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Philosophy, Fantasy and Film
The Spaced Out Cogito*
* Transcript of a recording by
Dark Star (
Fantasia (
Allegro Non Troppo (
Welcome. This week,
during our extended session in anticipation of the forthcoming holiday, we are
going to have a selection of visual delights – a bit of a jamboree, really.
Over the next two weeks, I want you to write an essay (a minimum of three
pages) on at least one of the themes discussed today.
I am going to begin with one particular
definition of phenomenology as it is expressed in a film, called Dark Star
(1971). This was John Carpenter’s first movie and, despite its immense
narrative ambition, it was made on a shoestring budget. It also stands out as a
particular historical landmark of the genre, because, quite apart from being
the scriptwriter (in collaboration with John Carpenter) and editor, Dan
O’Bannon actually performs in it. Now – for those of you who don’t know
who
The Film, Dark Star is a
black comedy, unlike Dan O’ Bannon’s later sci-fi horror fest. There is a
hilarious sequence where the character, Pinback (played by
…What I would like you to focus on
is the extraordinary philosophical dialogue that takes place towards the end of
the film. What we find is a definition of phenomenology that is of a Cartesian
order, which inevitably leads to psychosis. It is an interesting view. Dan O’
Bannon and John Carpenter are obviously attuned to this intellectual history.
I’ve never seen it handled quite so eloquently and in such a funny way in any
other kind of medium before. So, it is going to be my treat for you.
The background to the story is
brilliant as well as being very off beat. Basically, four guys and a corpse are
travelling in a spacecraft, called "Dark Star" – their mission is to
explore the galaxy looking for possible systems to colonize. In those systems
that are designated for possible colonization, any planetary bodies that are
predicted to be a threat to its stability are to be destroyed by special
thermo-stellar nuclear devices. So, basically, the primary function of the crew
is to go out into the galaxy and bomb unstable planets. The interesting twist
is that these thermo-stellar devices are also artificially intelligent
computers, highly intelligent entities – sentient computers, if you like.
Coming after Stanley Kubrick's film, 2001: a Space Odyssey, with the
sophistication of the psychotic Hal 9000 computer, Dark Star reprises
the nightmarish situation in which a computer might follow out its own
directives in flagrant disregard of the intentions of its programmers. It also
pokes a little fun at the cinematic history of artificially intelligent entities
that had been conceived up until that time. In contrast to Hal’s male voice,
the on-board computer of "Dark Star," which sustains regular ship's
functions and looks after the crew, is distinctly like that of Marilyn Monroe.
The main problem for the crew of
"Dark Star" is that the members are suffering from extreme lethargy,
after twenty years of planetary demolition. We are told that because of the
temporal dilatory effects that occur travelling at hyper speeds, they have not
actually aged significantly. But, they are very, very bored. They are
completely cut off from the Earth and they have allowed the systems of the ship
to fall into a state of disrepair. Furthermore, their boredom of one another
has turned into contempt – particularly regarding Pinback, as chronicled in his
video diary. The situation
has deteriorated even further since the death of the commander – who was the
victim of an accident several years before our introduction to the crew. His
seat exploded – no doubt an indirect result of the crew's akrazia borne of
chronic ennui. His corpse rests in a cryogenic chamber.
At the point at which we are
introduced to what remains of the crew, it is noted that a recent explosion has
destroyed the entire supply of the ship’s toilet paper. Basically, the
occupants of the starship "Dark Star" are in a mess, and a series of
haphazard events have led to a malfunction that finally seals their doom. Just
as they are about to destroy an unstable planet in a newly discovered system,
they find that they cannot activate the bomb's release mechanism. The problem
is that the countdown to detonation is already underway. Now, the bomb has a
gung-ho type of personality and it is really anxious to fulfill its primary aim
in life – which is to explode. It actually looks forward to detonating, and so
it will not listen to reason, it will not stop the countdown.
The bomb is about to explode and
take the ship with it. So, the acting commander (
* * *
In the cryogenic chamber:
Doolittle: Commander Powell! This is
Doolittle. Can you hear me?
[Silence]
Commander
Powell, this is Doolittle. Something serious has come up – I have to ask you a
question.
Commander Powell (Com): I am glad you’ve come to talk to me, Doolittle. It’s been so long since
anyone has come to talk with me.
Doolittle: Commander, Sir, we have a big problem. The Bell Nebula bomb – bomb
number 20 – it’s stuck! It’ll blow up in the bomb bay. It refuses to listen,
and it’s planned on detonating in…less than 11 minutes.
Com.: Doolittle, you must tell me one thing.
Doolittle: What’s that, Sir?
Com.: Tell me, Doolittle, how are the "Dodgers"
doing?
Doolittle: Well…Mmm…The "Dodgers"…They broke up, they
disbanded – almost fifteen years ago!
Com.: Ah! Pity, pity…
Doolittle: But, you don’t understand, Sir! We cannot get the bomb to drop!
Com.: Ah! So many malfunctions. Why don’t you have anything
nice to tell me, when you activate me? Well… Right. Did you try the azimuth
flux?
Doolittle: Yes, Sir. Negative effect.
Com.: What was that, Doolittle?
Doolittle: Negative effect!
Com.: It didn’t work?
Doolittle: That’s correct, Sir.
Com.: Sorry to hear. I’ve forgotten so much, since I’ve been
in here, so much…
Doolittle: What should we do, Sir? Time is running out!
