirical realm of objective representations – representations in the flesh – but on the essential rules of any possible network of representations; where such expressions as shading-off, adumbration, running-off
phenomena (Ablaufspähenomene) indicate the unfolding of a fabric of interwoven intentionalities that constitutes the presentative conditions of the possibility of the form of association that is thought \( \text{re-presentatively} \). Consider the difference between an actual repetition and a virtual repetition. Both indicate the same structure of doubling, but one is real and the other is not. In these terms, retention \( \text{gives} \) that which is no-longer by giving the ‘passing-over’ or ‘shading-off’ of the now into the not-now, but it does not re-produce it \( \text{re-presentatively} \). It is the original consciousness \( \text{of} \) the ‘passing-over’ that provides the possibility of an actual reproductive repetition, copy, or phantasy. Not only does it provide the material presentatively, it also provides the measure of its mode of presentation.

16. **Retention, Phantasy, and Having-Beenness**

Husserl’s discourse on perception at the level of primordial time-consciousness, as originary giving, always already extends into the domain of what we would normally call phantasy. Perhaps, Husserl’s principal inspiration in this regard is Augustine. As indicated in chapter one, it is useful to turn to section 20 of Book XI of the *Confessions* where Augustine asks about the existential status of the future and the past – that is, whether they can actually be said to exist. He shows that such a determination can make sense only when it is based on the understanding that the future is nothing more than a presently occurring anticipation and that the reality of the past has no existence outside a presently occurring act of remembering.

When we take into account that Augustine’s meditations on time determine that the now / present is not extended, we find that time and reality are effectively reduced to a point (despite the fact that that his speculation about the possibility of time being an extension of
the mind undermines such a view-point). While he did not return to the problem of this discontinuity and re-examine the structurality of the now itself, Husserl’s inquiries do continually return to this very question. His phenomenological discourse on the now does not determine its being in terms of an extensionless point, but as a stretched horizon in which the present is already the cutting edge of a retentional continuum. This is the principle breakthrough that is adumbrated by the *Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*.

If we return to section 18 of the lectures on time-consciousness, we find the culmination of Husserl’s claim that when we speak of retention it is not as a past-consciousness, but as a present consciousness of pastness – the giving of *having-beenness*.

Retention constitutes the living horizon of the now; in it I have a consciousness of the “just-past.” Husserl. *PCIT*, p.45.

The great point of departure from Augustine's discourse on the non-extension of the now is Husserl’s demonstration that it must, necessarily, be a *field*. When we consider Augustine’s afterthought on time as an “extension of the mind itself,” in phenomenological terms, we are brought back to the concept of intentionality. Thus, retention is a backward looking present orientation. When we speak of the past in these terms, we mean a present scan of that which has already preceded the moment at which or from which one is turned toward it. The past, when considered as a substantive domain, is actually constituted objectively by a ray of directedness whose source of illumination lies in the ever moving present as primal impressions constantly undergo retentional modification. Of course, this is a metaphorical description of a dynamic structurality – a matrix of intentionalities that unfold time / duration.
where, to paraphrase William James, the present is the saddleback upon which we sit and from which we observe all that passes.

We have already made reference to the constitutive function of reproduction (secondary memory) in relation to primary memory (retention), but we have, so far, only concentrated on what distinguishes them. It is here that we turn to a different level of constitution that presupposes originary retentional modification, but also surpasses it in terms of the new levels and dimensions of experience that are constituted by reproductive performances. So far, there has been no reference to what we might call an ‘I,’ as agent. We have simply covered the passively constituted flowing through which the possibility of the practical ‘I-can’ first comes into being. It is on this basis that Husserl begins to speak of the “Freedom of Reproduction” by taking into account the active dimensions of experience that are creative with respect to that which is given passively. This follows a genetic movement of building-upwards, whereby we can begin to play with the past in terms of the multiplicity of ways in ‘how’ it is recollected.

In anticipation of our later return to the issue of Selfhood, it is at this level that we begin to unearth the constitutional elements that are indicative of style, character, personality, etc. whereby discourse on an ‘I’ extends beyond a mere continuum of interwoven perceptions – an extending consciousness of continuity – into an actor who assigns significance to this continuum and who chooses the manner in which it is re-collected – authentically or inauthentically.

However, for now, let us return to Husserl’s specific programme and his comments on the differences between “…the original and the reproduced running-off belonging to ‘the process of sinking backwards in time.’” At this point, the emphasis is on how re-presenting is “…a free running through.”
§ 20. The “Freedom” of Reproduction

Noteworthy differences emerge between the original and the reproduced running-off belonging to “the process of sinking backwards in time.” The original appearing and the flowing-away of the running-off modes in the appearing is something fixed, something of which we are conscious through “affection,” at which we can only look (if we happen to achieve the spontaneity of looking). Re-presenting, on the other hand, is something free, a free running through: We can carry out the re-presentation “more quickly” or “more slowly,” more distinctly and explicitly or more confusedly, in a single lightning-like stroke or in articulated steps, and so on. Moreover, the representation itself is an event belonging to internal consciousness and as such has its actually present now, its running-off modes, etc. And in the same extent of immanent time in which the re-presentation actually occurs, we can accommodate “in freedom” greater or smaller parts of the re-presented event together with its running-off modes, and consequently run through it more swiftly or more slowly. When we do this, the relative running-off modes of the re-presented points of the temporal extent remain unchanged (presupposing that the identifying coincidence continuously occurs). I constantly re-present the same thing – always the same continuity of running-off modes of the temporal extent, always the temporal extent itself in its way of appearing [im Wie]. But if I thus return again and again to the same beginning-point and to the same succession of time-points, that beginning-point nevertheless continuously sinks further and further back in time.


What stands out here in the final sentences is that the relative positions of past shadings of experience retain their temporal positions in relation to one another despite the free running through of reproductive remembrance. Therefore, the reproduction of a certain span of time that has its beginning and end-points continues to recede from the present moment of recollection such that the constant shading-off of reproductive remembrance itself continues to retain its own temporal position relative to the extent of time that it re-presents. Thus, it is still a limited freedom with respect to how an extent of time may be made to re-appear as a span of successive shadings, but it also opens up another dimension of existential freedom – of valuation – that cannot be taken into account at the level of retention alone.
Given that there is an intentional coincidence of retention and reproductive remembrance as members of the same continuum, we should not suppose that the kinds of obscurity that announce themselves as past instances recede from the present moment of vision are identical. There are important differences, the most pivotal being the announcement of a certain kind of substitution in the case of reproductive remembrance, which is not felt retentionally. Moreover, these differences in clarity and obscurity are not simply announced by that which is represented or by the way in which it is represented.

Husserl writes,

§ 21. Levels of Clarity Pertaining to Reproduction

Moreover, what is re-presented hovers before me in more or less clear fashion, and the different modes of this obscurity concern the whole object that is re-presented and its modes of consciousness. In the case of the original givenness of a temporal object, we also found that the object at first appears clearly and vitally and then with diminishing clarity passes over into emptiness. These modifications belong to the flow. But while the same modifications certainly occur in the re-presentation of the flow, still other “obscurities” confront us there as well. Specifically, the “clear” (in the first sense) already stands before me as if seen through a veil, obscurely – and, in fact, more or less obscurely, etc. We must therefore not confuse the one sort of obscurity with the other. The specific modes of the re-presentation’s vividness and lack of vividness, of its clarity and obscurity, do not belong to what is re-presented, or do not belong to it only by virtue of the specific way in which the particular re-presentation intends its object; they belong to the actual experience of re-presenting.

Husserl. PCIT, p.50-51.

Obviously, what is required at this point is an analysis regarding the evidence of reproduction / re-presentation in contrast to that which announces itself through retention.
§ 22. Evidence of Reproduction

There also exists a noteworthy difference with respect to the evidence of primary and secondary memory. What I am conscious of retentionally is absolutely certain, as we have seen. Now what about the more distant past? If I remember something I experienced yesterday, then I reproduce the event experienced yesterday, perhaps following all the steps of its succession. I am conscious of a sequence while I am doing this: first one step is reproduced, then, following a determinate order, the second, and so on. But apart from this succession, which evidently belongs to the reproduction insofar as it is a flow of experience, the reproduction brings a past temporal flow to presentation. And it is indeed possible not only that the individual steps of the memorialy present event deviate from those of the past event (the steps belonging to the latter did not ensue in the way in which they are now re-presented), but also that the actual order of succession was other than what the memorial order now takes it to have been. Errors are therefore possible here; specifically, errors that derive from reproduction as reproduction and must not be confused with the errors to which the perception of temporal objects (of transcendent objects, that is) is also subject. That this is the case and in what sense it is the case has already been mentioned: If I am originally conscious of a temporal succession, there is no doubt that a temporal succession has taken place and is taking place. But this is not to say that an event—an objective event—actually does occur in the sense in which I apprehend it. The individual apprehensions can be false; that is, they can be apprehensions to which no reality corresponds. And then, if the objective intention aimed at what is apprehended is preserved (with respect to its constituting content and its relation to other objects) as it is pushed back in time, the error penetrates the whole temporal apprehension of the appearing process. But if we restrict ourselves to the succession of presenting “contents” or even to the succession of “appearances,” an indubitable truth continues to hold: a process has become given and this succession of appearances has occurred, even if the succession of events that appeared to me in them perhaps did not occur.
Now the question is whether this evidence pertaining to time-consciousness can be preserved in reproduction. This is possible only through a coinciding of the reproductive flow with a retentional flow. If I have a succession of two tones c, d, then, while fresh memory lasts, I can repeat this succession, even repeat it adequately in certain respects. I repeat c, d internally, with the consciousness that c occurred first and then d. And while this repeated succession is “still living,” I can proceed in the same way again, and so on. Surely, in this way I can go beyond the original field of evidence. We also see here the way in which recollections are fulfilled. If I repeat c, d, this reproductive representation of the succession finds its fulfillment in the still living earlier succession.33

Husserl. PCIT, p.51-52.

The issue of the different types of evidence pertaining to retention, on the one hand, and reproductive remembrance, on the other, raises a specific question: “...how does the reproduced now happen to re-present a past? Surely a reproduced now immediately represents precisely a now. How does the reference to something past that can be given originally only in the form of the ‘just-past’ come about?” (Husserl, section 23, p.53).

Husserl answers this question by turning to the distinction between ‘mere phantasy’ and ‘recollection.’ “In mere phantasy,” writes Husserl, “no positing of the reproduced now and no coinciding of this now with a past now is given. Recollection, on the other hand, posits what is reproduced and in this positing gives it a position in relation to the actually present now and to the sphere of the original temporal field” (Ibid). In other words, representations share the same time constituting formations as the retentional flow that is reproduced. There is a common measure.

