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Dr. Louis N. Sandowsky
Phenomenology and Existentialism
Lecture Two: The Method of Phenomenology
1. The Aims
of Phenomenology
In the previous lecture, I discussed
the modern historical context of the development of phenomenology. We looked at
how it radicalizes the thought of consciousness by freeing it from the
box-conception of mind, allowing it to express the intentionality through which
it transcends itself toward the world – out amongst the things. Phenomenology
restores a sense of wonder in the face of the immanent and yet, for precisely
this reason, that which is usually unseen. It opens up that which is closed in
its habituated familiarity. In other words, it transforms the familiar into the
strange / uncanny (unheimlich), thus
making it stand out in its original complexity and grace. In this sense,
phenomenological movement is the unfolding of a philosophical poetics. It
restores certain rights to phenomena that have been formerly ignored for
largely systemic reasons. In contrast to the tendency throughout the history of
Philosophy to erect systems, phenomenology is not another ‘system.’
We also looked at how phenomenology
maintains a methodological abstention from taking up a metaphysical position in
its project of description. It is our task today to look at the development of
the methodology that raises the issue of such a suspension to the level of a
prescriptive theme.
Husserl's
project of phenomenological critique began in the form of a powerful
phenomenological-deconstructive engagement with psychologism, objectivism, and
phenomenalism. He rigorously articulates the inherent paradoxes of the
'imagistic' thinking upon which they base themselves and unravels the logic
responsible for their 'objectivist' conflation of the fleeting contents of
experience with lived-experience itself. Once again, it must be stressed here
that the phenomenological motivation of this critique resists falling back into
any particular form of realism. In the opening of The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness (section two: The
Question of the "Origin of Time"), Husserl writes,
We do not classify lived experiences according to any particular
form of reality. We are concerned with reality only insofar as it is intended,
represented, intuited, or conceptually thought (P.26).
Firstly,
for Husserl the articulation of the phenomenon embodies a fundamental
difference within itself by comprising both the language of appearances and the
language of appearing in their
intertwining (as articulated by the noetic-noematic intentional
correlation). It is not to be confined to mere 'objective' discourse. Husserl's
theory of intentionality does not present us with an 'object-theory' or
'image-theory' of perception, caught up in a 'container-type' conception of
consciousness, but one which considers object-perception in terms of the contextual-unfolding-of a certain
'phenomenal content.' As we have already
seen, consciousness is characterized as a self-surpassing, sense-directed –
transitive / intentional – relation between meaning and meant. For Husserl, the
giving or standing-out of phenomena is irreducible to the appearance of mere
'objective' simulacra / representations that stand-in for extra-phenomenal
existents (as images or 'doubles' of the world). The call to the 'things
themselves' does not base itself on a naive / presuppositional metaphysics, but
is a call to methodological vigilance, which ultimately re-situates discourse on
the question of the Thing. In the context of this turn, which is also a
critical re-turn to questions of
method, it must be understood that this is in no way tied to a mere 'call to
idealism' – certainly not in any doctrinal sense.
Husserl's
concern in “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” (one of the main texts along with
Ideas 1 that is so often quoted in
regard to the call 'to the things themselves') is with ‘phenomenal evidence.’
For methodological reasons, the Husserlian directive is not limited to
existential matters in classical objective terms, since it only addresses
questions of existence in terms of their ‘phenomenological sense.’ The existential character of the appearing of a phenomenon (its phenomenal givenness as an
'actuality') is simply one possible mode among many. For phenomenology,
questions concerning the givenness of the 'pastness' of the remembered, or the
'imaginality' of the imagined, are just as significant as any interrogation of
the 'real.' They are not merely consigned to a 'secondary' or
'representational' field, which has been their traditional fate.
Most
importantly, Husserl is not an 'image-theorist' – for whom the question of extra-phenomenal existents and the
veracity of their givenness through images would be 'the' fundamental question
(the perennial issue for Cartesian metaphysicians). Phenomenology does not
begin as a system that is built upon a metaphysical divide between a world of
appearances or mental-images and that which appears (things-in-themselves).
This would suppose a covert act of hypostatization that is characteristic of a
phenomenalism and not a phenomenology. The call 'to the things themselves' is a
kind of attitudinal categorical imperative that seeks evidence as it gives itself.
It does this without confining such interrogation to the reductive limits of,
on the one hand, a naturalistic
objectivity, which seeks to rid itself of any residual subjectivity
(representation) in its interrogation of 'Things' or, on the other hand, a
further re-presentative notion of
consciousness, of a psychologistic
orientation, that reduces all experiences and objects of experience to
subjective states, which are articulated as successive mental events and facts.