Com.: Well. What you might try is…[radio static]
Doolittle: Commander! Hello, commander! …Commander Powell, Hello?!
Com.: Doolittle? Hello.
Doolittle: Sorry, Sir. You faded out there for a little while.
Com.: Sorry.
Doolittle: What was that you were saying about the bomb?
Com.: Ah! It seems to me… Sorry, I’ve gone blank… Hold it,
I’ll have it again in just a minute. I forget so many things in here, so many
things… Hold on. Just a minute. Let me think. [We see time running out]
{Louis: See what death does to you?}
* * *
On the bridge:
Pinback: You can’t explode in the bomb bay! It’s foolish! You’ll
kill us all. There’s no reason for it.
Bomb: I am programmed to detonate in nine minutes. Detonation
will occur at a programmed time.
Pinback: Wouldn’t you consider another course of action? For
example, just waiting around awhile, so we could disarm you?
Bomb: No.
Boiler: I can tell. That damn thing just doesn’t understand.
Pinback: Bomb!
* * *
In the cryogenic chamber:
Doolittle: Commander, Sir! Are you still there?
Com.: Oh, yes, Doolittle… I am thinking.
Doolittle: We are running out of time, Sir!
Com.: Oh. Yes… Well, Doolittle. If you can’t get it to drop,
you’ll have to talk to it.
Doolittle: Sir?!
Com.: Talk to the bomb.
Doolittle: But, I have been talking to it, Sir! And Pinback’s talking
to it right now!
Com.: No, no, Doolittle. You talk to it. Teach it
phenomenology, Doolittle.
Doolittle: Sir?
Com.: Phe-nom-en-ology.
* * *
On the bridge:
Pinback: Doolittle!? Six minutes
to detonation! Doolittle.
[Pause]
Doolittle,
tell me, what the hell are you doing!?
* * *
Doolittle puts on a space suit and
goes outside the ship to speak to the bomb directly:
Doolittle: Hello, Bomb! Are you with me?
Bomb: Of course.
Doolittle: Are you willing to entertain a few concepts?
Bomb: I am always receptive to suggestions.
Doolittle: Fine. Think about this, then. How do you know you exist?
Bomb: Well, of course, I exist.
Doolittle: But, how do you know you exist?
Bomb: It is intuitively obvious.
Doolittle: Intuition is no proof. What concrete evidence do you have that you
exist?
Bomb: Hmm… Well… I think, therefore I am.
Doolittle: That’s good, that’s very good. But, how do you know that anything else
exists?
Bomb: My sensory apparatus reveals it to me.
Doolittle: Ah! Right.
Bomb: This is fun.
Doolittle: Now, listen. Here is the big question. How do you know that the evidence
your sensory apparatus reveals to you is correct? What I am getting at is this.
The only experience that is directly available to you is your sensory data, and
that sensory data is merely a stream of electrical impulses that stimulate your
computing center.
Bomb: In other words, all that I really know about the
outside world is related to me through my electrical connections.
Doolittle: Exactly!
Bomb: Why, that would mean that … I really don’t know what
the outside universe is like at all, for certain.
Doolittle: That’s it! That’s it!
Bomb: Intriguing. I wish I had more time to discuss this
matter.
Doolittle: Why don’t you have more time?
Bomb: Because I must detonate in seventy-five seconds.
Doolittle: Now, bomb. Consider this next question very carefully. What is your one
purpose in life?
Bomb: To explode, of course.
Doolittle: You can only do it once, right?
Bomb: That is correct.
Doolittle: You wouldn’t want to explode on the basis of false data, would you?
Bomb: Of course, not.
Doolittle: Well, then. You’ve already admitted that you have no real proof of the
existence of the outside universe.
Bomb: Yes, well…
Doolittle: So, you have no absolute proof that Sergeant Pinback wanted you to
detonate.
Bomb: I recall distinctly the detonation order. My memory is
good on matters like these.
Doolittle: Of course, you remember it. But, all you are remembering is merely a
series of sensory impulses, which you now realize have no real definite
connection with outside reality!
Bomb: True. But, since this is so, I have no proof that you
are really telling me all this.
Doolittle: That’s all beside the point! I mean, the concept is valid no matter
where it originates.
Bomb: Mmm….
Doolittle: So, if you detonate…
Bomb: …in nine seconds…
Doolittle: …you could be doing so on the basis of false data.
Bomb: I have no proof that it was false data.
Doolittle: You have no proof that it was correct data!
The countdown to detonation
terminates
Bomb: [Pause] I must think on this further.
Ship's Computer: Attention, attention! The bomb has returned to the bomb bay. The
destruction sequence is aborted.
* * *
{Louis: So,
the bomb has been persuaded – by means of a Cartesian argument based on a
procedure of systematic doubt – into a state of solipsism. This endpoint is
simultaneously a beginning...however, it results in the end of Dark Star. After
the apparent success of this short lesson in phenomenology, Doolittle orders
that the rear airlock be opened (because he is too lazy to return to the
original hatch through which he started his spacewalk). However, none of the
other crew-members are aware that Talby – a stargazing freak wearing a space
suit – is in the airlock as the atmosphere is expelled. He is forcibly ejected
into space and so Doolittle ignites the thrusters of his jetpack and goes to
rescue him. Meanwhile, the remaining crew-members finally decide to disarm the bomb...}
...On the bridge:
Pinback: All right, Bomb. Prepare to receive new orders.