However, it is still necessary that we engage with the vital distinction between retention and reproductive remembrance, to which we alluded earlier. What is it about reproductive experience that announces itself as re-presentation in contrast to original presentation? It has been necessary to look at the moments of coincidence by which they are bearers of the same temporal formation of shadings...
But on the other hand, representations have the peculiar property that in themselves and in all of their experiential phases they are representations of... in another sense, that they have a second and different sort of intentionality, one proper to them alone and not to all experiences. Now this new intentionality has the peculiarity that, in form, it is a "replica" [Gegenbild] of the intentionality that constitutes time; and as it reproduces in each of its elements a moment of a presentational flow and in its elements taken as a whole a whole presentational flow, so it produces a reproductive consciousness of a re-presented immanent object. It therefore constitutes something twofold: first, through its form as a flow of experience it constitutes the re-presentation as an immanent unity; then, since the moments of experience belonging to this flow are reproductive modifications of moments belonging to a parallel flow (which in the ordinary case consists of nonreproductive moments), and since these reproductive modifications involve an intentionality, the flow is joined together to make up a constitutive whole in which I am conscious of an intentional unity: the unity of what is remem-bered.

Husserl. PCIT, p.54.

It is here that Husserl finally gets to discuss the function of protention in memory. Although it has already been implied in reference both to the constitution of the now and to memory, we have travelled a rather circuitous route to protention as that which is equi-primordial with primary impression and retention.

§ 24. Protentions in Recollection

Now in order to understand the insertion of this constituted unity of experience "memory" into the unitary stream of experience, we must take the following into account: every memory contains expectation-intentions whose fulfillment leads to the present. Every process that constitutes its object originally is animated by protentions that emptily constitute what is coming as coming, that catch it and bring it toward fulfillment. However, the recollective process does not merely renew these protentions memorially. They are not only there in the process of catching what is coming; they have also caught it. They have been fulfilled, and we are conscious of this in the recollection. The fulfillment in the recollective consciousness is re-fulfillment (precisely in the modification that belongs to memorial positioning).
And if the original protention belonging to the perception of the event was indefinite and left open the possibility of things' being otherwise or not being at all, in the recollection we have an expectation settled in advance that does not leave all of that open, unless in the form of an "unfinished" recollection, which has a different structure from the indefinite original protention. And yet this too is included in the recollection. Thus there are already difficulties of intentional analysis here for the event considered separately, and then in a new way for the expectations that concern the succession of events up to the present: Recollection is not expectation, but it does have a horizon directed towards the future, specifically, towards the future of what is recollected; and this horizon is fixed. As the recollective process advances, this horizon is disclosed in ever new ways and becomes richer and more vital. And in this process the horizon is filled with ever new recollected events. Those that formerly had only been indicated in advance are now quasi-present – quasi in the mode of the actualizing present.


Protention is not identical to expectation as the latter is "...settled in advance," whereas protention is open. However, the key to understanding how these differences are still intertwined at a constitutional level is through Husserl’s discourse on evidential fulfillment.
17. The Equi-Primordiality of Retention, Primary Impression, and Protention

Husserl’s analyses of immanent time consciousness demonstrate a genetic approach to what is none other than a kind of Transcendental Aesthetic. Ultimately, the question of judgement has to be taken into account in the constitution of temporal duration, i.e., the possibility of the consciousness of different moments of temporality in the contextualization of the experiencing and the experienced. The multiplicity of intentional modes of fulfillment that make this possible at the most primordial – and pre-egological – level are adumbrated most succinctly by Husserl in the following passage.

I shall reproduce section 25 in full in order to allow Husserl’s own course of argument to fulfil itself.

§ 25. The Double Intentionality of Recollection

20 If, in connection with a temporal object, we distinguish the content with its duration – which can have a different place in the context of “the” time – from its temporal position, then, in the reproduction of an enduring being, we have in addition to the reproduction of the filled duration the intentions that concern its position; and we have them necessarily. A duration cannot even be represented, or better, cannot even be posited, without its being posited in a temporal context, without the presence of intentions aimed at the temporal context. Moreover, it is necessary that these intentions have the form either of intentions aimed at the past or of intentions aimed at the future. To the duality of intentions – to those directed towards the filled dura-
tion and to those directed towards the filled duration’s place in time—there corresponds a dual fulfillment. The total complex of intentions that makes up the appearance of the past enduring object has its possible fulfillment in the system of appearances that belong to that same enduring object. The intentions aimed at the temporal context are fulfilled by the production of filled connections up to the actual present. Hence we must distinguish within every re-presentation between the reproduction of the consciousness in which the past enduring object was given, that is to say, was perceived or in some way originally constituted, and that which attaches to this reproduction as constitutive of the consciousness “past” or “present” (simultaneous with the actually present now) or “future.”

Now is the latter also reproduction? This question can easily mislead us. Naturally the whole is reproduced, not only the then-present of consciousness with its flow but “implicite” the whole stream of consciousness up to the living present. That means—and this is a fundamental part of a priori phenomenological genesis—that memory flows continuously, since the life of consciousness flows continuously and does not merely piece itself together link by link into a chain. Rather, everything new reacts on the old; the forward-directed intention belonging to the old is fulfilled and determined in this way, and that gives a definite coloring to the reproduction. Thus a retroactive effect, necessary and a priori, shows itself here. The new points again to the new, which, in making its appearance, becomes determined and modifies the reproductive possibilities for the old, and so on. Moreover, the retroactive power extends back along the chain, for the reproduced past bears the character past and an indeterminate intention aimed at a certain location in time in relation to the now. Thus it is not as if we had a mere chain of “associated” intentions, one bringing to mind another, this one recalling the next (in the flow); rather we have one intention that in itself is an intention aimed at the series of possible fulfillments.

But this is a nonintuitive, an “empty” intention. Its object is the objective series of events in time, and this series is the obscure surroundings of what is actually recollected. Does this not universally characterize “surroundings”: a unitary intention related to a multitude of interconnected objectivities and coming [55]
This whole movement of reciprocal implication, which fulfills itself in a movement of constant play between temporal foreground and background as articulated within the living horizon of the now, gives us a dynamical description of the genesis of time. What should be most apparent at this point is that ‘repeatability’ is the most essential form of this movement while simultaneously expressing that the variety of different forms of return cannot be reduced to re-presentation alone – that is, when re-presentation is understood as duplication or replication. It is clear that protention also falls into this essential form of repeatability, since it is a kind of futural call to which a future now answers as the site of a repetition that led up to it. In this sense, the present is the site of the fulfillment of an anticipated now that preceded it while a retained now given in primary memory (retention) as that which is no longer now finds its fulfillment in the now that follows it. Thus, memory always lies ahead of the now rather than simply behind, while the future as anticipation / protention precedes it as the
I would like to conclude this lecture by examining section 26 of *The Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, which provides a thoroughgoing description of the differences between memory and expectation, which then permits a distinction between expectation and protention. The latter (protention) is ostensibly an *open* intentionality that only finds fulfillment in a future now, whereas determinate expectations are memorial projections, which also only find fulfillment in a future now, but which first *re*-present the now before its arrival. It is here, finally, that Husserl explicitly determines that protention is as primordial a form of giving as retention and primal impression. Thus, the *living* now ultimately shows the tri-horizontal intentional structure that is in play at the very heart of itself.

§ 26. Differences between Memory and Expectation

We must also investigate whether memory and expectation stand on the same footing. Intuitive memory offers me the living reproduction of the elapsing duration of an event, and only the intentions that point back at what preceded the event and point ahead up to the living now remain nonintuitive.

In the intuitive representation of a future event, I now have intuitively the reproductive “image” of an event that runs off reproductively. Fastened to this image are indeterminate intentions aimed at the future and at the past, that is, intentions that from the beginning of the event concern its temporal surroundings, which terminate in the living now. To that extent, the intuition belonging to expectation is memorial intuition turned upside down, for in memory’s case the intentions aimed at the
now do not "precede" the event but follow after it. As empty intentions directed towards the surroundings, they lie "in the opposite direction." Now what about the way in which the event itself is given? Does it make an essential difference that in memory the content of the event is determined? But memory can also be intuitive and yet not very determinate, since many of its intuitive components do not have the character of actual memory at all. In the case of "perfect" memory, of course, everything down to the smallest detail would be clear and would be characterized as memory. But *idealiter* this is also possible in the case of expectation. In general, expectation leaves much open, and this remaining-open is again a characteristic of the components in question. But as a matter of principle, a prophetic consciousness (a consciousness that passes itself off as prophetic) is conceivable; that is, a consciousness for which every characteristic belonging to the expectation of what is coming to be lies within view: as when, for example, we have a precisely defined plan and, intuitively representing what is planned, accept it, so to speak, lock, stock, and barrel as future reality. Yet in the intuitive anticipation of the future there will also be much that is insignificant, which as stopgap fills out the concrete image but which in many respects can exist otherwise than the image offers it: from the beginning it is characterized as being open.

But there are fundamental differences in the manner of fulfillment. Intentions aimed at the past are necessarily fulfilled by bringing to light the contexts that belong to intuitive reproductions. The reproduction of a past event with respect to its validity (in internal consciousness) admits of completion and of the confirmation of its memorial indeterminacies only by being converted into a reproduction in which each and every component is characterized as reproductive. Here it is a matter of such questions as: Have I actually seen this? Have I actually perceived it? Have I actually had this appearance with precisely this content? At the same time, all of this must be inserted into a nexus of like intuitions extending up to the now. A different question, of course, is the following: Was what appears, real? Expectation, on the other hand, finds its fulfillment in a perception. It belongs to the essence of what is expected that it is something that is going to be perceived. Moreover, it is evident [57] that when something expected occurs, that is, has become something present, then the state of expectation itself is over with; if what was future has become something present, then what was present has become something relatively past. This is also the case with the intentions aimed at the surroundings. They too are fulfilled through the actuality of an impressional experiencing.

These differences notwithstanding, the intuition belonging to expectation is something just as original and unique as the intuition of the past.