Each view, in its own way, completely undermines the possibility of discourse
on questions concerning our lived
access to what we might call truth – or more specifically, the truth of the
world of lived-experience. Here, we
speak of both Erlebnis and Lebenswelt.
The
inadmissibility of these questions within the bounds of these viewpoints is
inscribed at the outset. As in the case of the image-theory / phenomenalism,
they cannot, for reasons of principle, extend themselves beyond a closed
dimension of 'mental objects'
('representational' images) without due access to an independent and external
criterion by means of which their veracity, regarding that which they
represent, can be tested. We find nothing more than a kind of mimetic doubling
– echoes of echoes – words which, in this context, must be re-situated with
regard to their traditional lexical significations. This is because they attach
themselves to a movement that originally problematizes the question of sources,
beginnings, the original point that would inaugurate a sequence of doubles or
echoes. Here, they no longer automatically imply the echo of something other,
and more originary, than an echo. We are left with nothing more than echoes
that are caught up in the reflective (yet another word whose semantic horizon
has been caused to slide) vortex of an infinite regress. In this realm, one is
not really at liberty to continue saying that the consciousness of signs or
images ultimately, and inadequately, substitutes for the consciousness of
things / objects (understood in the broadest sense) and the world itself,
because any Thing that is postulated as being external to consciousness in a
substantive sense can be nothing more than a metaphysical presupposition.
Husserl
insists that..."On no account should we fall into the fundamentally
perverse copy and sign theories..." (Ideas
1, Sec. 52). If the world resists 'adequate' exhibition it is not, for
Husserl, due to any inadequacy in our perceptual apparatus (as the
representational / image / sign doctrine of consciousness suggests). When we
speak of transcendence, this expression does not designate some Thing that subsists beyond some
impermeable membrane behind which consciousness is forever trapped within a
matrix of immanent mental-objects or images – cut off from all that is transcendent.
The 'transcendence' of the world has a 'sense,' or rather, a diversity of
senses that articulate themselves 'within' or 'through' lived-experience. From
an important phenomenological viewpoint, they are actually bestowed (as
horizonal characters of that which appears) by the transcending consciousness
as it 'encounters' the world – that is to say, to extend a Heideggerian twist, through its situational engagement in
the world.
Consciousness does not name a
dimension that is closed within itself. It is already familiar with
transcendence for this constitutes part of its own essence. Consciousness is
always already outside-itself-in-the-world – out amongst the things. As such,
the question of transcendence is eminently susceptible of phenomenological analysis.
What
appears are horizons of different constellations of meaning, which are not to
be set against the Thing of experience in the same way that subjectivity is
traditionally contrasted with objectivity or immanence is distinguished from
transcendence. For Husserl, the giving
of meaning qua phenomenon is also
transcendent to the consciousness that perceives it. Such appearing is
non-situated, in a certain sense, in that it is 'intentionally immanent'
without being really inherent (or contained) in consciousness itself. It is not
a case of different realities that somehow stand side by side – where it can be
said, in a way that has become firmly habituated, that what is experienced is
the mere subjective duplication of the objective Other. The 'given' is not 'in'
consciousness, neither is it necessarily 'of' consciousness (although this can
also be a dimension of phenomenological inquiry), but it is for consciousness.
In
these terms, the sense of giving or appearing signifies more than a mere
horizon of 'subjective' and immanent images / representations. The world as it is given participates in both
subjectivity and objectivity – and is both immanent and transcendent. Since
appearances (a word that we must treat with the utmost care) are not treated, according
to the phenomenological perspective, in the way of subjective hypostatizations
that 'immanently' duplicate a transcendent reality, but are designated as
'transcendent' in themselves, the phenomenality of the phenomenon (the giving
of its givenness) must be grasped in a way that no longer sets it in opposition
to transcendence.
The
phenomenon always already participates in transcendence and is that through
which transcendence is articulated.
This,
of itself, must re-invoke questions concerning the meaning of evidence as it gives itself – without postulating any
particular form of transcendence that would force us to think in terms of an
extra-phenomenal horizon of sense / truth / reality to which we would need
'direct' access in order to assess the validity or truth-value of such
evidence. An external 'source' or 'measure' of this kind is not required. The
question of the 'meaning of evidence' in terms of 'its-giving-of-itself' is phenomenological. The
preposition 'of' (which defines both consciousness and world) is decisive in a
number of vital ways. As we have seen, the primordiality of the dimension of
transitivity that it indicates is one of the most fundamental themes of
phenomenology.