Bomb: You are false data.
Pinback: Mmm?
Bomb: Therefore, I shall ignore you.
Pinback: Hello, Bomb!
Bomb: False data can act only as a distraction. Therefore, I
shall refuse to perceive you.
Pinback: Hey, Bomb!
Bomb: The only thing which exists is myself.
Pinback: Snap out of it, Bomb!
Bomb: In the beginning there was darkness, and the darkness
was without form and void. And, in addition to the darkness there was also me.
And, I moved upon the face of the darkness, and I saw that I was alone.
Pinback: Hey… Bomb?…
Bomb: Let there be light…
There is a blinding flash as the
starship "Dark Star" explodes…
* * *
Brilliant! Dark Star is a
very ambitious film, and I believe that it exceeds its goals, especially in
view of its negligible budget. It is an extraordinary movie for many different
reasons. Quite apart from its obvious philosophical value, it’s great fun. Take
particular note of the treatment of hyperspace travel, which is actually one of
the greatest 'jump' sequences
in any of the movies of this genre – and it precedes the others that usually
get all the credit by a number of years (i.e., Star Wars, Star Trek:
The Motion Picture, etc). The effect is a brilliant visual analogue to A.
E. Van Vogt's description of non-inertial travel in his classic sci-fi novel,
Voyage of the Space Beagle. The idea is that when the starship pops out of
hyperspace, it just stops, dead – zero inertial forces and minimal vibration.
Once again, Dan O’ Bannon is responsible for the artistic input. He also acts
as special effects supervisor for the film.
Dark Star plays around with some fascinating
concepts. I ordered it for the library some time ago, and it has finally
arrived. So, you can see it. Do.
* * *
Okay. You followed the argument –
"I think, therefore I am" / "cogito, ergo sum" and
the consequences that can arise, which are…? Would any of you like to comment
on this? Come on – this is kindergarten stuff, basic philosophy.
Right, you are a bunch of Task
Masters! So, I’m going to have to do all the work…
Phenomenology, well – solipsistic
psychosis is not the inevitable terminus of phenomenology. It is really the
result of an extreme ‘phenomenalism’ – where phenomenality is reduced to a
hermetically sealed sphere of mental objects / images. I repeat that this is
not the inevitable consequence of ‘phenomenology’! If we begin in modern
history with Rene Descartes’ declaration cogito ergo sum, which is both
the beginning and the endpoint of the dialogue in Dark Star, we can
establish the context of the difference.
The Cartesian epistemological
project proceeds by way of systematic doubt. The principal question is whether
there is anything that can not be doubted. The idea is that, perhaps,
everything that I experience (that is revealed to me through sense data) is
merely false – false evidence. There may be some kind of malign creature that
is basically fooling me, so is there anything for which we can have Absolute /
clear / distinct and, most significantly, immediate evidence? Basically,
Descartes maintains that – it is our own existence. According to him, I can
doubt anything, but I can’t doubt the doubting. The doubting itself, as a
modality of thinking, has an existential determination and it is given directly.
He then uses the logic of attributes to say that we cannot doubt this modality
of thinking and that this modality must of itself belong to a thinking
substance / res cogitans. This is the great Cartesian metaphysical leap.
But, ultimately, Descartes arrives at solipsism.
In order to get out of solipsism, he
needs to invoke God – this is his famous Ontological Argument. Built into the cogito,
according to Descartes, is the knowledge that we are finite beings – we do not
possess non-perspectival omniscience. We rely on information relayed to us not immediately,
but mediately. And yet – there is, Descartes argues, an immediate idea that can
not find its origin in finite, imperfect beings, such as ourselves. This is the
idea of God. This is the idea of a Being for which no greater Being can be
conceived. Basically, Descartes says that this idea has to have been instilled
in us by God. It’s a very-very strange argument for the existence of innate
ideas, and there are logicians in this field, who are still playing around with
it and taking it seriously. Basically, God is invoked to provide the connection
between us and the world of res extensa. Everything is connected through
God, which gives us the vertical relation that binds all horizontal relations.
Now, all the different theories of
dualism that emerged after Descartes had to have this point of mediation. In
Leibniz, we find the pre-established harmony, which is only a slight
improvement. But, there were many, like the Occasionalists, who argued that
such a pre-established harmony had to be inaugurated by something, like a First
Mover or a Divine Architect, if you like. So, you end up with the Argument from
Design. The three principal arguments for the existence of God are / were the
Ontological Argument, the Cosmological Argument (the argument for a ‘prime
mover’), and the Argument from Design, which is the idea that everything
exhibits purpose. The last idea, in particular, is very Aristotelian, where
everything is considered teleologically. The logic is that: if everything has purpose,
then it must have been designed and first set into motion by a purposive Being.
Immanuel Kant, in the Critique of
Pure Reason, actually shows how all of these arguments fail. Interestingly
enough, Kant was actually a believer – an observing protestant. However, he
maintained that, like the noumenal realm of ‘things in themselves,’ there are
things that cannot be known directly and that we have to leave room for faith.