The implications of this section are literally breathtaking in their complexity of scope regarding the pluri-dimensional richness of interwoven intentionalities that make up *living temporality* over and above, the linear and causal limitations of objective time. It is here that we may begin to see how the ‘prophetic’ or *magical* dimensions of lived-time are primordial structures of the unfolding of consciousness in *real* time that make its self-conception possible without being coincidental with it. It is by means of these interweaving intentionalities that it is possible to distinguish between dreams and waking states, between the imaginary and the actual, and which distinguish between the many different modalities of the appearing of past, present, and future. The irreversibility and arrow of real time, according to the classical laws of *causality* and the second law of thermodynamics, are discontinuous with the *to and fro / backward and forward* inter- / intra- play of different intentionalities binding the *consciousness of* time together as the condition of the possibility of its ability to hold different moments apart. Truly, time – or immanent temporality – when considered phenomenologically / intentionally is more exotic than the time that is made thematic by the physical sciences alone.
Chapter Five – The Unity of a Life

18. Protention and Waiting – Waiting for Protention

This reading of Husserl’s lectures on immanent time consciousness has taken the route of exploring how the linearity of experience is constituted and how the spannedness of the now and that which presently endures – as the now constantly shades off into retention – is constituted by primal perceptual performances that are pre-representative. Husserl’s temporal analyses employ an extraordinary array of sophisticated arguments that are extremely subtle in their effects with respect to the meaning of the consciousness of time. For instance, his transvaluation of the meaning of perception as originary giving – which makes primal impression (consciousness of the now) and retention (consciousness of the just-past) equiprimordial – simultaneously re-situates the meaning of the ‘re’ of re-presentation. The subtle nuances in meaning that are brought out and the important differences that manifest themselves here enrich the themes of presentation and re-presentation immeasurably. Husserl shows how the classical meaning of representation indicates a certain kind of substitution, a reproduction that stands in as a proxy for that which does not actually give itself and that it automatically supposes that only the present falls into the category of presentation / the real. However, if a real temporal object always implies temporal extendedness above and beyond that which is given in the present then such a notion of representation (which is not the only possible notion of representation) fails to account for how extendedness / duration is given. If it is only ever re-presented by a process of echoing former moments, we are left with the
impossible situation in which we would not be able to distinguish between real duration and
imagined / phantasied duration. Husserl demonstrates that reproductive (secondary) memory
presupposes retention (primary memory), since it automatically implies that it works with
material that is always already on hand. Both forms involve return, but only the former is
substitutive.

One of the most important consequences of Husserl’s temporal analyses is that his
discourse shows how time-consciousness is not simply a matter of the consciousness of that
which is ‘in’ time, but that it is primarily consciousness of the temporalization of that which
is in time. The givenness of a temporal object’s extendedness is not simply a matter of its
duration being given as a product of a line of reproductions of the object, but that the duration
itself is given primordially. It is a case of seeing the ‘extendedness’ of the object originally,
rather than merely extrapolating it from a collection of represented objectivities.

Husserl then works through the question of the role of reproductive remembrance and
shows that it also functions in an originary way when it comes to the issue of a unified life.
Thus, Husserl works through the different levels of constitution that are in play in the
temporalization of consciousness as a whole.

With the thought of primal impression and retention, Husserl presented the signifiers
of the present and the past, but it took a while before he uncovered the signifier of the future.
Prior to this point, it would have been understandable if we had come to the conclusion that
the givenness of futurity is somehow less original. This is by no means the case! Interestingly,
we have had to wait for its signification to arrive through the very theme of waiting itself. It is
in section 26, “Differences between Memory and Expectation,” that Husserl reveals how
expectation, as the futural correlate of reproductive (secondary) remembrance, points to a
more primordial form of anticipation, which he calls protention. Unlike expectation, which
projects determinate (objective) phantasms that await their fulfillment in a future now (which
is a kind of extension of memory into the not-yet), protention is actually open. It first unfolds the not-yet as the site in which we may project futural possibilities. This restores the future ekstasis to the union of present and past in the ever-flowing present.

At first, it seems rather strange that it took Husserl so long to get around to the question of the originarity of protention, but if we look at his writing retroactively from the point of view of existential discourse on anxiety, then the detour that he takes through reproductive memory before disclosing the primordiality of protention makes perfect sense. Since Husserl is concerned to show how objectivities are given – that is, to demonstrate the experience of the *giving* of the given – then protention announces the problem of the giving of that which does not give itself. This is not to confuse such a lack of givenness with re-presentation, which reproduces (substitutes) without giving, since it points to a more primordial lack of givenness that originally motivates it. The original coming toward us of futurity is a waiting toward possibility, which is intrinsically discomforting. Unlike expectation, which fills the futural space of uncertainty that is disclosed by the originary intuitive openness of anticipation with familiar repetitions of an objective order that create the illusion of determined limits / certainty, protention is open and ostensibly objectless. Husserl’s own narrative strategy and his route of inquiry had to proceed by way of the same unremitting tendency of consciousness to focus on the given. However, since his analyses traverse the path that leads to the question of the *giving* of the given, the giving of that which does not give itself (objectively) is finally permitted, somewhat belatedly, to announce itself – even though it is, in a certain sense, more primordial.

The inquiries that follow on immediately after this disclosure repeat much of what has preceded them. However, these repetitions occur at other levels with different lines of focus. What begins to stand out is the manner in which the overlapping intentionalities of time-consciousness produce a self-modifying nexus of interplaying performances that extends into
higher dimensions of constitution. Moving from the constitution of the extendedness of temporal objects, which is always already in strict correlation with the extendedness of consciousness itself, Husserl’s return to the intentional interplay that is constitutive of this two-dimensional horizon turns to the issue of the unity of a life in which such an inter-play is none other than its intra-play.

19. Having-Beenness

In section 27, Husserl returns to the issue of how we distinguish between an actual experience of the past (immanent / internal or transcendent / external) and a mere representation of it (in a substitutive sense) by analyzing what is absolutely essential to memory in general.
§ 27. Memory as Consciousness of Having-Been-Perceived

The following is of the greatest significance for the characterization of the positing reproductions we have been analyzing: not only the reproductive positing of temporal being belongs to their essence, but also a certain relation to internal consciousness. That it is consciousness of having-been-perceived belongs fundamentally to the essence of memory. If I remember an external event intuitively, I have a reproductive intuition of it. And it is a positing reproduction. But this reproduction of something external is necessarily given in consciousness by means of a reproduction of something internal. Since the external event is given in a determinate mode of appearance, an appearing of something external must be reproduced. The appearing of the external, as an experience, is a unity belonging to the consciousness of the internal; and to the consciousness of the internal corresponds the reproduction of the internal. Now there exist two possibilities for the reproduction of an event: the reproduction of what is internal can be a positing reproduction, and therefore the appearance of the event can be posited in the unity of immanent time; or the reproduction of what is external can also be a positing reproduction that posits the temporal event in question in objective time but does not posit the appearance itself as an event belonging to internal time, and thus also does not posit the time-constituting stream in the unity of the total life-stream.

Therefore memory is not immediately memory of earlier perception. But since the memory of an earlier event includes the reproduction of the appearances in which it came to be given, there also exists at any time the possibility of a memory of the earlier perception of the event (or the possibility of a reflection in the memory that makes the earlier perception something given). The whole complex of the earlier consciousness is reproduced, and what is reproduced has the character of reproduction and the character of the past.
Once again, Husserl demonstrates how the functioning of memory is a manifold of different intentionalities – interwoven intentions that do not imply an infinite regress because they have their own unique positing indices. When one remembers, purely and simply, one does not re-present a re-presentation. One does not re-present the original perception of that which is given in the memory as if the perception was already a re-presentation.
Remembrance grasps “the being-present of the perceived object.” Of course, there are many different kinds of recall. There are even types of memory that seemingly erase the present – where there is a memorial positing of something past in the mode of being ‘as if it were now,’ e.g., memories based on olfactory stimuli that have the slingshot effect of instantaneously transporting one back to a distant moment of the past, or invasive memories that appear to have a life of their own (Nietzsche’s “...a thought comes when it wants, not when I want...”), which saturate the present, thus dissolving it into a mere stage for the reiteration of the past – trauma / neuroses, in Freudian terms. However, the essential point that Husserl is concerned to impress upon us is that the remembrance of a past perception is an immanent re-living – in that we are living in the re-presentation – of that which was formerly present precisely as that which is no longer present – thanks to the presentative function of retention, which originally ‘gives’ the distance from the present of that which is recalled and which is reproduced in the memorial representation that re-iterates it (regardless of the many different modes in which that may occur).

20. Memory and Substitution

In sum, memory is not principally an imaginal / pictorial form of consciousness – which is the classic way in which it is generally conceived. It is presentative and re-presentative, but it is not fundamentally substitutive. Thus, Husserl goes on to delineate other senses of re-presentation that do not fall under this determination.
We still need to consider what sort of re-presentation is involved here. What is not in question is a re-presentation by means of a resembling object, as in the case of conscious depiction (paintings, busts, and the like). In contrast to such image-consciousness, reproductions have the character of the re-presentation of something itself. The reproductions are distinguished in turn according to whether they are nonpositing ("mere" phantasies) or positing. And then the temporal characteristics are added to this. Memory is the re-presentation of something itself in the sense of the past. The present memory is a phenomenon wholly analogous to perception. It has the appearance of the object in common with the corresponding perception, except that the appearance has a modified character, in consequence of which the object does not stand before me as present but as having been present.

What is essential to the sort of reproductions called memory and expectation lies in the insertion of the reproduced appearance into the context of the being of internal time, the flowing sequence of my experiences. The positing normally extends also to what is given objectively in the external appearance. But this positing can be annulled, can be contradicted, and yet memory—or, respectively, expectation—will still remain; that is, we will not cease to speak of memory and expectation, even if we designate the earlier perception or the perception to come as merely "supposed." If, from the beginning, it is a question of the reproduction of immanent objects rather than transcendent objects, then the hierarchical structure we have described as pertaining to reproductive intuitions disappears, and the positing of what is reproduced coincides with its insertion into the sequence of experiences, into immanent time.


We live ‘in’ or ‘through’ the reproductive intentionalities of memory. In other words, these performances are immanent.

In section 29 “Memory of the Present,” Husserl goes on to discuss how we can posit something as presently existing in a representation by having reference to memories or a description of some kind, but not to an actual perception of it in the present. It is here that he reiterates that every temporal object (including such a type as this) still has a context (even when it has not been generated by a retentional continuum of past present-perceptions) and
that we have to take into account positing intentions that are aimed at the surroundings, which “always furnish a halo of intentions for the ‘possible’ appearances themselves” (Husserl. *PCIT*, p. 63). Husserl further writes that “…This is also the case with the intuition of an enduring being that I am now perceiving and that I posit as having existed previously without my having perceived it previously and without my now remembering it, and that I posit as something that will exist in the future” (*Ibid*).