In objective
terms, to stand-out is not merely a question of a dual relation between
appearance and that which appears, but involves a certain structure and
character or tone of such a standing-out. The phenomenon expresses this in
terms of the 'ways' or 'modalities of showing / giving' in which something
stands-out. Phenomenality cannot be reduced to either the language of
appearances or that which appears for it first constitutes the space of such a
distinction. And this space, though it is the necessary horizon of presence is
not present itself (in any sense of being a present 'object').
There
is not a single principal definition of the phenomenon. It has been constantly
confused (and, in some quarters, is still being confused) with appearance,
appearing, presence, representation, etc. The term appearance alone is just as
problematical. Although there are intimate associations, it is to be
distinguished from the meaning of the phenomenon. To say that the phenomenon is
simply that-which-is-manifest (which, on one level is not incorrect) allows
anything – including an appearance – to be called a phenomenon. The 'showing'
or 'making-manifest,' as distinguished from the 'shown' or
'that-which-is-made-manifest,' are expressions that can be applied
indiscriminately in the word ‘presence.’ However, appearance, or better here,
visibility is only one moment of the phenomenon. It is to be granted that there
are many different forms of visibility, ranging from that which gives itself in
itself to different kinds of substitutional forms of appearing where that which
gives itself can, in certain instances, actually conceal that which it
indicates (that for which it is the proxy). And, it is not only in regard to
the latter moment of this vast spectrum that we must understand that there is
equally a zone of invisibility associated with the phenomenon, which is
constitutive of anything that stands-out. The phenomenon is the site of the opening
of the giving-of-the-given, and is presupposed by any 'form' of appearance.
There is
an aspect of principal importance here that always plays at the heart of any
discourse on the phenomenon (above all, in line with Heidegger’s discourse on
the logos of phenomeno-logy as a kind of speaking-out)
as that-which-gives-itself-in-itself or from-itself. The very possibility of
discriminating between different kinds of appearing (which is the descriptive
task of phenomenology) lies in a certain modal announcement in the phenomenon –
which rounds out the phenomeno-logical definition as follows: the phenomenon as that which shows / gives itself from
itself as it gives itself. It is
in the ‘as-it-gives-itself’ that we find the 'meaning,' 'modality,'
'truth-value,' etc., of that which appears. This is the vital phenomeno-logical
sense that announces itself in the structure of the appearing of something as distinct from mere appearance. Evidence
has to do with a certain 'style' of appearing. It announces itself as the
meeting point of an intentional structure of negotiation (that is stretched
temporally) and is not to be limited to either the appearance in itself or that
which is said to give itself (inadequately) 'in' the appearance.
The
pre-phenomenological problematization of the question of the veracity of
phenomenal evidence, as-it-gives-itself through the various kinds of
directedness of consciousness toward the world, disregards the fact that it is on the basis of such evidence that
questions regarding actuality, transcendence, truth, meaning, and evidence
first find themselves articulated. The question of evidence points to the
intentional structures of experience itself (the nexus of experiencing and the
experienced) and does not indicate another more original source from which it
is bestowed. This does not, it must be said, rule out questions of
'exteriority,' but resituates them. The thought of the standing-out of the
phenomenon in terms of evidential-giving rediscovers, in more Derridian terms
now, the outside that already inhabits its inside.
The
phenomenon, as the appearing of that which appears, is not an object that
duplicates / doubles / stands-in for the world as something that is 'extrinsic'
to it, but is the appearing of the
world itself. However, we must be careful here, since the thesis 'actual world'
must be understood within the context of the phenomenological reduction. With
this procedure, which disconnects the 'thesis' actual world by means of a kind of methodological detour, we do not
lose the world as such but regain it qua
the world of lived-experience.
As
Husserl writes...
...whatever is phenomenologically disconnected remains
still, with a certain change of signature, within the framework of
phenomenology (Ideas 1, Sec.135).
The parenthesizing of the actual world through the
implementation of the phenomenological epoché
does not annul the evidence of its appearing as such, i.e., the world is
thematized 'in its appearing' as an intentional
nexus of 'actuality phenomena.' What is at issue here is a particular kind of
'change in signature.'
2. The Epoché: the phenomenological reductions
The epoché is the principal mechanism at work in the movement of
phenomenological interrogation, This is a form of methodological suspension
that is motivated by the desire to abstain from taking up any metaphysical
presuppositions. The Greek word, epoché means ‘to-cut’ or ‘to suspend.’
The methodological epoché is not to
be confused with a form of Cartesian methodological doubt, because doubting
principally involves the negation of a positive thesis by simply taking up a
contrary position. Phenomenology aims to avoid taking up any positions at all.
This is the definition of critique in its most ideal form. It represents an
extremely radical philosophical posture and it remains a problem, or rather, a
‘crtitical issue’ in phenomenology.