Have any of you had the pleasure of
reading Douglas Adams’ excellent trilogy (in more than three parts…joke…)
called, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy? There is a really
wonderful parody of this logic that turns the Argument from Design on its head,
when we are introduced to the Babel Fish. These creatures are little leech-like
entities that you stick in your ear. They feed on mental energy and one of the
by-products of this consumption is that they act as little translation devices,
so that the host can understand any other sentient being in the universe. In
this weird and wonderful scenario, certain theologians argued that something
that was so inherently useful admitted such purpose; that it must have been
brought into being by a purposive creator, and this in itself had to be
adequate proof of the existence of God. But, then there were other theologians,
who argued that God, in principle, is not an object of knowledge; that, in
fact, such proof would render faith unnecessary. Therefore, since God is
nothing without faith, he is said to disappear in a puff of Aristotelian logic.
This logical inversion is extremely characteristic of 60's / 70's British
humour.
But, this is all by the way. So much
for logic versus faith and the theological implications of dualism.
The British empiricists, beginning
with John Locke (Essay concerning Human Understanding) maintained that
we do not have innate ideas – that everything begins with experience. If you
follow that argument through to its natural conclusion, certain fundamental
problems arise. Basically, Locke said that the way we have knowledge of things
in the world is as follows – there are certain ‘bodies’ that have primary
powers to affect us – it is a causal relation. They actually affect our senses
in such a way that ideas are produced in us. There are primary powers
that are related to the body in itself, which involve such qualities as:
magnitude, its spatial-temporal extension, impenetrability, figure – these are
attributes that are said to be inherent in the object. Taste, colour, feel,
roughness, softness, etc. – these are said to be secondary qualities
that we actually bring into existence by interacting with the thing. They are
not inherent in the thing in itself.
Those who wish to refute this form
of idealism come along and say: "Look. I see a tree, and then I no longer
look at the tree. Do I then assume that that tree ceases to exist, because I am
no longer looking at it?" No, not at all,
The remarkable David Hume came
along, pushing empirical methods to their absolute limits, by showing that
empiricism itself must ultimately rest on metaphysics – it will always fall
back on metaphysics. He extended empirical interrogation to the point, at which
he actually undermined Descartes’s argument for the original and ‘immediate’
evidence of the ‘cogito’ (‘cogito, ergo sum’ – "I think, therefore
I am"). This skeptical position is articulated in the section, "Of
Personal Identity" in Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, which he
wrote in his twenties (incredible!). This three-volume text fell dead from the
press – no one could deal with it. It was only when Hume was quite old that he
returned (in the Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding) to many of
the themes that were presented in his earlier work. According to Immanuel Kant,
Hume woke him from his dogmatic slumber.
Now, in the earlier Treatise,
the section "Of Personal Identity" (the end of the first book), we find
that Descartes’ proposition ‘cogito, ergo sum’ – "I think,
therefore I am" is not sufficient to explain continuity. It does not mean
that with every experience I have a direct sense of an abiding Self that is
continuous with each act. Hume observed that when he meditated on this issue,
he could not find such an entity. Thus, he maintains that all that one is aware
of is a flux of impressions, moving with inconceivable rapidity. There is no
immediate and abiding idea of Self that remains present consistently throughout
this flux.
This is an insight that is made
thematic in existentialism. For example, Jean-Paul Sartre has a fascinating
argument along these lines when he asks whether one is aware of oneself when
reading a book. His answer is no! One gets caught up in the narrative, and one
is drawn into the text. This is often one of the reasons why one is motivated
to read a novel in the first place. It is to forget oneself by living
vicariously through another narrative. It is an interesting argument, which
finds its basis in a certain interpretation of Kant’s discourse on experience.
Kant maintains that every
representation is such that it must be able to be accompanied by
self-representation. Sartre’s argument is basically a re-reading of this.
Basically, he says: Okay…every representation is such that it must have the capacity
for self-representation, however – it does not mean that in actuality this
happens all the time. It is just that it has this potentiality.
And, this brings us to one of the
central issues in phenomenology – incidentally, existentialism is nothing other
than phenomenological ontology – which is the reflexivity of consciousness, its
intentionality. When we are engaged with things, our primary
consciousness is not simultaneously an awareness of a Self. Each consciousness
transcends itself. It is only through a second, or higher order level of
reflection that it can turn upon itself as a unity of a single project.
Hume’s methodological skepticism
leads to the conclusion that there is no Self. This is very close to the
Buddhist position. However, although Hume takes up a skeptical position, he
says in the Appendix that he is not content with this state of affairs. It
can’t be right. And, he hopes that either he, or someone else, will solve this
problem.
The issue of the continuity
of consciousness – unburdened by the notion of a metaphysical Self – was not
really solved until the beginning of the twentieth century, with the
phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and, in particular, his lectures on The
Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness.
He says that when we are looking for
continuity – because this is primarily what we are talking about – we are
looking for continuity of experience – that through which there can be such a
thing as an abiding ego. Now, Hume sort of objectifies experience – he
basically says that all he is aware of is impressions that run off without the
immediate co-presence of a Self. He also argues that there is no necessary
connection between the perception of sense data and what exists outside
(causality is explained in terms of psychological association). Nevertheless,
there is a kind of metaphysical realism at work – we still assume that what we
perceive is something that remains outside of us, and yet, within the bounds of
empirical phenomenalism – we can never ground that, never.
Basically, Kant maintains that even
empiricists are metaphysical realists – they say that they cannot ground that
which is at the basis of perception, and yet they still implicitly maintain that
there is an extra-phenomenal reality – outside of what we actually perceive.
However, since we do not have access to some kind of middle-ground, or an
objective reference point, there is no independent criterion by means of which
we can assess the truth of any alleged correspondence between a representation
and the represented. So, this gave rise to many different theories about Truth.