Remembrance and expectation are always already constituting the context of the given – extending beyond the mere retentional and protentional giving of their temporal extendedness. One wonders to what extent Husserl’s motivation for writing this extremely abstract passage (section 28) has to do with a desire to engage with the problem of how to go beyond the limits of Berkeley’s statement “esse est percipi” (to be is to be perceived), which problematizes the possibility of speaking about the existential status of that which is not actually perceived as *given in a present perception*. Context is everything, and it is re-presentation that furnishes this even when an originary givenness of a primary impression as it passes over into a retention – thus giving a perception of the just-past of that which was actually perceived – has not occurred. Even Berkeley’s idiosyncratic form of idealism has to admit that present-being is only possible on the basis of its dependency on a larger context that is not actually perceived. But, then again, we might suggest that a Husserlian re-reading of Berkeley shows how there is also a re-presentational function at work in his notion of perception and that it is only the ‘substitutive’ sense of re-presentation that has been eliminated, since there is no ‘matter’ / ‘hyle’ to be represented. Of course, Berkeley ascribes a unique and overarching position to the mental, thus sidestepping the Cartesian problem of trying to explain the nature of interaction between two different types of substance. For Berkeley, there is only one. Husserl’s phenomenology avoids taking up either position. The important difference that distinguishes the Husserlian enterprise from the excesses of
Berkeleyanism is that it concerns itself with the careful description of the manifold intentional structures that prescribe the horizon of possible modes of the giving of the given without losing itself in metaphysical speculation. Husserl is concerned with the mental only insofar as it is intentional. But, this sphere of interrogation is irreducible to the mental as such. It is that which makes mentality possible – although this comment should not be misconstrued as a re-statement of Platonic realism (the hypostatization of the ideal).

21. The Constitution of One Temporal Continuum

So far, we have focused on the pluri-dimensional intentionalities that are in play in the temporalization of experience and the constitution of temporal objects as enduring objectivities; and we have begun to explore the multi-levelled structures of re-production that originally produce / constitute the evolution of a life history. But, where in this self-modifying flux of interplaying intentionalities may we find an intention that can abide throughout this constant transformation? Husserl engages with this issue in section 30.
There are two fantastically interesting elements of time-consciousness that stand out here in their intertwining. The ‘structure’ of unity that is given through the movement of temporal transmutation is based on a consciousness of continuous ‘alteration’ – that is, the consciousness that is undergoing continuous alteration has its continuity through change by virtue of the fact that it is a continuous consciousness of alteration. Consciousness of time is the temporalization of consciousness.

Thus, Husserl returns to the issue of primary impression and its primordial relation to retention in terms of the flow of modification – whose outermost limit is the primal impression as it flows off by way of its retention – that constitutes objective identity as a stretched out unity through time. The static is first constituted by change – the ek-static. The
apparent *a temporality* of objects, whereby they are simultaneous with themselves in their identity, is necessarily constituted 'in' the flowing of time.

Husserl continues,
of the object contains two components: one of them constitutes the object with regard to its extratemporal determinations; the other produces the temporal position, the being-now, the having-been, and so on. The object as the temporal material, as that which possesses a temporal position and temporal extension, as that which endures or changes, as that which now is and then has been, springs purely from the objectivation of the apprehension-contents; and therefore, in the case of sensuous objects, from the objectivation of sensuous contents. In saying this, we do not lose sight of the fact that these contents are nevertheless temporal objects, that they are produced in a succession as a continuum of primal impressions and retentions, and that these temporal adumbrations of the data of sensation have their significance for the temporal determinations of the objects constituted by their means. But in their property as representants of the qualities of a physical thing as far as the pure “what” of the qualities is concerned, their temporal character plays no role. The data of apprehension that are apprehended nontemporally constitute the object in its specific composition, and where this is preserved we can already speak of an identity. But when we spoke a short time ago about preserving the relation to something objective, that signified that the object remains preserved not only in its specific composition but also as an individual object, and therefore as a temporally determinate object that sinks back in time together with its temporal determination. This sinking-back is an original phenomenological modification of consciousness through which an ever-growing distance forms in relation to the actually present now, which is always being freshly constituted. This growing distance comes about by virtue of the continuous series of changes leading away from the actual now.

Husserl. PCIT, p. 64-66.

The sinking-back of a temporal object with its temporal determination has to do with “...an original phenomenological modification of consciousness.” Living in this consciousness, we find that the temporal extent of the object is one that stretches behind us, falls away from our present as the now continuously dissolves into a retention through which it presences as no-longer now while retaining its temporal position within the temporal context that stretches into the past – a past that has been objectively constituted by this original running-off. The fresh now is nothing other than the source of a flowing-away from itself – a dehiscence.
In section 31, “Primal Impression and the Objective Individual Time-Point” – which is not to be confused with the meaning of a time-point that Husserl has already called a fiction, since present time and the time of presence concerns ‘fields’ and not ‘points’ – the focus of the lectures returns to the example of a sounding tone as it runs off into the past and the issue of how its objective identity is constituted by the consciousness of its running-off characters / modes of temporal orientation.

§ 31. Primal Impression and the Objective Individual Time-Point [64]

At this point we are seemingly led to an antinomy: the object, in sinking back, constantly changes its place in time; and yet in sinking back it is supposed to preserve its place in time. In truth, the object of the primary memory, which is being pushed back continuously, does not change its place in time at all, but only its distance from the actually present now. And this is the case because the actually present now is taken to be an ever new objective time-point, while the past temporal moment remains what it is. Now this raises the question: How, in the face of the phenomenon of the constant change of time-consciousness, does the consciousness of objective time and, above all, of identical temporal positions come about? This question is very closely connected with the question about the constitution of the objectivity of individual temporal objects and events: all objectivation is accomplished in time-consciousness; without clarification of the identity of the temporal position, there can be no clarification of the identity of an object in time either.

Set forth in more detail, the problem is the following. The now-phases belonging to the perception continuously undergo a modification; they are not preserved simply as they are: they flow away. What we designate as sinking-back in time is constituted in this process. The tone now sounds, and it immediately sinks into the past – it, the same tone, sinks into the past. This concerns the tone in each of its phases and therefore the whole tone as well. Now the sinking into the past appears to be intelligible to some extent by means of our reflections up to this point. But how does it happen that in the face of the tone’s sinking into the past, we nevertheless say that a fixed position in time belongs to it, that time-points and temporal durations can be identified in repeated acts, as our analysis of reproductive
consciousness has shown? The tone and every time-point in the unity of the enduring tone certainly does have its absolutely fixed position in "objective" (even if immanent) time. Time is fixed, and yet time flows. In the flow of time, in the continuous sinking down into the past, a nonflowing, absolutely fixed, identical, objective time becomes constituted. This is the problem.

To start with, let us consider somewhat more closely the situation of the same tone sinking into the past. Why do we speak of the same tone that sinks into the past? The tone is built up in the temporal flow by means of its phases. We know that each phase (say, the phase belonging to an actually present now), subject to the law of continuous modification, must nevertheless appear, so to speak, as objectively the same, as the same tone-point, since an apprehension-continuum presents itself here that is governed by the identity of sense and exists in continuous coincidence. The coincidence concerns the extratemporal material, which is preserved in the flow precisely as the identity of objective sense. This is true for each now-phase. But every new now is precisely new and is characterized as new phenomenologically. Even if the tone continues so utterly unchanged that not the least alteration is apparent to us, hence even if each new now possesses precisely the same apprehension-content with respect to moments of quality, intensity, etc., and carries precisely the same apprehension—even if all of this is the case, an original difference nevertheless presents itself, a difference that belongs to a new dimension. And this difference is a continuous one. Considered phenomenologically, only the now-point is characterized as an actually present now, that is, as new; the preceding now-point appears as having undergone its modification, the point prior to that its further modification, and so on. This continuum of modifications in the apprehension-contents and the apprehensions built on them produces the consciousness of the extension of the tone together with the continual sinking into the past of what is already extended.

But how, in the face of the phenomenon of the continuous change of time-consciousness, does the consciousness of objective time and, above all, the consciousness of identical position in time and extension in time come about? The answer runs as follows: It comes about by virtue of the fact that over against the
flow of the process of being pushed back in time, over against the
flow of the modifications of consciousness, the object that
appears pushed back remains apperceptively preserved precisely
in absolute identity—specifically, the object together with the
posing as "this" that it underwent in the now-point. The
continuous modification of the apprehension in the continuous
flow does not concern the apprehension's "as what," its sense.
The modification intends no new object and no new object-phase.
It yields no new time-points, but constantly the same object with
the same time-points. Each actually present now creates a new [66]
time-point because it creates a new object, or rather a new
object-point, which is held fast in the flow of modification as one
and the same individual object-point. And the continuity in
which a new now becomes constituted again and again shows us
that it is not a question of "newness" as such but of a
continuous moment of individuation in which the temporal
position has its origin. The essence of the modifying flow is such
that this temporal position stands before me as identical and as
necessarily identical. The now as actually present now is the
givenness of the present of the temporal position. When the
phenomenon recedes into the past, the now receives the charac-
teristic of being a past now; but it remains the same now, except
that it stands before me as past in relation to the currently actual
and temporally new now.

The objectivation of the temporal object therefore rests on the
following moments: the content of sensation that belongs to the
different actually present now-points of the object can remain
absolutely unchanged in quality, yet still not possess true identity
in this identity of content, however far it may extend. The same
sensation now and in a different now possesses a difference—
specifically, a phenomenological difference—that corresponds to
the absolute temporal position; this difference is the primal
source of the individuality of the "this," and thereby of the
absolute temporal position. Each phase of the modification has
"essentially" the same qualitative content and the same temporal
moment, although modified; and it has them in itself in such a
way that, by their means, the subsequent apprehension of identity
is made possible. This applies to the side of sensation or,
correlatively, to the side of the apprehensional basis. The differ-
ent moments support different sides of apprehension, of objectivation proper. One side of objectivation finds its basis purely in the qualitative content of the material of sensation: this yields the temporal material—the tone, for example. This material is maintained as identical in the flow of the modification of the past. A second side of objectivation derives from the apprehension of the representants of the temporal positions. This apprehension too is continuously maintained in the flow of modification.

To summarize: The tone-point in its absolute individuality is held fast in its matter and in its temporal position, and it is the latter that first constitutes individuality. Add to this, finally, the apprehension that belongs essentially to the modification and that, while holding on to the extended objectivity with its immanent absolute time, lets the continuous process of being pushed back into the past appear. In our example of the tone, therefore, each now-point of the ever new sounding and fading-away has its material of sensation and its objectivating apprehension. The tone stands before me as the sound of a violin string that has been struck. If we again disregard the objectivating apprehension and look purely at the material of sensation, then, as far as its matter is concerned, it is constantly tone c, its tonal quality and timbre unchanged, its intensity perhaps fluctuating, and so forth. This content, understood purely as content of sensation underlying the objectivating apperception, is extended—that is to say, each now has its content of sensation, and each different now has an individually different content, even if the content is exactly the same materially. Absolutely the same c now and later is perfectly alike as far as sensation is concerned, but the c now is individually different from the c later.