The epoché is not a single procedure. The expression actually refers to
a constellation of different moments of applied suspension. The principal
movements are as follows:
The phenomenological reduction: is the suspension of any position-taking with
regard to what is commonly taken for granted about the actuality or inactuality
of that which is given in experience. Things are to be taken purely in terms of
the ways in which they speak to us. The suspension (otherwise known as
bracketing) is not simply objective since it also necessarily requires an
abstention from belief. Rather than simply living-in
the act of perception, there must be a reflective shift that subjects the
course of the interrogation itself (and the presuppositions which may motivate
it) to a form of malign vigilance. In other words, the phenomenologist must
simultanously break with the subjective presuppositions that have a distorting
effect on the speech of that which gives itself. In harmony with the objective
orientation of phenomenology, there is a deep phenomenological psychology at
work. This is phenomenology’s internal dialogue with itself. This is not a monologue. The two-sided reduction
prevents phenomenology from degrading into a pure naturalism, on the one hand,
or a form of psychologism on the other.
The actual is not negated as such.
It is reduced to the category of ‘actuality-phenomenon.’ The existence of an
object over and above one that is, let us say, imagined, is a question of a
difference in phenomenological signature.
In other words, it has to do with the style in which that which gives itself
makes itself present to us – the way
in which it appears. It is the task of phenomenology to describe these differences as they announce themselves in
experience. Epistemologically, this means that feeling is also a kind of
knowing.
The eidetic reduction: is the procedure by means of which particular
forms of phenomena are reduced to their essential
components – the general structures of continuity by which phenomena are
meaningfully cohesive. (i.e., that which abides through variation). The Greek
word eidos means essence, shape or
form (Husserl’s use of this expression is not to be confused with any instance
of platonism).
The eidetic reduction is a movement
of imaginative variation that varies the object of interrogation only up until
the moment at which it would otherwise lose its integrity. For example, the
spatiality of something presupposes that it is both spatially and temporally extended. Also, the consciousness of
change presupposes continuity – otherwise there would not be any way to cognize
alteration. If nothing remained unaltered, how would one measure change? It is
the eidos of a cup to be largely made up of empty space, otherwise it would not
fulfil its function as a container of liquid. The expression eidos refers to
the general structurality (in contrast to the particularity) of a given
phenomenon.
The concept of essence has a
formidable array of meanings in Husserl’s phenomenology. He speaks of anexact
morphological essences – anexact and not inexact. Redness in its ideality is
irreducible to particular instances of red, but all red things participate in
redness. A ball is round, but one would not say that roundness was over there
in that particular ball. Roundness is non-localizable. It only manifests itself
in different instances. A circle is an exact idealization of roundness in a
geometrical form that already presupposes the intuition of a more primordial
anexact morphology, which organises it.
The transcendental-phenomenological epoché:
is the combination of both movements of reduction. In the second half of
Husserl’s career, this procedure was put to work on a genetic phenomenology,
which focused on the issue of constitution, e.g., the temporalization of
experience, motivation, sedimentation (structures of memory) and the conditions
of the unity of a life history. This epoché leads to the unconcealment of the Lebenswelt (the world of lived
experience).
These reductions represent a kind of
unbuilding, which became thematic in the movements of Abbau and Aufbau: deconstruction and construction. See, in particular, the series of
Husserl’s research papers edited by Ludwig Landgrebe under the title of Experience and Judgement.
In sum, to perform an epoché, does not
annihilate ‘the’ world. It is the suspension of a certain metaphysical ‘thesis’
regarding the world. Worldliness remains in abundance, awaiting its
phenomenological description.
Husserl writes of the epoché that
"...the bracketed matter is not wiped off the phenomenological slate, but
only bracketed, and thereby provided with a sign that indicates the bracketing.
Taking its sign with it, the bracketed matter is reintegrated in the main theme
of the inquiry" (Ideas 1.
Sec.76, P.194). And earlier, in section 31, Husserl writes, "...it is
still there like the bracketed in the brackets."
Note:
Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction is
a radical development of this methodology. Deconstruction is a utopic or non-positional form of
critique that employs a strategy known as writing under erasure (sous rature).
This involves placing certain themes between parentheses and then crossing them
out. This means that the bracketed matter is put out of play, in a particular
sense, without being wholly erased. This is a useful graphical representation
of the strategy since it shows that the bracketed themes are still visible
beneath the sign that crosses them out. They remain in view while the sign
indicates that a certain value has been put out of action / suspended.
Writing under erasure is a strategy
in which the erasure is only partial. The [crossing-out within brackets] gives
us a foreground sign that affects our relation to that which is still visible
beneath the cross within parentheses. The crossed-out [or bracketed] is not
annihilated, but modified in the manner
of its articulation.
* * *
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