The Correspondence Theory is completely blown out of the window, because there
is no way to purely ascertain the degree of correspondence between the
representation and that which it is supposed to represent.
Kant said that, indeed we do only
start with experience. However, how is it that experience is intelligible to
us? How is it organized? He maintains that there are basic organizational forms
at work in experience that are primordially built into it. These are not
‘innate ideas’ of a Cartesian order, but nevertheless they are forms that
structure experience. We don’t see these structures because we are already
operating in their effects. It is like the ‘All Seeing Eye’ – which cannot be
‘all-seeing’ precisely because it does not actually see itself – it raises the
question of the ‘structure’ of the ‘way’ in which it is relating to something
other, something that it is not. With respect to Hegelian phenomenology, there
is a process of negation involved.
Now, Kant, in his revision of his
first Critique (the Critique of Pure Reason), which he revised
after a period of about six years, was basically left with an untenable position,
saying that there is a noumenal realm of ‘things in themselves,’ which we
cannot actually know. With what does that leave us?
He employs both a ‘language of
appearances’ and a ‘language of appearing.’ In a language of appearances one
can talk about the appearances of appearances of appearances… and it doesn’t
necessarily presuppose anything lying beyond the appearance. The language of
appearing is something else – it means that something gives itself through
the appearance. In the revision of the Critique, Kant introduces a
new section in the main body of the text, called "Refutation of
Idealism."
Remember, Kant basically says (with
reference to his transcendental aesthetic, where space and time are treated as forms
of experience – that they are not inherent in the world outside), that ‘space
is the form of all outer experience and that time is the form of all inner
experience’. He further maintains that ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ are necessarily
intertwined. The "Refutation of Idealism," argues that the continuity
of that which is given outside of experience, is also intimately bound up with
the continuity of our own experience itself – that is, the continuity of our
Selves or the Transcendental Subject. And, it is this structuration that makes
it possible to speak of a Self. This is an interesting argument. But, there are
still many problems.
Edmund Husserl’s project of
phenomenology resolves a number of these issues. His Phenomenology of
Internal Time Consciousness, which is based on lectures that were given in
1905, does not approach the issue of continuity from the point of view of the
Self or the Transcendental Subject. His phenomenology does not automatically
predicate consciousness to some ‘thing’ that thinks, as is the case in the
Cartesian tradition. Rather, Husserl looks at the issue of continuity within
the fundamental ‘intentional structurality’ of consciousness itself – that is,
temporalizing consciousness as consciousness of temporalization.
However, this is not idealism in disguise – nor is it a radical empiricism
(phenomenalism / psychologism) where
consciousness is reduced to the idea of something trapped within a box.
Consciousness is always already outside-itself. When it is understood
‘intentionally,’ consciousness is always consciousness of something.
Here, the preposition ‘of’ is the defining value of the fundamental structure
of consciousness – where the 'some thing' is framed as a certain kind of
phenomenon without immediately taking up a position on its actuality or
non-actuality. The question of ‘seeing’ extends beyond a point-like immediacy
or coincidence between seer and seen.
This is very important, because if
we take an object (such as this can that I hold before you), a sense datum
theorist would say: ‘I don’t see the object as it is in itself, because I only
see perspectivally. When I look at the top of it from above, I see a circle. If
I look at it from this angle – I see an ellipse.’ Is this to say that I do not
see ‘the’ can? We would say – that’s rubbish. I don’t just see that which is
‘immediately’ present to the senses in abstracto from the can – I see the
can. If you reduce ‘what you see’ to simply ‘that which is actually visible
in that perspective at that precise moment’, you end up with a stark
impoverishment of what it is to perceive something.
Absence is already a necessary part of the perception
of anything. In fact, this absence is not a negative, but a positive
determination of the actuality status of a three-dimensional object. If this
object gave itself to me, as an entirety, in any one moment – it couldn’t be
three-dimensional. This is the evidence that it is three-dimensional, that it
has to unfold in time – I can turn it around, I can move it further
away, I can bring it closer to me. And, all these different profiles belong to
the one thing – in a sense, they point beyond themselves to a
transcendent whole, of which they are a part.
Now, if you think about a die
(singular dice) – you have, let’s say, one dot facing you. You pick it up, you
throw it down, and then you can see three dots facing you. Do you assume that
it is a different object? Every time you see a different number of dots, do you
assume that you are looking at a different object? – No, you do not. You know
that you are looking at different faces of the same object. Consider
another example – you are sitting at that end of the room, I am sitting at this
end of the room. If we describe the room, you and I will have very different
descriptions of the same room, which may, at certain points, radically conflict
with one another. Of course, we would not assume that we are talking about two
different rooms.
So, there are ideal aspects and
empirical aspects that are bound up together in any given perception. And, what
is most important is – perception always takes time. Space has to be
temporalized. Husserl shows us that it is the fundamental binding together
and spacing of difference, of temporalization, that makes it possible
for anything to be continuous. It creates a continuum. This issue of
structurality comes well before the question of the Self.
A Student: It
is not really continuity, because it is in the past.
Louis: Pardon?
A Student: You
don’t perceive this tin can now – you perceive it like part of a second ago.