What “individual” means here is the original temporal form of sensation, or, as I can also put it, the temporal form of original sensation, here of the sensation belonging to the current now-point and only to this. But the now-point itself must, in strictness, be defined through original sensation, so that the proposition asserted has to be taken only as an indication of what is supposed to be meant. The impression, as opposed to the phantasm, is distinguished by the character of originalness.
Now within the impression we have to call special attention to the primal impression, over against which there stands the continuum of modifications in primary memorial consciousness. The primal impression is something absolutely unmodified, the primal source of all further consciousness and being. Primal impression has as its content that which the word "now" signifies, insofar as it is taken in the strictest sense. Each new now is the content of a new primal impression. Ever new primal impressions continuously flash forth with ever new matter, now the same, now changing. What distinguishes primal impression from primal impression is the individualizing moment of the impression of the original temporal position, which is something fundamentally different from the quality and other material moments of the content of sensation. The moment of the original temporal position is naturally nothing by itself; the individuation is nothing in addition to what has individuation. The whole now-point, the whole original impression, undergoes the modification of the past; and only by means of this modification have we exhausted the complete concept of the now, since it is a relative concept and refers to a "past," just as "past" refers to the "now." This modification also touches the sensation above all, without nullifying its universal impressional character. It modifies the total content of the primal impression both with respect to its matter and with respect to its temporal position, but it modifies precisely in the sense in which a phantasy-modification does; that is to say, modifying through and through and yet not altering the intentional essence (the total content).

Thus the matter is the same matter, the temporal position the same temporal position, only the mode of givenness has changed: it is givenness of the past. The objectivating apprehension, then, bases itself on this material of sensation. Even if we look purely at the contents of sensation (disregarding the transcendent apprehensions which may perhaps be based on them), we carry out an apprehension: the "temporal flow," the duration, then lies within our view as a kind of objectivity. Objectivity presupposes consciousness of unity, consciousness of identity. Here we apprehend the content of every primal sensation as it-itself. The primal impression gives a tone-point-individual, and this individual is identically the same in the flow of the modification of the past:
the apperception relative to this point abides in continuous coincidence in the modification of the past, and the identity of the individual is \textit{eo ipso} identity of temporal position. The continuous welling-up of ever new primal impressions, apprehended as individual points, again and again yields new and different temporal positions. The continuity yields a continuity of temporal positions. In the flow of the modification of the past, therefore, a continuous portion of time filled with sound stands before me, but in such a way that only one of its points is given through primal impression and that from there on the temporal positions continuously appear in different degrees of modification, receding into the past.

Every perceived time is perceived as a past that terminates in [69] the present. And the present is a limit. Every apprehension, however transcendent it may be, is bound by this law. If we perceive a flight of birds or a troop of cavalry at the gallop and the like, we find in the substratum of sensation the described differences: ever new primal sensations carrying with them the characteristic that determines their temporal position and gives rise to their individuation; and, on the other side, we find the same modes in the apprehension. It is precisely in this way that something objective itself – the flight of birds – appears as primarily given in the now-point but as fully given in a continuum of the past that terminates in the now and continually terminates in an ever new now, while what has continuously preceded recedes ever further into the continuum of the past. The appearing event constantly possesses the identical absolute temporal value. As its elapsed portion is pushed further and further back into the past, the event is pushed into the past together with its absolute temporal positions, and accordingly with its entire temporal extent: that is, the same event with the same absolute temporal extension continually appears (as long as it appears at all) as identically the same, except that the form of its givenness is different. On the other hand, in the living source-point of being, in the now, ever new primal being simultaneously wells up, in relation to which the distance of the event’s time-points from the actually present now continuously expands; and consequently the appearance of sinking backwards, of moving away, grows up.


Up until this point, Husserl’s examination of the manifold running off of time-consciousness and its objects has primarily concerned itself with the running-off temporal characters that constitute both the flowing-away and the stability of temporal objects. In section 32, Husserl draws together the different levels or dimensions of temporal constitution.
in order to show how the one objective time is constituted. It is here that the fundamental structurality of the possibility of a unity of one life – a homogeneity in heterogeneity – finally announces itself. Take particular note of Husserl's comment that the "...temporal field extends further than the actually present field" (my emphasis).

§ 32. The Role of Reproduction in the Constitution of the One Objective Time

With the preservation of the individuality of the time-points as they sink back into the past, however, we still do not have the consciousness of a unitary, homogeneous, objective time. In the bringing about of this consciousness, reproductive memory (intuitive memory as well as memory in the form of empty intentions) plays an important role. By virtue of a reproductive memory, every point that has been pushed back in time can be made – and made repeatedly – the zero-point of a temporal intuition. The earlier temporal field, in which what is presently pushed back was a now, is reproduced; and the reproduced now is identified with the time-point still living in fresh memory: the individual intention is the same. The reproduced temporal field extends further than the actually present field. If we take a point of the past in this field, the reproduction, in partially coinciding with the temporal field in which this point was the now, yields a further regress into the past, and so on. This process must evidently be conceived as capable of being continued without limit, although in practice the actual memory will soon fail. It is evident that each time-point has its before and after, and that the points and extended sections that are before cannot be compressed in the fashion of an approach to a mathematical limit, such as the limit of intensity. If there were a limit, a now would correspond to it which nothing had preceded, and that is evidently impossible. A now is always and essentially a border-point of an extent of time. And it is evident that this whole extent must sink backwards and that, as it does so, its whole magnitude and complete individuality are preserved. Of course, phantasy and reproduction do not make possible an extension of the intuition of time in the sense that the extent of temporal shadings really given in the simultaneous consciousness would be increased. One will perhaps ask in this respect how, in these temporal fields succeeding one another,
I shall conclude this lecture with a reading of section 33, “Some A Priori Temporal Laws,” which brings us to the end of Part Two of Husserl’s *Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*. It establishes a launch point for Part Three and the extraordinary discourse on time as primordial Flux. Here, we see the laws by which the multiple streams of consciousness (to paraphrase William James) flow as parts of the same river.

§ 33. Some A Priori Temporal Laws

Obviously, this *a priori* requirement is grounded in the validity of the fundamental temporal evidences that can be immediately grasped and that become evident on the basis of the intuitions of the data of the temporal positions.

If, to begin with, we compare two primal sensations – or rather, correlative, two primal data – both actually appearing in one consciousness as primal data, as now, then they are distinguished from one another by their matter. They are, however, simultaneous: they have identically the same absolute position in time; they are both now; and in the same now they necessarily have the same value as far as their temporal position is concerned. They have the same form of individuation; they both become constituted in impressions belonging to the same
impressional level. They are modified in this identity, and they continually preserve the identity in the modification of the past. A primal datum and a modified datum of different or equivalent content necessarily have different positions in time. And two modified data have either the same or different temporal positions: the same, if they spring from the same now-point; different, if they spring from different now-points. The actually present now is one now and constitutes one temporal position, however many objectivities are separately constituted in it: they all have the same temporal present and preserve their simultaneity in flowing off. That the temporal positions have intervals, that these are magnitudes, and the like, can be seen with evidence here; so too can further truths, such as the law of transitivity or the law that if a is earlier than b, then b is later than a. It belongs to time's a priori essence that it is a continuity of temporal positions, sometimes filled with identical and sometimes with changing objectivities, and that the homogeneity of absolute time becomes constituted indefeasibly in the flow of the modifications of the past and in the continuous welling-up of a now, of the generative time-point, of the source-point of all temporal positions whatsoever.

Furthermore, it belongs to the a priori essence of the situation that sensation, apprehension, the taking of a position—all of these—take part in the same temporal flow and that the objectivated absolute time is necessarily identically the same as the time that belongs to sensation and apprehension. The preobjectivated time belonging to sensation necessarily founds the unique possibility of an objectivation of temporal positions, which corresponds to the modification of sensation and to the degree of this modification. To the objectivated time-point in which, for example, bells begin to ring, there corresponds the time-point of the matching sensation. In the beginning-phase, the sensation has the same time; that is, if it is subsequently made into an object, then it necessarily keeps the temporal position that coincides with the corresponding temporal position of the ringing of the bells. So too the time of the perception and the time of the perceived are identically the same. The perceptual act sinks backwards in time just as what is perceived in its appearance does, and in reflection identically the same temporal position must be given to each phase of the perception as is given to what is perceived.

Husserl. PCIT, pp. 73-75.

In sum, we find a uniformity of temporal positions being preserved as they are shunted back into the ever-receding past, while the ever new present wells-up continuously generating new modifications of the temporal positions of the retained in their changing relation to the
present. That is, two simultaneously appearing primary data – appearing as now – are distinguished by their different matter. However, they have the same form of temporal individuation in that they have the same value of temporal position. Of course, they are then modified through their retention, but they retain their simultaneity, one with the other as they sink back into the past together. Thus, their modification has to do with their changing distance from the now, which simultaneously maintains their temporal individuality as they recede further and further into the past background of the one continuum. Their coincidence in this play of continuous-alteration consists in a uniformly mobile extension away from the generative over-flowing of the present.

N.B. Mention John Ellis McTaggart’s definition of the B-series of time as raised in his essay “The Unreality of Time” (1908).
Chapter Six – Primordial Flow / Flux

22. The Constituting and the Constituted – Fields of Presence and Vanishing Points

In the Third Section of Husserl’s *Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, we are introduced to a dimension of temporal discourse in which time begins to lack any resemblance to what we ordinarily take as time. With the thought of time as a pre-objective constituting flow, according to Husserl, we can no longer frame it in terms of duration, change, succession, or process – since “[t]here is nothing here that changes, and for that reason it also makes no sense to speak of something that endures” (Husserl. *PCIT*, section 35, p. 78). As we shall see, this is a region for which names are lacking.

Beginning with section 34 “Differentiation of the Levels of Constitution,” Husserl describes the different levels of constitution that have been disclosed by the analyses of Sections One and Two:
It is the third level, or better, *dimension* of time constitution – “absolute time-constituting consciousness” – that occupies the focal position of Husserl’s analyses in the final part of his lectures. Here, we find a deepening of what is essentially a Transcendental Aesthetic, which indirectly pays homage to Kant, but also surpasses the limits of his rather static and Euclidean approach to time.

Husserl presents a transcendental-genetic form of discourse that takes into account the different levels and dimensions of time constitution and of their interplay, in which the genesis of time is not to be understood in terms of an empirical genesis, although it is that which makes possible the genesis of the empirical (as a constituted spatio-temporal horizon of extended unities [qualities and quantities]). The next stage on the passage to this sphere of absolute time-constituting consciousness is reached by way of an analysis of the difference
between constituted unities and the constituting flow (where the ‘flow’ is irreducible to an actual successive process).

§ 35. Difference between Constituted Unities and the Constituting Flow

Now to begin with, this absolute consciousness that lies before all constitution should be discussed somewhat more closely. Its peculiarity stands out distinctly in contrast to the constituted unities belonging to the most different levels:

1. Each individual object (each unity, whether immanent or transcendent, constituted in the stream) endures, and necessarily endures—that is, it continuously exists in time and is something identical in this continuous existence, which at the same time can be regarded as a process. Conversely: what exists in time continuously exists in time and is the unity belonging to the process that carries with it inseparably the unity of what endures in the process as it unfolds. The unity of the tone that endures throughout the process lies in the tonal process; and conversely, the unity of the tone is unity in the filled duration, that is, in the process. Therefore, if anything at all is defined as existing in a time-point, it is conceivable only as the phase of a process, a phase in which the duration of an individual being also has its point.

2. Individual or concrete being is necessarily changing or unchanging; the process is a process of change or of rest, the enduring object itself a changing object or one at rest. Moreover, every change has its rate or acceleration of change (to use an image) with respect to the same duration. As a matter of principle, any phase of a change can be expanded into a rest, and any phase of a rest can be carried over into a change.

Husserl. *PCIT*, pp. 77-78.

Thus, endurance and change are intertwined as ‘continuous alteration.’ All concrete being has this in common. It is a non-static (ekstatic) structurality of referential indices through which objects (in the most general sense) and concrete beings have their extendedness / concreteness / presence. These can always be carved up into points, which are actually phases of a continuum that may be carved up infinitely because it is none other than continuous alteration itself. It is that by which rest and movement, simultaneity and succession, the static and evolutionary are constituted and defined. That which is extended in
unity of sameness and difference always refers back to a certain structurality of extending. Thus, Husserl inaugurates a shift from the consideration of constituted phenomena and extends his phenomenological orientation toward the constituting phenomena themselves.

Now if we consider the \textit{constituting} phenomena in comparison with the phenomena just discussed, we find a \textit{flow}, and each phase of this flow is a \textit{continuity of adumbrations}. But as a matter of principle, no phase of this flow can be expanded into a continuous succession; and therefore the flow cannot be conceived as so transformed that this phase would be extended in identity with itself. Quite to the contrary, we necessarily find a flow of continuous “change”; and this change has the absurd character that it flows precisely as it flows and can flow neither “faster” nor “slower.” If that is the case, then any object that changes is missing here; and since “something” runs its course in every process, no process is in question. There is nothing here that changes, and for that reason it also makes no sense to speak of something that endures. It is therefore nonsensical to want to find something here that remains unchanged for even an instant during the course of its duration.

Husserl. \textit{PCIT}, pp. 78.

This primordial flow – as a continuity of adumbrations – constitutes objectivity, but it is pre-objective in the classical sense of objectivity, since it falls outside the language of time that it originally constitutes. What is fascinating about such a proposition is that it suggests that time appears to be non-temporal. Does Husserl’s discourse on the time-constituting flow rip it from time and cast it into eternity? Yes and no! If we are stuck with the limited idea of time as an order of succession, without recognizing the intimacy of its intertwining with the order of contemporaneity (which is pre-relativistically associated with spatiality), then indeed, we fall back into a kind of Parmenidean plenum where time cancels itself out. However, this would also mean that we fall into an eternal horizon in which alteration, which is fundamental to the constitution of an extension in the most general sense (unity of identity and difference), could never announce itself. When we understand that in spatio-temporal terms rest is but a limit to motion, it is rather the case that even non-time is but a limit to time, a modality of
time itself. But, this time is irreducible to the language or measure by which we ordinarily define it. It is rather Uberzeitlich, an over- or super-time.

According to Husserl, this dimension is Absolute Subjectivity, where the definition of time-constituting consciousness as ‘flow’ operates purely as a metaphor. Time-constituting phenomena are lacking in names. It is in section 36: “The Time- Constituting Flow as Absolute Subjectivity” that we are introduced to this radical dimension of thought.

§ 36. The Time- Constituting Flow as Absolute Subjectivity

Time-constituting phenomena, therefore, are evidently objectivities fundamentally different from those constituted in time. They are neither individual objects nor individual processes, and the predicates of such objects or processes cannot be meaningfully ascribed to them. Hence it also can make no sense to say of them (and to say with the same signification) that they exist in the now and did exist previously, that they succeed one another in time or are simultaneous with one another, and so on. But no doubt we can and must say: A certain continuity of appearance—that is, a continuity that is a phase of the time-constituting flow—belongs to a now, namely, to the now that it constitutes; and to a before, namely, as that which is constitutive (we cannot say “was”) of the before. But is not the flow a succession, does it not have a now, an actually present phase, and a continuity of pasts of which I am now conscious in retentions? We can say nothing other than the following: This flow is something we speak of in conformity with what is constituted, but it is not “something in objective time.” It is absolute subjectivity and has the absolute properties of something to be designated metaphorically as “flow”; of something that originates in a point of actuality, in a primal source-point, “the now,” and so on. In the actuality- experience we have the primal source-point and a continuity of moments of reverberation. For all of this, we lack names.

Husserl. PCIT, pp. 79.

The sentence, “For all of this, we lack names,” may be interpreted as a kind of invitation. But, an invitation to do what? – to create some more names? I do not think so! – although some philosophers have taken it as such an invitation. The point here lies in the specific import that the meaning of ‘metaphor’ introduces when making reference to time-constituting consciousness as a ‘flow,’ when the senses of duration, movement, process, etc.,
have been left out, but where a certain meta-structurality remains over. The metaphoricity at work here is nothing other than a limit to language itself – and this is the very horizon of metaphysics. However, this is not identical with ‘unsayable,’ it is just that we are required to speak with the awareness that we remain within the margins of metaphor / simile. In other words, we fictionalize – where fictionalizing should be understood in terms of the Husserlian eidetic reduction, whereby we shift our orientation into the mode of ‘as-if,’ but not in such a way that it is ‘contrary’ to truth. To embrace possibility is to be open to fleshing out the truth – or that which in phenomenology may be accorded the status of ‘actuality-phenomenon’ through the adumbration of its various essential moments (e.g., anexact morphological essences).

Note: Quote passage from Husserl’ Ideen 1, where he says that the knowledge of possibility precedes that of actuality...

The old ontological doctrine, that the knowledge of 'possibilities' must precede that of actualities (Wirklichkeit) is, in my opinion, in so far as it is rightly understood and properly utilized, a really great truth.

Edmund Husserl. Ideas 1. sec 79.

23. Temporality and Eidetic Analysis

The eidetic reduction was not thematized formally until the publication of the first volume of *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy* (1913), although it is quite clear that it defines the whole course of the lectures on time. Eidetic analysis is not only inaugurated as a means of uncovering and describing ‘essential’ structures of experience in order to make them explicit, it also concerns such essential components as their anexactitude, which would ordinarily be characterized within the logic of naming as simple inexactitude. But, such morphological types as roundness, crinkliness, smoothness, redness, etc., which make up the very contours of experience in both intimate and peripheral dimensions, are not inexact. Rather, it is only their ideal limit forms (e.g., the relation between a circle and roundness as the idealized limit form of curvature in general) that have exactitude. Anexactitude and ambiguity are suppressed by their movement and fall outside the limitation of that which is merely inexact. Incompleteness of givenness, indeterminateness, ambivalence, etc., are essential horizons of any kind of perception and they deserve to be addressed accordingly. In an important sense, idealization itself is nothing more than a movement of fictionalizing by virtue of its aim to reduce and filter out that which is always in excess of the limits that it names (which includes the idealizing activities of the sciences). In these terms, we cannot extend beyond metaphor, since language is always already operating within its manifold margins. However, with awareness (which we might characterize as irony), such a fictionalizing mode of orientation may also open up that which it might otherwise reduce – restore its essential mystery, so to speak.

Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive form of philosophical critique has generated some new names (as well as re-defining some old ones), but only by playing within the margins of metaphor. The neologism, ‘*différance,*’ gives us a postmodern expression for engaging with a
dimension in which successivity and simultaneity are inseparably intertwined without it being reducible to these determinations (Husserl’s region for which names are lacking). It names the play of difference / spacing and deferral / temporizing that always already constitutes the successive and the simultaneous – where temporizing is spacing and spacing is temporizing, but only metaphorically, since the copula ‘is’ is crossed out. As an existential determinator (and not just a mere sign of predication), the copula is ‘the’ very sign of metaphysics and yet one cannot do away with it. It is not possible to put it out of play, one can only continue to play with it. Thus, crossing out the copula and placing it between brackets does not erase its resonance, but only provides us with a foreground sign that alters its tone. Writing under erasure (sous rature) actually bears many similarities to Husserl’s method of epoché, particularly in terms of the functions of bracketing, the suspension of position-taking, fictionalizing, etc.

Derrida’s deconstruction is very much influenced by the varied forms of discourse on time that trace themselves out in the works of Freud, Husserl, and Heidegger. We shall have the opportunity to take a look at his deconstructive interpretation of Husserl’s implicit invitation to turn toward that which lacks names in the final lecture of this course.