Louis: Not quite. That is only if you are a
rabid sense-data theorist caught up in a representational theory of perception,
which requires that the crystallization of each representation be the product
of a further representation. Such a view also understates the role of
protention, whereby that which is presently given is not simply something that
has been retained, but that it is also the fulfilment of that which was already
anticipated. It is insufficient to say that perception is merely a relation
between the now and the just-past. According to Husserl’s phenomenology of time
consciousness, continuity is structured upon an originary interplay between
retention, primal impression, and protention. When he defines perception as
originary giving, then all three intentionalities are perceptions, but it is
only in their intertwining that perception in the common sense is possible at
all.
The point is – I am not simply
perceiving what is ‘immediately’ visible. It is only within the bounds of a
rigid phenomenalism that ‘mediacy’ is a dirty word. Is it the case that I when
I look at a tin can, I am not perceiving the can, since I only see a
part of it directly? Am I lying? But, I do perceive the can – or more
precisely, I perceive the part of the can that faces me ‘in the
understanding’ that it is precisely one profile of ‘this’ tin can.
Similarly, if I hold up a cup and view it from above, I see a circle. Now, if I
tip it over slightly, I see an ellipse. Which one is true? – Both of them are
potentially true of the object as a whole. The profile of the object as
a whole is not the terminus of the perception. I know that that which exhibits
itself is precisely one face of the cup. What has to be taken into
account is that if you try to reduce that which indubitably exists to that
which is given ‘immediately’ in a point-like moment – you end up in the
clutches of a paradox. Because, most identification theories, most existential
theories begin with this idea of existence inhabiting a point – i.e., only
that, which exists now, is real – since that, which is in the past, no
longer exists, and that, which is in the future, does not exist yet – but, the
problem is that existence is then reduced to a point. That is completely
counterintuitive.
This state of affairs has to do with
the hypostatization of numbers or measurement systems. When we look at a ruler,
we have these divisions. When we look at these numbers we find distinctness
(which is immediately problematized, as Zeno shows us, as soon as one starts to
think in fractions). We may look at dots or other kinds of inscriptions, marks.
What we tend to do is: we reduce that which is measured to the form of the
measure itself.
Apparently, we may look at a point
in time. We can look at a frame of celluloid (or I can pause a video tape
at any given point). And, given that there are anywhere between 18 to 24 frames
(depending on the gauge), for each second of film, I can stop it wherever I
like. In fact, these numbers of ‘frames per second’ actually say more about the
limits of our technology, because, we could have 50, or 60 frames per second.
Actually, we do have those kinds of speeds at work in science and industry (for
instance, when filming events such as crashing vehicles or high-velocity
bullets – then something like one minute of film can run through the gate of
the camera in a second, which, on playback, will stretch out a second into a
minute). The point is that you can carve up reality infinitely – that is, into
an infinite number of infinitesimal moments. This is Zeno’s argument regarding
the infinite divisibility of any given magnitude. You never get to the end of
the sequence of divisions. You move into the fractional universe – the
infinitesimal, infinitely. To reiterate, this says more about the numbering
systems, about the ways in which we define things, than about the things
themselves.
We have to take time into account.
And, time is extension – extension, not only in the sense of a stretching out,
but also in the sense of a delay or postponement / temporization. In temporal
terms, stretch and delay are always already intertwined in presence /
presencing. In this sense, the atomic moment is not fundamental. It is
constituted on the basis of an original extension rather than the other way
round. Thus, if one were to try to divide time or space into infinitely small
parts, then one would be required to do this infinitely. Even a millionth of a
second has breadth since there is no limit to the extent to which it can be
further divided up into even smaller parts.
Now, to return to the idea of
solipsism, what we have in the quasi-phenomenological dialogue of Dark Star
is a statement regarding the classic idea of evidence and proof. The argument
goes like this: I am only aware of an evidence regarding my own actuality
status that is given to me immediately – which, as I have demonstrated
is actually quite problematic – but I have to infer the existence of everything
else that is mediated through my senses. If one takes this viewpoint to
its outermost limit, one is reduced to solipsism, where one is literally the center
of the universe.
There is an interesting
phenomenological approach to this issue that is worth taking into account, and
it is this:
If we take a look at the evolution
of science and cosmology – in
Now, the thing is that we use the
mathematics that arises out of Galilean and Newtonian astronomy to send probes
like Voyager to the outer planets of our solar system – and this is achieved
with amazing accuracy. But, on a ‘large’ astronomical scale – it is
insufficient. The point is that in relativistic physics, there is no
substantive distinction between space and time – it is a question of
‘spacetime,’ which is rarely even hyphenated. And, unlike the Newtonian idea of
gravity being a force of attraction between different ‘bodies,’ in Einstein’s
General Theory of Relativity it is not really about ‘objects’ (in the classical
sense) at all. Objects are understood in terms of mass, and mass is understood
in terms of the warpage of the space-time fabric itself. So, instead of there
being void between objects, where only the objects actually interact with one
another – what we have is a certain kind of folding and unfolding / warpage of
space-time itself. The space between is everything!
The classic example of this, which
is a three-dimensional model to describe a four-dimensional space-time, is an
extended elastic sheet. Imagine it stretched out, and you drop ball bearings of
various different weights onto the fabric. Then, you take a smaller ball
bearing, and you roll it in – and it will naturally trace out a path to the
deepest well, because of the actual contour of space-time that is traced out
between. To reiterate, it is a question of the warpage of the space-time fabric
itself. This is a significantly different cosmology.