But, this is to protentionally – or rather, to expectationally – run ahead again. To return to Husserl’s lectures on time-consciousness, in section 37 “Appearances of Transcendent Objects as Constituted Unities,” we finally arrive at a point where the aesthetical, the epistemological, and the ontological exhibit their common locus in temporality. The timelessness of a cherished value, the a temporality of a concept or an idea, eternal Being (in a pre-Heideggerian sense) are still announcements / appearances that are borne out of that which Husserl has metaphorically named as ‘flow.’ They may not be temporal in themselves – in that they do not refer to temporal states of affairs – but their non-temporality still has to be given in an immanent unity that always has the form of the ‘flow.’
Husserl has systematically worked through the constituted unities of temporal experience and demonstrated how the identity of that which is experienced is a unified multiplicity of temporal phases held in a retentional continuum (the form of the flow). And, each point (we use the word metaphorically, of course) has reference to its before and after. Thus, at the most basic level, we find the primary interplay between pastness, nowness, and futurity that produces the associative matrix whereby the many coincide with the one as an identity that is extended in linear time. But, the focus here only really speaks of the unity of temporal objects (immanent or transcendent). It is also a question of returning to the flowing unity of the experiencing in contrast to the experienced. And, Husserl does precisely that in
section 38 “The Unity of the Flow of Consciousness and the Constitution of Simultaneity and Succession” (which is reproduced here in full).
§ 38. The Unity of the Flow of Consciousness and the Constitution of Simultaneity and Succession

We have already occupied ourselves with the constitution of such immanent objects, with their growth from ever new primal sensations and modifications. Now in reflection we find a single flow that breaks down into many flows, but this multitude nevertheless has a kind of unity that permits and requires us to speak of one flow. We find many flows because many series of primal sensations begin and end. But we find a connecting form because the law of the transformation of the now into the no-longer— and, in the other direction, of the not-yet into the now— applies to each of them, but not merely to each of them taken separately; there rather exists something like a common form of the now, a universal and perfect likeness in the mode of flowing. Several, many primal sensations occur "at once." And when any one of them elapses, the multitude elapses "conjointly" and in absolutely the same mode with absolutely the same gradations and in absolutely the same tempo: except that, in general, one ceases while another still has its not-yet before it—that is to say, its new primal sensations that further prolong the duration of what is intended in it. Or described more adequately: The many primal sensations flow away and from the beginning have at their disposal the same running-off modes, except that the series of primal sensations constitutive of the enduring immanent objects are variously prolonged, corresponding to the varying durations of the immanent objects. They do not all make use of the formal possibilities in the same way. Immanent time is constituted as one for all immanent objects and processes. Correlatively, the time-consciousness of what is immanent is an all-inclusive unity. The "being-together" [Zusammen], the "being-all-at-once" [Zugleich] of actually present primal sensations is all-embracing; all-embracing too is the "before," the "having-gone-before" of all the immediately preceding primal sensations, the steady transmutation of each ensemble of primal sensations into such a before. This before is a continuity, and each of its points is a homogeneous, identical running-off form for the entire ensemble. The whole "being-together" of primal sensations is subject to the law according to which it changes into a steady continuum of modes of consciousness, of modes of having elapsed, and according to which in the same continuity an ever new being-together of primal sensations arises.
originally, in order in its turn to pass continuously over into the condition of having elapsed. What is a being-together as an ensemble of primal sensations remains a being-together in the mode of having elapsed. Primal sensations have their continuous “succession” in the sense of a continuous running-off, and primal sensations have their being-together, their “being-all-at-once.” Actual primal sensations exist all at once; in the succession, however, one sensation or group of sensations existing together is actual primal sensation, while the others have elapsed. But what does that mean? One can say nothing further here than “look”: a primal sensation or a group of primal sensations that has an immanent now as object of consciousness (a tone-now, in the same now a color, and so on) continuously changes into modes of the consciousness of the before, in which the immanent object is intended as past; and “all at once,” together with these, an ever new primal sensation emerges, an ever new now is established, and thereby an ever new tone-now, form-now, etc., is intended. In a group of primal sensations, primal sensation is distinguished from primal sensation by means of content; only the now is the same. The consciousness, in its form as primal sensation-consciousness, is identical.

But “together” with the primal sensation-consciousness there exist continuous series of modes pertaining to the flowing-away of “earlier” primal sensations, of earlier now-consciousness. This being-together is a being-together of modes of consciousness continuously modified with respect to form, while the being-together or primal sensations is a being-together of modes purely identical in form. We can extract a point in the continuity of running-off modes, and we then find in this point too a being-together of running-off modes perfectly alike in form; or rather, we find an identical running-off mode. One must make an essential distinction between these two ensembles. One is the site for the constitution of simultaneity, the other the site for the constitution of temporal succession—although it is also the case that simultaneity is nothing without temporal succession and temporal succession is nothing without simultaneity, and consequently simultaneity and temporal succession must become constituted correlative and inseparably. We can differentiate terminologically between the retentional being-all-at-once of fluxions
[fluxionalen Vor-Zugleich] and the impressional being-all-at-once of fluxions [impressionalem Zugleich von Fluxionen]. We cannot call the one or the other being-all-at-once a being simultaneous. We can no longer speak of a time that belongs to
5 the ultimate constituting consciousness. The simultaneity of a color and of a tone, for example—their being in an “actually present now”—originally becomes constituted with the primal sensations that introduce the retentional process. But the primal sensations are not themselves simultaneous, and we can no more
10 call the phases of the retentional being-all-at-once of fluxions simultaneous phases of consciousness than we can call the succession of consciousness a temporal succession.

We know what this retentional being-all-at-once is from our [79] earlier analyses: the continuum of phases that attach themselves
to a primal sensation, each of which is retentional consciousness of the earlier now (“original memory” of it). Here we must note:
When the primal sensation recedes and is continuously modified, we not only have in general an experience that is a modification of the earlier experience, but we are also able to turn our glance
20 in it in such a way that we “see,” so to speak, the earlier nonmodified experience in the modified experience. When a tonal succession runs off (not too rapidly), we are not only able to “look at” the first tone, after it has elapsed, as a tone that is “still present” although no longer sensed, but we can also take
heed of the fact that the mode of consciousness that this tone just
25 now possesses is a “memory” of the primal sensation’s mode of consciousness in which it was given as now. But then we must differentiate sharply between the consciousness of the past (the retentional consciousness as well as the consciousness that re-
30 presents something “again”) in which an immanent temporal object is intended as immediately past, and the retention or (depending on whether the original flow of the modification of sensation or its re-presentation is in question) the recollective “reproduction” of the earlier primal sensation. And this we must
do for every other fluxion.

If any phase of the duration of an immanent object is a
35 now-phase and therefore intended in primal sensation, then, in the retentional being-all-at-once, retentions that are continuously joined to one another are united with this primal sensation. These
retentions are characterized in themselves as modifications of the primal sensations that belong to all of the rest of the points of the constituted duration; that is, to those that have elapsed in time. Each of these retentions has a determinate mode to which
5 distance in time from the now-point corresponds. Each is the consciousness of the past of the corresponding earlier now-point and gives it in the mode of the immediate past that corresponds to its position in the elapsed duration.

Husserl. PCIT, p. 80-84
What stands out in particular at this stage of Husserl’s analysis is a twofold dimensionality of retention – two intentionalities that are necessarily intertwined in the unfolding of a single continuum. He elaborates on the functioning of this double intentionality of the retentional flux of consciousness in section 39 – which is, undoubtedly, one of the most important moments in the lectures on time-consciousness as a whole (there is a further reference in Appendix VIII).
§ 39. The Double Intentionality of Retention and the Constitution of the Flow of Consciousness

The duality in the intentionality of retention gives us a clue to the solution of the difficulty concerning how it is possible to be aware of a unity belonging to the ultimate constituting flow of consciousness. Without doubt a difficulty does present itself here: if a self-contained flow (one that belongs to an enduring process or object) has elapsed, I can nevertheless look back on it; it forms, so it seems, a unity in memory. Hence the flow of consciousness obviously becomes constituted in consciousness as a unity too. The unity of a tone-duration, for example, becomes constituted in the flow, but the flow itself becomes constituted in turn as the unity of the consciousness of the tone-duration. And must we then not also go on to say that this unity becomes constituted in an altogether analogous way and is every bit as much a constituted temporal series, and that one must therefore surely speak of a temporal now, before, and after?

In the light of our latest explanations, we can give the following answer: There is one, unique flow of consciousness in which both the unity of the tone in immanent time and the unity of the flow of consciousness itself become constituted at once. As shocking (when not initially even absurd) as it may seem to say that the flow of consciousness constitutes its own unity, it is nonetheless the case that it does. And this can be made intelligible on the basis of the flow’s essential constitution. Our regard can be directed, in the one case, through the phases that “coincide” in the continuous progression of the flow and that function as intentionalities of the tone. But our regard can also be aimed at the flow, at a section of the flow, at the passage of the flowing consciousness from the beginning of the tone to its end.

Husserl. PCIT, pp. 84-85.

The retentional shading-off, through which lived-experience is stretched out, involves a transformational movement of return that originally gives linear duration. The theme of the double-intentionality of retention responds to some extremely compelling questions concerning the conditions of the possibility of lived time-consciousness. This is a theme to
which Jacques Derrida is particularly attuned when he introduces the deconstructive strategy and quasi-concept of *différance* as temporization and spacing. By intermixing the Husserlian phenomenological terminology of temporalization with that of Derridian deconstruction the double intentionality of retention may be expressed in the following way:

Inscription = the *retention of* that which is no-longer → a retaining that is the condition of the possibility of an *appearance* as a unity of duration: the *being-scribed* of the inscription. We might, but only very loosely, speak of this aspect of retention as a kind of doubling. However, this movement of inscription is actually auxiliary to that second aspect of retention which originarily constitutes positional differentiation of a temporal order. An inscribed moment must be capable of being delivered up in relation to other temporal positions – and this means that the relations of difference must somehow be able to give themselves within a single grasp. There is a differential 'style' of *appearing* that has to be taken into account that permits the simultaneous interpenetration and standing-out of different moments without removing their temporal differences.

Then there is the *being-scribed of the inscription* → the spacing-out of the mark as *re-marking in a specific modal form of appearing* → the 'manner' or 'style' in which the mark (retention) articulates itself = the retention of that which is no-longer precisely *as that which is no longer*. This is the *mode of appearing of* that which is given in relation to other moments of the past (including the ever fresh now). The retained mark must have the 'character' of a *retained* mark (and it must also distinguish itself from other retained marks). It is a *deferred* presentation; a presence that is Other to the present; a presence in the present that is not of the present, in the sense in which it falls short of the present otherwise it could do no more than appear 'as-now.' In that case, there would not be 'temporal duration / succession,' but only an eternal present in which all was given, as Husserl says, *Zugleich* (all-at-once). However, there is also another kind of all-at-once that is not equal to the lack of the appearing of succession.
The very meaning of temporal horizon involves a kind of vertical and horizontal opening through which different temporal positions can be given simultaneously without eradicating their relative temporal signatures. Any event that gives itself must be more than the sum of a singular temporal modality. The event as-it-gives-itself in the Living Present is always made up of fringes of the before and after. The second intentionality of which we speak, holds together different moments together within a single grasp without nullifying their differences, since the other face of this giving is a certain 'holding-back.'