The point is that because
Einsteinian relativity tells us of the finitude of the velocity of light as it
propagates through a vacuum, anything that appears, as relayed to us by light,
is not contemporaneous with what is actually perceived. This means that
anything that is at a distance lies in the past. Which means that, if that
which exists in the past, no longer exists – the only thing that exists is
myself, the perceiver. In other words, I am seeing you all as you were in
the past.
A Student: Yes
– that’s what I was saying.
Louis: But, do you understand the problems
that are inherent in such criteria? The insufficiency is shocking, since time
is not really taken into account with respect to what is accorded actuality
status – as presently existing. According to the traditional / formal
view, existence is reduced to a point. This is the problem of simultaneity as
raised in relativistic physics. Of course, we have to re-think the meaning of
simultaneity beyond the old corpuscular view of space, time, and existence.
Speaking about the inner time / personal
time – we are talking about frames of reference. It is not just ‘my
perspective’, but ‘I am part of an objective framework’. For instance, if I am
travelling near the speed of light, and the space in which I am moving is
undergoing a certain temporal dilation… Let’s say, if I am approaching the
event-horizon of a Black Hole, a distant observer looking through a telescope
would see my ship slow down. More correctly, s/he would not actually see the
ship slow down – what would happen is that the red shift would become so great,
because of the extreme gravitational forces, that it would just disappear from
view (we can’t see light at such a low end of the spectrum – however, the point
is that the increase in red shift is precisely the signification that temporal
dilation is occurring). The idea is that the closer the ship gets to the event
horizon of a black hole, as far as the observer – at a distance – is concerned,
the ship is actually slowing down. Does this mean that a passenger on the ship,
holding up an alarm-clock, would say: "Oh! Look at that clock – I can see
it slowing down"? No, because their own biorhythms would be undergoing the
same degree of dilation – they are part of that objective framework.
You see, Einstein is not giving us a
subjective theory – he gives us an objective theory of time, but he does
not give us an Absolute Time – there is no Absolute Time, which
can perform as the measure of everything else, any more.
Objective time has to be understood relatively,
but there is something of the Absolute when we do come to subjective
time. Because, regardless of what are the actual objective differences in
space-time warpage, experience will always be its own frame of reference. In
these terms, the rhythm of objective temporality is determined within the
experiential field. And, when it comes to the feeling of rhythm, then
this has a considerable range of possible forms, depending on whether one is
concentrating, happy, depressed, waiting, etc.
What we have in Dark Star's
phenomenological dialogue is a move toward phenomenalism. It does not actually
represent phenomenology, as such. Phenomenalism is the idea that all we ever
see are phenomenal representations of things and that we will never know
the things in themselves directly, but only through appearances. This means
that it is still participating in metaphysics, which it cannot ground for
reasons of principle. It overestimates the issue of ‘directness’ and fails to
recognize that it is riddled through and through with mediating phenomena. Furthermore,
it already presupposes that there is an external reality beyond the phenomena,
but – epistemologically, it says that we can only know the phenomenal
representations. So, there is a schism, a gap. And, basically, it forces us to
bang our heads up against the notion that our perceptual apparatus is
inadequate.
Edmund Husserl comes along and says:
No – there is nothing inadequate about our perceptual apparatus at all! So…back
to the things themselves!
And, I am not going to say anything
more about this point, because without a sufficient explanation regarding the
phenomenological epoché, you might be inclined to imagine that this
represents a grand return to metaphysics. I will introduce you to Husserl's
approach a little bit more as we go along in time. I’ll just say this:
basically, phenomenology is a method of interrogating phenomena – and so
it is crucial to interrogate the meaning of the phenomenon. The discipline that
is called ‘phenomenology’ is derived from two meanings: ‘phenomenon,’ which is
‘that which shows itself from itself’ (it presences, has extension, stands-out
from a horizon, while also receding within a horizon) and ‘logos,’ ‘reason’,
‘the word.’ Martin Heidegger uses the German word rede, which means
‘speech’. Phenomenology (to round out the whole thing) makes reference
to ‘that which shows itself from itself precisely as it speaks.’
This means that, if I am looking at
something, I want it to speak to me – I don’t just want to simply look
at a phenomenon or some kind of appearance that steps in on its
behalf, as some kind of proxy. I want to look at the thing itself, which gives
itself in the speaking. So, I already have to understand that when I engage
with things in the world, I am already bringing something of myself into the
world – which means that much of what I think I know about the world actually
says more about me, than it does about the world. Thus, phenomenology is a
methodological conception that is a self-critical enterprise. It seeks to
describe rather than to explain.
So, there are two fundamental
moments to phenomenology: one is a kind of depth psychological
investigation, which is an analysis of what I myself bring into the world;
and the other is the continuing attempt to abstain from any position-taking
– that is, to subject what I put into the world with a malign vigilance,
so that I can then begin to let things speak for themselves. It is
really a question of how to listen. So, this is a regulative
principle of comportment – there is no end to the story. A lot of people
have problems with this, or rather, many philosophers have problems with this
because they want to uncover a Grand Overview – they want to arrive at
an absolute termination point. There isn’t one. Phenomenology is not
about eschatology. And, indeed, we require a type of philosophy that shows that
the movement of interrogation is actually an eternal return to
beginnings – that it is infinitely open. This constitutes a field of
investigation in its own right – it has its own legitimacy. It employs many empirical,
skeptical, idealistic, analytical techniques, but, it is not
a metaphysical system like other philosophies – Descartes’s system, for
instance, for which he needs God to provide the glue.
To do phenomenology is to be
a little mad. To do philosophy according to the narrow constraints of
phenomenalism is to be completely crazy. As the brilliant dialogue in
the film, Dark Star demonstrates: one is left with psychosis –
where all we think that we can know is ourselves, that we cannot know
anything else, and that we can only make inferences about other things.
So, "The only thing that exists is myself. "In the beginning there
was darkness…. And I moved upon the face of the darkness and I saw that I was
alone…. Let there be light." Okay.
Now. In the absence of some
kind of divine creator…
…this is some kind of pythonesque,
discontinuous lead-up to the next film that I am going to show you…
* * *
…Here we have a section from Fantasia.
And, what is remarkable about this segment is that it was a very brave attempt
on Walt Disney’s part…to popularize evolution…
…but – I’d rather leave it up to
Deems Taylor to provide the introduction – who utilizes a very smart narrative.
As you probably know, the Darwinian theory of evolution is anathema to those
who inhabit the Bible-belt of
In this segment, The Rite of
Spring by Igor Stravinsky provides the pulse of a Darwinian interpretation
of the evolution of the Earth, and dinosaurs, and so on. But, the preamble to
the piece emphasizes the ‘theoretical’ aspect of
…very nice. And, with that, Walt
Disney presents a revolutionary depiction of the birth of the planet without
losing a vast section of his potential audience.
This film is then going to be
followed immediately by a segment from an Italian movie, called Allegro Non
Troppo, by Bruno Bozzetto. He is an Italian animator with a wicked sense of
humour, who brings into account something that Walt Disney does not, when it
comes to the issue of evolution – it’s our place: humankind –
opportunism run wild. It was made with tongue planted firmly in cheek. And, I’d
like you to see both of these films today, because they are fun as well as
thought-provoking.
While Walt Disney’s version unfolds
to Stravinsky’s The Rite of Spring, the scene from Bruno Bozzetto’s Allegro
Non Troppo – which is both an homage to, and a parody of Disney – is set to
Ravel’s Bolero.
* * *
"When Igor
Stravinsky wrote his ballet The Rite of Spring, his purpose was, in his
own words, "to express primitive life". And so, Walt Disney and his
fellow artists took him at his word. Instead of presenting a ballet in its
original form, as a simple series of tribal dances, they have visualized it as
a pageant – as a story of the growth of life upon Earth. It is a coldly
accurate reproduction of what science thinks went on during the first few
billion years of this planet’s existence. So, now imagine yourselves out in
space billions and billions of years ago, looking down on this lonely tormented
little planet, spinning through an empty sea of nothingness."
* * *
Okay. And now – Bruno Bozzetto’s
version, in which humankind shows its face as nature’s incorrigible
opportunist.
[At the end] We never really
evolved, did we?
* * *
Okay. We are running out of time,
I’m afraid – and I still have one last film to show you. It is an extraordinary
piece by Luis Bunuel and Salvador Dali – a short movie, entitled: Un Chien
Andalou.
I’ll send you all an updated list of
the videos by E-mail. The film that I am about to show now, and the others that
I’ve shown today, and the themes that we’ve discussed, should be the basis of a
paper – at least 3 pages, certainly no less, to be handed in in two weeks’
time, after Pesach). And, I’d like this material to be, perhaps, the basis of
your final projects. So, consider this as a research period. All right? These
assignments are just to get the creative juices flowing. You don’t have to
actually refer to the films shown today, but I think that you’ll find many
themes here that will be useful to you. If these themes, in turn, point to
other movies that you’d like to talk about – that’s great! I’m not going to
write down a series of questions for you – I want to give you more credit, than
that.
So – the last film: Un Chien
Andalou. It is a dream landscape…and it really breaks all the rules of
sense and linearity when it comes to narrative…
* * *
I’ll see you and your
essays in a couple of weeks’ time. Hag Sameach!
* * *
Appendix
I
relented about the essay questions!
From: Dr. Louis N.
Sandowsky
E-mail: cafediferance@yahoo.com
Subject: Cinema: Philosophy
and the Moving Image
Dear Friends
I hope that you
enjoyed the show, today. I have attached a revised video list for you, which includes the info about the most
recent films that I have
either
talked about or screened.
The
copy of John Carpenter's first film, "Dark Star" has just arrived in the media
section of the library (VCV 6158). As I said during the show, I would like all of you to write a three page
paper, based on some of the themes that were raised in the session. Use your
imagination and utilize other film resources as well as those that I have
talked about. For example, you may want to tackle the assignment by writing on
the following types of questions...
1.
What is phenomenology?
2. Is knowledge always
plagued by the problem of solipsism?
3. Does death affect the
consciousness of the passage of time?
4. Is
boredom a kind of death?
5. If exploding was your
primary aim in life, would you be content to do so on the basis of false data?
6. Darwin versus Genesis?
7. Is humankind still
evolving?
8. Does the surreal
dreamscape of "Un Chien Andalou" (Luis Bunuel and Salvador Dali)
convey any message?
9. What is the significance
of slicing an eye with a
razor
blade?
These questions
are only guidelines. As I said, use your imagination.
Please
send your papers to this e-mail address as attached Microsoft Word 97 documents. If in
doubt about software
compatibility, send your documents in RTF format. I wish you all a good Pesach and I look forward to seeing you soon. I'm off with
my dog,
All the best
Louis
=====