This is precisely the twofold relation necessary for the constitution of any horizon and the process of sedimentation. It is an intertwining of proximity and distance, a fold that is an unfolding of depth. In a way, one could say that a horizon is everywhere (given in a single grasp) and yet it recedes. Like a gestalt, this temporal horizon is the contextualizing structure (or connective tissue) that binds different moments together, while simultaneously holding them apart. So, here we find that the all-at-once does not necessarily mean non-time, but a manner in which time, in its unfolding, folds in on itself (like the instantaneity of all spatial points in a hologram). The second intentionality of retention is constitutive of the 'unity' of the appearing of that which appears in the flux (an unfolding of changing temporal modalities of the same) in that it gives a certain temporal difference. It is a stretching-out of duration itself (without restricting the actual appearing to a purely discrete appearance that is given in a sequence of successions). There is a kind of presentative scan (not re-presentation) of that which is no longer present, where the latter can be anything from a particular moment to a sedimented multiplicity.

Taken together, these forms of intentionality (along with protention as negotiated through primal impression) constitute the consciousness of the 'passing-over' of that which was now into that which is not-now precisely because it is simultaneously the consciousness
of itself as flow – “…one unique flow of consciousness in which both the unity of the tone in
immanent time and the unity of the flow of consciousness itself become constituted at once.”

Thus, we return to the fundamental phenomenological determination of retention as
that which does not merely present a temporal object as 'give' a certain interval – a spacing,
through which it is stretched out in the unity of the one flow of consciousness. In this section
[39], Husserl continues by showing how the ‘duration’ of a sound is articulated as such, when
he writes,

Every adumbration of consciousness of the species “retention” possesses a double intentionality: one serves for the
constitution of the immanent object, of the tone; it is this
intentionality that we call “primary memory” of the (just sensed)
tone, or more precisely, just retention of the tone. The other
intentionality is constitutive of the unity of this primary memory
in the flow; namely, retention, because it is a still-being
conscious, a consciousness that holds back – because it is, pre-
cisely, retention – is also retention of the elapsed tone-retention: [81]
in its process of being continuously adumbrated in the flow. it is
continuous retention of the continuously preceding phases.

Husserl. PCIT, p. 85.

In sum, the twofold intentionality of retention gives us a certain movement of
reciprocal implication: retention of that which is no longer present. This refers us to the logic
of appearance – and is auxiliary to the deferring / holding-back which constitutes it as one
moment of a 'unity of duration.' With this, we also have the retention of the retentional
'orientation' through which that which is no longer present is ‘given’ precisely as that which is
no longer present. This speaks of the logic of appearing: the structurality and modality of the
given in its givenness, that aspect of presencing that gives duration through a certain kind of
deferral of presence, or more precisely, the deferral of a certain 'mode' of presence, e.g., that
of nowness.
Within this movement of delayed return, we also find a reference to protention as it fulfils itself in an ever fresh now, and where the *articulation* of 'pastness' implies a certain *evidence of surpassing* – a further-consciousness that holds back.

The pivotal nature of Husserl's discourse on the double intentionality of retention requires that we focus on the rest of section 39 in order to see how the structurality of this intertwining unfolds itself.

If we...

If we... fix our regard on some one phase of the flow of consciousness (a phase in which there appears a tone-now and an extent of the tone-duration in the mode of the just-having-elapsed), then this phase comprehends a continuity of retentions united in the retentional being-all-at-once. This continuity is retention of the total momentary continuity of the continuously preceding phases of the flow. (In its initial member it is new primal sensation; in the member that then follows next in the continuity – in the first phase of adumbration – it is immediate retention of the preceding primal sensation; in the next momentary phase, it is retention of the retention of the primal sensation preceding the one above, and so on.) Now if we allow the flow to flow on, we then have the flow-continuum running off, which causes the continuity we have just described to be modified retentionally; and in this process, each new continuity of phases existing together in one moment is retention in relation to the total continuity belonging to the being-all-at-once in the preceding phase. Thus there extends throughout the flow a horizontal intentionality that, in the course of the flow, continuously coincides with itself. In the absolute passing-on, in the flowing process, the first primal
impression becomes changed into a retention of itself, this retention becomes changed into a retention of this retention, and so on. But together with the first retention there is a new "now," a new primal sensation, and the latter is combined continuously with the former in one moment in such a way that the second phase of the flow is primal sensation of the new now and retention of the earlier now; the third phase is again new primal sensation together with retention of the second primal sensation and retention of the retention of the first; and so on. We must also take into account here that the retention of a retention has intentionality not only in relation to what is immediately retained but also in relation to what, in the retaining, is retained of the second degree, and ultimately in relation to the primal datum, which is objectivated throughout the process. The situation is analogous to the re-presentation of an appearance of a physical thing, which possesses intentionality not only in relation to the thing-appearance but also in relation to the appearing thing; or better still, it is analogous to the memory [of a memory] of A, which makes us conscious not only of the memory but also of the A as what is remembered in the memory.

We believe, therefore, that the unity of the flow itself becomes constituted in the flow of consciousness as a one-dimensional quasi-temporal order by virtue of the continuity of retentional modifications and by virtue of the circumstance that these modifications are, continuously, retentions of the retentions that have continuously preceded them. If I direct my interest towards the tone, if I immerse myself attentively in the "transverse intentionality" (in the primal sensation as sensation of the actually present tone-now, in the retentional modifications as primary memories of the series of elapsed tone-points and as continually experiencing the unity in the flow of retentional
modifications of the primal sensations and of the retentions that are already on hand), then the enduring tone stands before me, constantly expanding in its duration. If I focus on the "horizontal intentionality" and on what is becoming constituted in it, I turn my reflective regard away from the tone (which has endured for such and such a length of time) towards what is new in the way of primal sensation at one point in the retentional being-all-at-once and towards what is retained "all at once" with this new primal sensation in a continuous series. What is retained is the past consciousness in its series of phases (first of all, its preceding phase). And then, in the continuous flowing-on of consciousness, I grasp the retained series of the elapsed consciousness together with the limit of the actual primal sensation and the continuous being-pushed-back of this series, along with the new addition of retentions and primal sensations.

Here we can ask: Can I find and apprehend in one glance the whole retentional consciousness, included in a retentional being-all-at-once, of the past course of consciousness? Obviously, the process necessary in this case is the following: I must first grasp the retentional being-all-at-once itself, and this is continuously modified; indeed, it is what it is only in the flow. Now the flow, inasmuch as it modifies this retentional being-all-at-once, coincides with itself intentionally, constituting a unity in the flow. And what is one and identical receives and maintains a continuous mode of being-pushed-back; something new is always being added "in front" in order to flow away immediately in its turn, together with what is connected with it in that moment. Throughout this process my look can remain fixed on the momentary being-all-at-once that sinks into the past, but the constitution of the retentional unity reaches beyond this, always adding something new. My look can be turned towards that in this process, [83] and I am always conscious of it in the flow as constituted unity.

Consequently, two inseparably united intentionalities, requiring one another like two sides of one and the same thing, are interwoven with each other in the one, unique flow of consciousness. By virtue of one of the intentionalities, immanent time becomes constituted - an objective time, a genuine time in which there is duration and the alteration of what endures. In the other
intentionality, it is the quasi-temporal arrangement of the phases of the flow that becomes constituted – of the flow that always and necessarily possesses the flowing “now”-point, the phase of actuality, and the series of phases that have preceded the phase of actuality or that will follow it (those that are not yet actual). This prephenomenal, preimmanent temporality becomes constituted intentionally as the form of the time-constituting consciousness and in it itself. The flow of the consciousness that constitutes immanent time not only exists but is so remarkably and yet intelligibly fashioned that a self-appearance of the flow necessarily exists in it, and therefore the flow itself must necessarily be apprehensible in the flowing. The self-appearance of the flow does not require a second flow; on the contrary, it constitutes itself as a phenomenon in itself.\textsuperscript{12} The constituting and the constituted coincide, and yet naturally they cannot coincide in every respect. The phases of the flow of consciousness in which phases of the same flow of consciousness become constituted phenomenally cannot be identical with these constituted phases, nor are they. What is brought to appearance in the actual momentary phase of the flow of consciousness – specifically, in its series of retentional moments – are the past phases of the flow of consciousness.


John Brough’s translator’s notes on Längsintentionalität and Querintentionalität.

\textsuperscript{9} \textit{Längsintentionalität}, which Churchill translates as “longitudinal intentionality.” I use “horizontal” because I take the intentionality in this case to be the flow’s intending of itself in its flowing; this intentionality, in other words, may be said to run lengthwise along the flow, which the term “horizontal” is intended to suggest. – Translator’s note.

P. 85.

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Querintentionalität}. Here I follow Churchill’s translation. I interpret the flow’s intentionality in this case to be directed towards the immanent object enduring or running off in immanent time (and towards a transcendent object if the immanent object is an act of the appropriate kind). I take the immanent object to be on a different level from the absolute flow that intends or constitutes it; the intentionality directed towards the immanent temporal object may, therefore, be said to cut across the direction of the flow. See the “Translator’s Introduction,” III. B. 2. a. – Translator’s note.

P. 86.
Längsintentionalität is the German expression for one of the two intentionalities of retention. John Brough translates it as 'horizontal' intentionality (refer to P.85 of his translation of the very comprehensive collection of Husserl's temporal analyses: *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* (based on the Rudolph Boehm edition, *Husserliana* Vol. X [1966]). In the Churchill translation it appears as 'longitudinal intentionality.' On first appearance, there is little to choose between their respective translations of this expression. However, since this intentionality is that which makes possible the bringing-together of different temporal moments as members of the same flow – “…being-all-at-once” – without erasing their different temporal signatures (e.g., like a moment of recall in which several distinct memories announce themselves simultaneously), this would actually be *constitutive* of the 'horizontal' dimension of experience. The horizontal is none other than the flow’s – longitudinal – intending of itself in its flowing. In this sense, Längsintentionalität expresses more of the sedimeted depth / the *vertical* elements of time-consciousness than that of the *horizontal*.

Querintentionalität (transverse intentionality) is intertwined with this intentionality, but it is directed towards the immanent temporal object, thus cutting across the direction of the flow, so to speak. Brough follows Churchill’s translation in this regard, but assumes that it is also to be designated as a vertical intentionality, whereas it actually has more affinity with the horizontal. Undoubtedly, this is mainly influenced by Husserl’s diagrams of time, which are not to be taken literally, but only as metaphorical representations. In other words, it is not a question of a correlation between *horizontal* and *transverse* intentionalities, but between:

\[
\text{Längsintentionalität} = \text{longitudinal or vertical intentionality}
\]

and

\[
\text{Querintentionalität} = \text{transverse or horizontal intentionality}
\]
Despite this technical difference in observation and translation, what stands out here is that both intentionalities always already imply one another since the consciousness of the temporal necessarily coincides with the temporalization of consciousness itself.

The importance of the theme of this double intentionality in play in the streaming of consciousness is brought into sharp relief once again in Appendix viii.

*End of First Part…*
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